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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a genealogical inquiry into law’s conditions of possibility for 
political critique as/and resistance. Questioning law’s claim to normativity, it 
argues that law is a performative discourse that generates and presents its 
normative materiality through performative iterations. From the constitution of 
sovereignty to the formation of the legal subject; from the rituals of legislation 
to ceremonials of adjudication, there is a performative logic that contingently 
conditions law’s generation of the normative reality of the present. Arguing that 
law’s normative representation and expression of sovereignty, the subject, and 
politics closes the possibility for change and becoming; contesting law’s claims 
to rationality, objectivity, neutrality, autonomy, and universality; it puts forth a 
performative epistemology of law that is attentive to power and discourse; and 
to the production of knowledge’ and the ‘generation of truth.’ Calling attention 
to law’s entanglement with power and the violence of exclusion and domination; 
it brings historical inquiry into the orbit of law and legality. The thesis presents 
the political trial both as: (1) a moment that subverts law’s normative claims to 
rationality, autonomy and value-neutrality; and (2) as a power-knowledge 
formation capable of accommodating fresh articulations of hegemonic norms. 
Drawing on Foucault’s conceptions of power and resistance, I will offer 
strategies and tactics that: (1) formulate and circulate strategic knowledges of 
power in law; and (2) open up new sites of struggle for what I call a 
performative-genealogical intervention. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Resistance or what the Ancient Greeks call agōn, began as ‘a moral gesture,’ as 
a concern with truth and a contestation against oneself.1 Although there are 
several mythologies of resistance dating back to the pre-Socratic era, it is really 
Sophocles’s Antigone that provides the most complete account of resistance 
against the state.2 Through Antigone, Sophocles shows the incommensurability 
between law and resistance – the antithetical and irreconcilable difference 
between sovereignty and the subject on questions of fundamental significance 
to organized political communities. Creon and Antigone hold mutually exclusive 
views about law and justice and the very meaning of the good life and how to 
achieve it. More than two millennia after Antigone, we are still asking the same 
question: what is the precise relationship between law and resistance? 
 
In contemporary political theory, agonism is conceptualized as an ‘alternative 
normative vocabulary’ to communicative rationality and democratic consensus. 
Theorists such as William Connolly, Bonnie Honig, Chantal Mouffe and others 
suggested various modes of agonistic struggles against the containment and 
reduction of politics through democratic consensus and procedural 
reductionism.3 In the legal domain, however, the whole idea of a ‘normative 
vocabulary’ is a normalizing discourse that disables resistance and renders it 
unintelligible. Law, we are told, is a paradigmatic normative system that lays 
claim to a very distinctive genre of normativity.4 Given this claim, i.e., law’s 
representation and expression of its constitutive and regulative conditions as 
always already normative, resistance becomes a backstage discourse that 
cannot be spoken in the face of law. Law’s claims to universality, rationality, 
objectivity, autonomy, and value-neutrality, on the one hand, and its 
                                         
1
 Herta Muller,  ‘Das Ticker, Der Norm,’ in Hunger and Seide (Reinbeck: Rowolt, 1997) 91-2. 
2
 See generally, Sophocles, Antigone, Oedipus the King and Electra, Edith Hall, eds., trans. H. D. F. Kitto 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
3
 See generally William Connolly, Pluralism, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005); Bonnie Honig, 
Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Chantal 
Mouffe, For an Agonistic Model of Democracy,’ in The Democratic Paradox, (London: Verso, 2000). 
4
 See generally, Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, trans. M. Hartney (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); 
H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Max Weber, 
Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and Clause Wittich, eds., (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1978). 
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prescriptive nature (law’s power to prescribe what is) impose a closure that 
renders resistance, a priori, unintelligible.  
 
With the emergence of democratic states, the rationalization and formalization 
of law in the 19th century, and the rise of legal positivism in the same period, 
law managed to institute a form of rationality and mode of reasoning that 
render resistance superfluous. The constitutionalization of the exercise of 
political power, the institutionalization of legality, and constitutionalism were 
defended as normative ideals that make resistance unnecessary or the right to 
resistance superfluous. Legal positivism played a crucial part in the elimination 
of the right of resistance from the juridical discourse. By 1831, John Austin, the 
father of legal positivism, proclaimed that ‘[a] law, which actually exists, is a 
law, though we happen to dislike it.’5 Two centuries later, the rationalization of 
law reached its apogee, with H. L. A. Hart, formulating the ‘crown of the 
positivist method’6: the ‘legal system is a 'closed logical system' in which correct 
decisions can be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical means 
alone.’7 This rationality and neutrality, it is argued, elevates law beyond the 
expediency of power and politics. It gives law an inner reality, closed within 
itself and inaccessible to the man ‘Before the Law,’ waiting at the gate in 
anticipation of its truth. According to this mode of reasoning, law and politics 
operate according to two exclusive axioms: politics is the field of power 
relations and contestations; and law is the sphere of truth and justice governed 
by the rule of law. 
 
Normatively speaking, then, law and resistance are incommensurable. They 
depart from different referent points, and operate through antagonistic genres 
of discourse that operate according to their own rules, strategies, and 
instruments. Given these differences, there cannot be mutual recognition 
between law and resistance.  On this register, resistance registers as resistant 
only insofar as it contests the order against which it stands on its own terms and 
from within its own discourse. If resistance is to register as resistant on its own 
                                         
5
 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2000), 184. 
6
 See P. d'Entrèves, Alexander, ‘Legality and Legitimacy.’ The Review of Metaphysics 16, (1963), 694.  
7
 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 302. 
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terms, it must resist law’s predominant modes of representation and expression 
of social conflicts, its notions, categories, and functional and systematic 
distinctions without which law cannot code the juridical universe. Law, on its 
part, can only process the claims it is faced with by reducing, re-enacting, and 
reconfiguring them into languages, categories, discourses, notions, and 
distinctions it understands: legal–illegal, good-evil, reason-unreason, and guilt-
innocence, etcetera. On this account, coupling law and resistance by a 
seemingly innocent conjunction – ‘and,’– as to suggest a causal relationship, is 
indeed analytically and conceptually unintelligible.  However, if we recognize 
the system’s grid of intelligibility as the effect of discourse, if we conceived 
both law and resistance as performative, rather than normative, as contingent 
and complex rather than coherent and logical, we can begin to problematize 
the unease underlying the conjunction ‘and’ in ‘law and resistance.’ In fact, 
insofar as law, and its foremost institution, the court, constitute the primary 
institutions responsible for rationalizing, justifying, and disseminating law’s 
contingent norms and rationalities, the ‘and,’ could be more explosive than law 
or resistance.  
 
This thesis is a genealogical inquiry into law’s conditions of possibility for 
political critique as/and resistance. Contra law’s claims, a genealogical inquiry 
into law’s conditions of possibility assumes that law, i.e., the system of rights, 
the judicial system, and other institutions and apparatuses that interpret and 
apply law, in their routine and exceptional operations, are permanent 
instruments of power – of exclusion, marginalization, and oppression. By 
codifying economic, political, social and technical power into rules, rights, and 
institutions, the legal system conceals and erases the fundamental relations of 
domination and inequality that traverse the social body. The thesis argues that 
the entire edifice of juridical thought, its mechanisms, instruments, discourses, 
knowledges, even its most cherished ideals, are the general mechanisms of 
power. Taking Foucault’s genealogical analysis of power and resistance as my 
point of departure, I want to ask, from below: is there something in the very 
nature of law, i.e., in its discursive and institutional forms, in its spatial, 
material, and temporal coordinates; in its own claims, and mechanisms, that 
makes law something more than the mere instrument and armature of power? If 
those in power can utilize the device of law and justice to achieve political 
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ends, isn’t there something about these devices that can accommodate fresh 
articulations? Furthermore, can law’s gate-keeping discourses or those who 
guard its gate protect and secure law from itself?  Isn’t there a raw material for 
resistance in the contingency of the founding moment, the contestability of the 
political order, in the uses and exceptions of legality, and in the radical 
indeterminacy of legal discourses? Can we carve out a space, a meta-level 
space, within the geometric space of the very courtroom that vindicates and 
rationalizes power; and strategically redirect it against the system itself? These 
are, broadly speaking, the questions this thesis is set out to elucidate.   
 
The judicial apparatus is my primary site of inquiry not only because it is the 
foremost institution of sovereignty with a superior quality of ‘knowledge 
production and truth generation,’ but also because it is one of the few 
responsive and reflexive legal spaces where intervention is possible and 
meaningful. Indeed, Foucault identified the court as an ‘important’ site of 
struggle.8 Conceiving the political trial as a power-knowledge-discourse 
constellation, I want to locate the analysis of power-struggles in the courtroom 
within this Foucauldian paradigm to explicate its repressive and productive 
architectures. By conceiving the political trial as struggle in power-relations, I 
will investigate, following Foucault, the forms and mechanisms power struggle 
assumes in the courtroom, ‘where and how, between whom, between what 
points, according to what processes, and with what effects’ power is used in the 
courtroom.9  
 
Conceiving the political trial as a crises-formation, endorsing it as a site of 
political critique and resistance, I claim that relationships of exclusion are not 
inevitable realities but effects of the power-knowledge dispositif that 
hegemonic performatives institute. Emphasizing incongruities, inconsistencies, 
points of tension, on the one hand, and gate-keeping juridical discourses 
deployed to manage, contain, suppress, or transcend these non-normative 
                                         
8
 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, eds. Colin 
Gordon, trans. Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972) ,16, 23, 36. 
9
 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, Lectures at the College de France, 1977-78, trans. 
Graham Burchell, eds. Arnold Davidson, Michel Senellart, Francois Ewald, and Alessandro Fontana  (New 
York; Palgrave, Macmillan, 2007), 1-2.  
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moments and sites, on the other, I conceive the political trial as a power-
discourse-knowledge constellation generative par excellence of power effects. 
Through this performative-genealogical approach to the political trial, the thesis 
attempts to offer a genealogical reconstruction of this formation, the forms of 
knowledge and discourse that inform it, the strategies that animate it, about 
who participates in the production of narratives, and who controls the means of 
narrative production, and finally the cultural meaning and power effects 
generated by a particular episodes of confrontation.  
 
 
1.2. Research Objective  
My goal is not to write a theory of law and resistance but rather to advance a 
discourse that opens up new lines of inquiry into law’s conditions of possibility 
for change and transformation. If there are discursive and institutional dynamics 
in the nature and form of law that makes it such a productive and irresistible 
site of power, my thesis argues, these resources could be re-purposed and 
redeployed as counter-discourse and counter-power for resistance and political 
critique. In order to do this, the thesis moves beyond the normative modes of 
thought and suggests what I call a performative epistemology of law that 
creates a condition of possibility for performative resistance. By taking the 
present as its point of articulation—‘what we do,’ ‘what we say,’ and ‘how we 
act’ now as subjects constituted within the terms of the very legal order we 
seek to change and transform—it puts forth a performative epistemology of law 
that is empirically intelligible and conceptually viable. Conceiving juridico-
philosophic conceptions of law as generative of power effects, I will argue for a 
performative epistemology of law that re-articulates law’s ‘inner-reality’ as an 
open-ended reality, one more attentive to contingency, complexity, 
responsibility, and justice.  
 
A performative epistemology of law therefore represents a conceptual break 
from essentialist modes of thinking about law and its constitutive and regulative 
domains. Both as a deconstructive and re-constructive device, the performative 
prefigures and displaces what the system regards as the normative. The 
normative in law, it may be said, stands in an oppositional relation to the 
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performative. While normativity claims to be representative and expressive of 
an essence, (validating conditions, and law’s reason giving ability), 
performativity is non-referential—it assumes that there are no absolutes, or last 
instances. Normativity claims to express a preexisting condition that 
foregrounds law’s normative validity, performativity rejects the existence of 
any essential identity behind law’s normative claims. Normativity claims to 
express the normativity of law by reference to a prior principle that preexists 
law, performativity generates the very norm it speaks about.  
 
Working through Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler, I will 
explore the interplay between the normative and the performative and call 
attention to why the celebration of abstract normativity is ultimately hollow, 
and to the extent that it hides and conceals law’s strategic entanglement with 
politics, history and power; oppressive. Against the normative thesis, I will 
argue for a performative epistemology that, among other things, (a) recognizes 
performative generation of normativity, (2) keeps law, sovereignty, politics, and 
subjectivity open to unprefigurable future resignifications, (3) recognizes the 
operations of language and discourse in law, (4) remains vigilant to law’s 
historicity, to the  contingent and complex constitution of its coherence and 
unity; (5) understands disciplinary and normalizing technologies of power; (6) 
remains attentive to techniques of  ‘knowledge production’ and ‘truth 
generation’ in the legal domain; and (6) capable of producing and actualizing 
new rights—rights that are emancipated from the colonizing logic of 
sovereignty.  
 
1.3. Methodology  
To claim that law is performative is not to deny its normative dimensions. 
Instead, it is to state that, contrary to the dominant philosophic reflections 
(legal positivism and natural law) that presumes law’s normativity as something 
already there, law’s normative quality is not a given. In most instances, the 
normativity of a legal proposition is posited by those authorized to speak the 
law—constituent assemblies, legislators, judges, and others—and becomes 
normative through our performance. Law is first performative, and only then, 
subject to the repetition of the signifying form, can it become normative. To 
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speak of the performativity of law is to speak of its historicity—the contingency, 
complexity, and heterogeneity—that undergirds law’s constitutive and 
regulative conditions. To say that law is historically contingent is to state that 
its coherence, necessity, universality, and rationality are contingently 
articulated. But the aim of this study is not merely to expose the historicity of 
law’s taken for granted necessities. Most importantly, I am interested in 
problematizing its contingency and heterogeneity to do something with it–
something of a transformative consequence on the present. By explicating the 
historicity and therefore the becoming potentiality of three key discursive 
formations—sovereignty, the subject, and the political—the thesis inquires into 
law’s conditions of possibility for resistance and struggle.  
 
This thesis is a genealogical work in the Foucauldian tradition but will not 
remain within the strict Foucauldian framework. Recognizing that genealogy at 
least theoretically tilts toward critique, than vindication and reconstruction, 
this thesis suggests a creative and strategic coupling of genealogy and 
performativity—performative genealogy—for a reconstructive problematization 
of the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present. As an inquiry into 
the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present, genealogy excavates 
the submerged juridico-political crisis of sovereignty, it unearths the contingent 
and heterogeneous ensembles woven into a coherent unity, bringing them into 
an arena of visibility. By tracing the conflict that rages beneath law’s normative 
registers to the submerged crisis of the past, to the abyss that unsettles law 
from within, genealogy historicizes the juridical realm and exposes the 
contingency that lies beneath the coherence of the normative order. This 
disclosure space created by genealogical work exposes the trials and tribulations 
of the present as the surface effects of the usurpations, defeats, dispossessions, 
and conquests of the past; the submerged past ‘where truth becomes a sort of 
error that cannot be refuted because it has hardened into an unalterable form 
in the long baking process of history.’10  
 
                                         
10
 Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, Donald F. Bouchard, (eds.) (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977), 144.  
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A skeptic might ask how a research with an explicit normative dimension uses a 
method whose normativity is at best contested.11 The answer is this: while 
genealogy does not seek to offer a normative conclusion about the historical 
processes that constitute and regulate the present, there is no reason to believe 
that genealogy is a value-free enterprise. But to say that it is not value-free is 
not tantamount to claiming that it is value-laden as juridical and many other 
discourses are. While Foucauldian genealogy is not normatively loaded, I will 
provide textual evidence to show that it is by no means value-free. Indeed, 
genealogies can be performative, vindicating or subverting the norms and 
practices they seem to problematize or explain.12 Although both performativity 
and genealogy are not about normative distinctions, I argue that we can 
engender normativity into our genealogical performances through the exercise 
of ethical responsibilities- through an ethic of care that leads to what Foucault 
termed an ‘ethical consensus,’ perhaps a basis for a different kind of ‘we.’13  
 
Insofar as genealogical work excavates that which ‘silently, animates and 
sustains the present(ed) understandings,’ this re-presented understanding 
creates domains of knowledge.14 The investigation into the logic, the modes of 
reasoning, and forms of rationality that contingently conditions and regulates 
our present consigns knowledges of consequence on these conditions.15 
Whatever our particular rendering of genealogical traditions from Nietzsche to 
                                         
11
There are different readings of genealogies political potential generally and Foucauldian politics 
specifically. Some genealogies are subversive (Nietzsche), some are vindicatory (Williams), and Foucault 
(problematization). But genealogies can also explain that which they ostensibly describe. Paul Rabinow for 
example describes Foucault’s genealogy as an attempt to ‘cultivate an attention to the conditions under 
which things become ‘evident,’ ceasing to be objects of our attention and therefore seemingly fixed, 
necessary, and unchangeable.’ Wendy Brown argued: ‘For Foucault, the project of making the present 
appear as something that might not be as it is constitutes the distinctive contribution of intellectual work to 
political life’ in Wendy Brown, Politics Out of History (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 2001), 
113.  
12
 See Edward Craig, Genealogies and the State of Nature, in Alan Thomas, (eds.) Bernard Williams 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 182. He argues that genealogy can be subversive, or 
vindicatory, of the discourses or practices whose origins (factual, imaginary, and conjectural) they claim to 
describe. They may at the same time be explanatory.’ 
13
 Michel Foucault, Social Security, in Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews, and Other Writings, 1977-
1984, Lawrence D. Kritzman, trans. Alan Sheridan et al (New York: Routledge, 1988), 165-66.  Foucault 
says, ‘I believe the decisions made ought to be the effect of a kind of ethical consensus so that the 
individual may recognize himself in the decisions made and in the values that inspired them. Only then 
would such decisions be acceptable, even if there might be protests here and there.’ 
14
 See Bell, Vikki, Culture & Performance: The Challenge of Ethics, Politics and Feminist Theory (Oxford: 
Berg, 2007), 82. 
15
 Id. 
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Bernard Williams16 and Foucault, I argue that genealogical knowledge, like any 
other knowledge, has a transformative consequence. It provides epistemic 
resources for those subjected to ‘epistemic injustice.’ By virtue of its existence 
and circulation, this knowledge ensures the contestability and resistibility of 
hegemonic knowledges. Those deprived of access to narrative production and 
knowledge practices can turn to genealogical knowledge to undermine and 
transform oppressive norms. By bringing historical inquiry (that which looks to 
the past) into the domain of politics (that which is said to look into the future), 
genealogy reveals subjection at sites not seen before. By ‘producing unfamiliar 
representations of persons, collectivities, places, and things,’ as Michael 
Shapiro argued, genealogy reveals the arbitrariness with which the reality of the 
present is constituted.17 By unearthing this arbitrariness and contingency 
underneath juridico-political norms, institutions, and familiar representations, 
genealogy creates conditions of possibility for what Jose Medina refers to as 
‘epistemic resistance,’ providing resistant subjects with the raw material for 
struggle against normative theories of law and sovereignty.18  
 
Genealogy may not generate a norm or argue in the name of a brighter future 
but there is nothing inconsistent with the genealogical framework in using 
genealogy to look both ‘backward into history and forward into futurity.’19 
Against the ‘buffer zones,’ to use Paul Ricoeur’s expression, erected by grand 
historical narratives, and against the paralyzing inertia of law, I will argue that  
genealogical knowledge creates entry points into these subterranean spaces for 
a performative intervention. Asked about the objective of his historico-political 
critique, Foucault replied: ‘It should be an instrument for those who fight, those 
who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in the process of conflict and 
                                         
16
 Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002).  William’s genealogy of truth and truthfulness is a vindicatory genealogy.  
17
 Michael J. Shapiro, Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice, (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1992), 2.  
18
 For an account of epistemic resistance, see Jose Medina, The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and 
Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and the Social Imagination, at 1. 
19
 See Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2013), 140. 
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confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. 
It isn’t a stage in programming. It is a challenge directed to what is.’20  
 
1.4. Outline 
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part one consists of four theoretical 
chapters that seek to identify and mark out the conditions that enable and 
disable resistance in law. Drawing on the insights that emerge from part one, 
the final three chapters will examine three landmark political trials. In 
demonstrating the means by which performative-genealogical strategies are 
synchronized with the legal form to create conditions of possibility for critique 
and resistance, my own writing will take on a performative-genealogical turn in 
this part.    
 
Chapter two will explore the volatile relationship between law and resistance. 
By problematizing the unease underlying the conjunction ‘and’ in the notion of 
law and resistance, I will identify various discursive and institutional 
mechanisms by which law usurps the speaking position of those it calls into 
being as subjects to its jurisdiction. Beginning at the constituent point of 
politics, it argues that the order of being, saying and acting instituted at this 
moment establishes rules of visibility and hearing that mishears, miscounts, and 
misrecognizes those it excluded from the ‘we.’ It emphasizes the modality of 
reasoning in law that functions to foreclose sovereignty and the subject from 
change and becoming. Drawing on Walter Benjamin and Foucault, I will try to 
demonstrate the non-normative origin of law and sovereignty.  
 
Against the dominant mappings, reference points, and analytic frameworks of 
the field, chapter three sets the tone for a performative epistemology of law. 
Arguing against normative conceptions of sovereignty, law, politics, and 
subjectivity, the chapter offers a detailed account of the performative logic 
that structures and organizes what I take to be the two constitutive points of 
politics: the constitution of the legal order and the formation of the legal 
subject. The central idea here is that, contrary to the received knowledge of 
                                         
20
 Michel Foucault, Questions of Method, in Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954- 1984, (eds.), James 
D. Faubion, (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 236.  
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juridico-philosophic thought, law is a performative discourse that generates and 
presents its specific normative materiality through iterative practices. I first 
provide a brief account of normativity and the normative thesis in law to show 
that what we regard as the normative in law is indeed a placeholder for the 
performative—the normative is the name law uses to conceal, suppress, and 
forbid its historicity to remain legitimate and coercive. Second, offering a brief 
genealogy of performativity both as a linguistic and deconstructive device, I will 
use these insights to explicate the performative rationale that cuts through the 
legal domain over and over again, making performativity a key conceptual tool. 
The chapter concludes with a detailed reflection on the transformative promises 
of the performative and an explanation of what it is that makes this rethinking 
of law and the legal domain a generative exercise.  
 
Chapter four identifies the political trial as a concrete performative moment 
that destabilizes juridico-philosophic accounts about law’s normative claims to 
neutrality, objectivity, autonomy and universality. Arguing against law’s denial 
of any relationship with ‘inescapable political and sociological realities’ and its 
autonomy from adulterating spheres of politics, history, and power, I argue that 
the political trial is a privileged site of domination and resistance. Far from 
being an impersonal and objective application of general norms to self-evident 
facts of criminality, where there is a necessary congruity, between the ‘ought’ 
and the ‘is,’ and, between criminal law and the compliance of the legal 
subject, the political trial is a double performative that denaturalizes so as to 
undermine and unravel the complex and contingent foundations of the very 
norm and order normativist thinking hides and conceals. Conceiving the political 
trial as a power-knowledge formation, I will argue for a performative 
conception of the political trial that goes beyond the transcendental plane of 
necessity and neutrality to a historicist account of contingency and 
heterogeneity that creates conditions of possibility for a reconstructive 
problematization of the juridical realm. 
 
Chapter five is a critical part of the thesis where I bring the power-knowledge 
constellation constituent of the political trial into a responsive and generative 
coupling with the disruptive and transformative impetus of performativity. The 
chapter begins by developing an account of what a performative resistance 
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looks like, the conditions of possibility it is able to create. By outlining a broad 
explanatory paradigm within which to locate different discourses and strategies 
of resistance, it identifies the ways in which specific discourses of resistance 
and struggle situate themselves and appropriate the legal space. Attending to 
gate-keeping legal technologies by which law conceals and suppresses the 
wrongs it inflicts, it shows how a creative subject reconfigures the categories 
and subject positions power uses to suppress or integrate the claims of its 
adversaries. Calling for a performative-political engagement with law, it 
identifies disruptive and utopian strategies sensitive to local and global 
situations, attentive to the reflexivity and responsive coordinates of both the 
trial and the rights discourse to appropriate core systemic contradictions to 
disrupt gate-keeping discourses. Situating performativity and genealogy in 
reflexive spaces, interstices and speaking positions made available by the 
‘deliberative’ paradigm of the trial, it suggests conceptual resources central for 
opening up a political space within a legal space to create conditions of 
possibility for what Foucault terms a ‘micro politics of resistance.’ Through a 
discussion of the Chicago Conspiracy trial, I hope to elucidate performativity’s 
disruptive and transformative potentials.  
 
In chapter six, I look at one of the most celebrated juridico-political events of 
the 20th century, Nelson Mandela’s 1962 trial for incitement (hereafter the 
Incitement Trial), where he appropriated ‘the transformative opportunities’ 
offered by the trial to infiltrate Apartheid’s complex apparatus of subjection. 
By submitting himself to the very law he denounces, Mandela excavates law’s 
aporetic moments, those most fragile frontiers that are so heavily policed from 
subversive discourses, opening up space for a micro-politics of resistance. 
Drawing on modes of critique that are both performative and genealogical, 
Mandela both uses and critiques the law, resists and claims authority, 
prosecutes and indicts at a site where political contestation is normatively 
deactivated. By synthesizing specific and local instances of violence, exclusion, 
and injustice, he offers a political testament that is both forward and backward 
looking; one that bears witness to law’s rotten past while calling into presence a 
new egalitarian form of legality and justice. Attentive to contradictions, cracks 
and points of tension that disturb Apartheid legality and justice from within, 
situating himself strategically to the spaces made available by the system, he 
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appropriates his speaking position to disclose the incommensurable, that 
fundamental wrong Apartheid cannot suppress, contain or integrate. Through a 
reading of a few scenes from the Incitement trial, the chapter shows how a 
performative-genealogical approach to political trials can create conditions of 
possibility for change and transformation, for visibility and hearing. It shows 
how a ‘racialized black body’ can overcome the usurpation of his voices to 
amplify and filter what Diana Taylor refers to as ‘repertoires of resistance’; 
‘acts of hope’ that register without being co-opted, integrated or domesticated 
by the discourse and the system they resist. 
 
From Apartheid South Africa, chapter seven turns to the Occupied Territories, 
to recount a similar, but substantively different narrative. Examining the stories 
and narratives of the prosecution and defense surrounding the trial of a 
Palestinian Member of Parliament Marwan Barghouti, this chapter tries to 
illuminate the complex interplay of discourses of occupation, resistance and 
terrorism in the courtroom. By attending to the political logic that animates the 
synchronization of politics with the legal form, the chapter tries to account for 
the power-effects the parties sought to generate to appeal to their respective 
constituencies. In particular, the chapter seeks to provide an account of the 
ways in which the trial seeks to decolonize Western epistemologies and 
methodologies, how the defendants produce and enact moral myths that 
undermined Israeli laws, culture, history, and conventions.  Dissecting the 
system of discourses within which both resistance and terrorism are situated, I 
will pay attention to the ways in which the narratives move from the personal to 
the political, from the local to the global, from the historical to the cultural, 
creating the space for meaning, and understanding. By situating this trial within 
Israel’s historical use of political trials, I want to give an account of the 
performative cultural politics that informs Israel’s deployment of terrorism to 
mute and paralyze Palestinian acts of resistance. The chapter concludes with 
some reflection on the defendant’s ethical appeal to the conscience of Israelis 
and the world alike, bringing ethical responsibility to his performative 
contestation. 
 
In Chapter eight, I look at one of America’s most memorable courtroom 
spectacles of resistance. Drawing on Foucault’s historico-political critique of 
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sovereignty, this chapter seeks to investigate the extent to which emancipatory 
counter-history can be deployed as a conceptual tool for problematizing and 
reconfiguring the instituted order. If Foucault’s ‘micro-politics of resistance’ 
takes off with re-politicization—finding a register for critique within the 
instituted formulas of rights and equilibriums of justice but breaks off—counter-
history imports a reflexivity essential for the re-politicization of the juridical 
realm. By analyzing some of the most disruptive scenes from the 1969 trial of 
Bobby Seale (the Chicago Eight Conspiracy Trial), I argue that Seale’s 
deployment of a counter-historical knowledge of enslavement and servitude 
reveals the discursive and visible practices of American sovereignty—including 
the constitution and the judicial apparatus—as strategic deployments used to 
conceal and secure the inequality of those Rancière identifies as ‘the part of no 
part’: Afro-Americans. I will further argue that as a strategic weapon capable of 
tapping contradictions, incongruities, and points of tension within the system, 
counter-history opens up a disclosure space that both uses and critiques 
juridical presuppositions to unmask the biological war that goes on beneath the 
rhetoric of ‘law and order’ and expose racism as the signifier of American 
sovereignty.  
 
Finally, the thesis is a genealogical critique of law and the modes of reasoning 
and the forms of rationality that animate and sustain it. My goal is not to 
uncover law’s pre-suppositional points but to try to identify a sociologically 
intelligible conception of law that provides a better illumination into law’s 
constitutive inside, its modes of regulation and generation, its truths and 
power-effects. It does not seek to obliterate the object of its critique but 
simply problematize certain assumptions that law presents as inevitable and 
natural and test opportunities for change and transformation.  
15 
   
Chapter Two 
 
2. Law and Resistance: Beyond a Normative Conception 
of Law 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Is there something conceptually unintelligible about the idea of ‘law and 
resistance,’ when coupled, as it were, by a conjunction ‘and’? What does it 
mean for both law and resistance to be coupled in this way? If law, at least 
within the constitutional state, claims to express or represent the very 
grievances or sources of indignation that provokes resistance, i.e., since law 
presents itself as the fulfilment of the normative justification of resistance, the 
notion of ‘law and resistance’ appears counter-intuitive or superfluous. 
According to this reading, if resistance has any truth, this truth is presumed to 
have been definitively materialized in law. On this register, there is an 
incommensurability that makes communication and understanding between law 
and resistance impossible. Law by definition renders resistance unintelligible. 
Despite the seemingly innocent conjunction, ‘and,’ however, the mere presence 
of resistance against law disrupts or can disrupt law’s normative claims to 
legitimacy, objectivity, rationality, neutrality, and universality. But the 
conjunction ‘and’ could be more explosive than law or resistance for it signifies 
something that cannot be exhausted or absorbed by law within its terms. 
 
This chapter is designed to set the scene for a conception of both law and 
resistance as performative formations. The first part provides a brief expose 
of the troubled dynamics between law and resistance and argues that the 
expression and representation of law as normative is the key reason why 
resistance came to have the kind of political reality it now has. By 
problematizing the various ways– discursive and institutional– by which law 
forecloses resistance and renders it unintelligible, the second part tries to 
unmask the non-normative in law that enables the spectral presence of 
resistance. Drawing on Benjamin and Foucault, the last part presents a non-
normative reading of law and sovereignty. 
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2.2. Law and Resistance 
 
In a recent book on the right to resistance, Costas Douzinas traces the 
genealogy of resistance – as a mythology, as a moral gesture, and as a right– to 
the Ancient Greece.1 In this rather brief blend of ‘radical philosophy’ and 
praxis, Douzinas insists on the notion of adikia (injustice) as the seedbed of 
despair and indignation that sustains resistance and supplies the passion and 
energy for its ‘eternal return.’2 Traversing various philosophical traditions from 
Aristotle to Hobbes, Kant, Heidegger, Arendt, and Derrida, Douzinas identifies 
two forms of ‘subjectivities’ that animate and sustain the antagonism between 
adikia (injustice) and dikaion (right): ‘the conserving and the revolutionizing.’3 
Despite the repeated declaration of its death by the constitutional state, 
resistance perpetually gnaws at injustice from lower depths. Wherever there is 
adikia, Douzinas argues, resistance becomes dikaion (right) in the double sense 
of a ‘claim accepted or seeking admission to the law’ and a ‘will that wills what 
does not exist or what is prohibited.’4 By alluding to the ‘out-of-joint-ness’ and 
dislocation immanent in Adikia, Douzinas points to the recent confrontation 
between sovereignty and the ‘multitude’ from North Africa to Europe as 
evidence of the right to resistance beyond positive law.5 
 
Whatever the significance of Douzina’s claim, it is really Sophocles’ Antigone 
that still provides the model for understanding the tension Hegel described as 
‘imminent in the life of both’ conserving and revolutionizing subjectivities.6 The 
confrontation between Creon and Antigone brilliantly encapsulates the insoluble 
conflict between law and resistance, sovereignty and the subject, law and 
conscience. For Creon, law is the posited law of the city, his edicts. He says, 
‘This is my command . . . That is my will. Take care that you do your part’ for 
                                         
1
 Costas Douzinas, Philosophy and Resistance in Crisis: Greece and the Future of Europe (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2013), 78. 
2
 Id. 
3
 Id. 
4
 Id at 86.  
5
 Id at 78. 
6
 Ann Paulicci and Henry Paulucci, Hegel: On Tragedy, eds. (West Port: Greenwood Press, 1962), xxvi 
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‘there is no greater curse than disobedience.’7 For Antigone, law is more than 
just a rule and is certainly not reducible to the mere command of the sovereign. 
To command obedience, law must be compatible with ‘the laws of the gods,’ – 
‘the final justice that rules the world below.’8 Creon mounts the standard 
objection to the natural justice argument: ‘Lawful authority must be obeyed in 
all things, great or small, just and unjust’ –claiming the unfettered right of 
obedience.9  Antigone deploys natural justice to subvert the authority of the 
city. We are still having the same debate – law or justice? 
 
2.2.1.   Between Legality and Legitimacy 
Despite an aggressive project of juridifications that led to the proliferation of 
laws and regulations, notwithstanding systematizations and institutionalizations 
of law and legal processes, law itself has not changed much since Antigone. 
Apart from the emergence of several strands of legal theory, legal positivism 
remained the dominant form of legal thought. The ‘positivist manifesto’ that 
was written by John Austin in 1832 – few decades after the revolutionary 
bourgeois begun the formalization and rationalization of law - was a fulfilment 
of Creon’s prophecy: ‘A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen 
to dislike it, or though it may vary from the text, by which we regulate our 
approbation or disapprobation.’10 By the mid 19th century, Antigone’s claims are 
no longer intelligible within the legal framework.  The same bourgeois that 
invoked the right to resistance less than a century ago, giving it a definitive 
expression in positive law for the first time, eventually eliminates resistance as 
an oppositional form of politics. 
 
One of the greatest achievements of the rationalization project is the 
constitutionalization of politics and the codification of commerce and other 
social relations. The civil law guaranteed the sanctity of the freedom of 
contract whilst public law institutionalized the principle of ‘legality,’ the ‘rule 
                                         
7
 Sophocles, Antigone, Oedipus the King and Electra, Edith Hall, eds., trans. H. D. F. Kitto (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 24. 
8
 Antigone makes specific reference to the Gods but I understand the Gods here to also include conscience.  
9
 Id. 
10
 John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2000), 184. 
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of law’ and ‘law and order.’11 The constitutionalization of political power meant 
that the right to obedience is taken from individuals and given to laws. Power is 
depersonalized and legalized: ‘commands are bestowed not in the name of a 
personal authority, but in the name of an impersonal norm.’12 The principle of 
legality emerged as an autonomous principle normatively indifferent to 
legitimacy, justice, and morality. It is seen as the ultimate safeguard against 
arbitrary power. Legal Positivism advocated ‘ethical neutrality’ towards the 
substance of laws. Here is what Alexis De Tocqueville says about the emergence 
of this legal rationality: ‘Lawyers are attached to public order beyond every 
other consideration; and the best security of public order is authority. It must 
not be forgotten also that if they prize freedom much, they generally value 
legality still more: they are less afraid of tyranny than of arbitrary power.’13 
 
Legality assumes that laws are neutral, objective, rational, clear, and 
independent of other extralegal considerations. By tracing the validity of law to 
the law itself, legality establishes itself as ‘the last fortress and fortification of 
the existing state of things.’14 This de-personalization of power and legalization 
of politics transformed legality, as Max Weber observes, into ‘the prevailing 
type of legitimacy.’15 Weber observes that ‘the most common form of legitimacy 
is the belief in legality, i.e., the acquiescence in enactments that are formally 
correct and which have been made according to established procedure.’16 By 
reducing legitimacy to legality, this mode of thought engendered a reading of 
‘politics in legal terms,’ conceptualizing the state, ‘as the exercise not of 
arbitrary force but of lawful authority.’17 
 
                                         
11
 Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John N. Clarke, and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: 
Mugging, the State and Law and Order (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978), 193 
12
 Max Weber, in Alexander P. D’entrèves, Legality and Legitimacy, 16 (4) The Review of Metaphysics, 
687(1963), 690.  
13
 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (A Penn State Electronic Classic 
Series, 2002), 304. 
14
 Hall et al, Policing the Crisis, 192-95. 
15
 Max Weber, Economy and Society, Guenther Roth and Clause Wittich, eds. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), 37. 
16
 Id. 
17
 D'entrèves, Legality and Legitimacy, 690; See also Eric Slauter, The Cultural Origins of the Constitution 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 39-40. 
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The basic architecture of the idea of legality formulated in Sophocles’ play and 
recalibrated by Austin as the positivist Manifesto in 1832 still reverberates 
across much of the world. Contemporary legal positivism retained the basic 
outline of its predecessors. If we simply look at Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart – 
the two giants of 20th century legal positivism, we will see that they will gladly 
repeat the Austinian dogma cited above. Of course, both Kelsen and Hart 
rejected Austin’s command theory and formulated theories that recognized 
law’s normative dimensions. Kelsen is best known for his ideas of the 
Grundnorm. In Kelson’s schema, the normative force of a legal proposition 
drives from the Grundnorm: a closed, self-generating and self-authorizing 
presupposition he later called a ‘fiction’ in contradiction with reality and with 
itself.18 However, Kelsen reduces the question of legitimacy to the mere 
effectiveness of the order. In ‘The General Theory of Law and State,’ he writes, 
‘the principle of legitimacy is restricted by the principle of effectiveness.’19 For 
Hart, law is both positive and normative. Arguing against Austin’s command 
theory, Hart defends the normative dimension of law.20 Rejecting the natural 
law thesis on the conceptual link between law and morality, he locates law’s 
normativity in the ‘rule of recognition,’ what he described as ‘the germ of the 
idea of legal validity.’ 21 
 
Both Kelsen and Hart sought to create a coherent and holistic order that can be 
analyzed solely on the basis of legal rules. In ‘The Concept of Law,’ Hart 
formulates this ‘crown of the positivist method’: the ‘legal system is a 'closed 
logical system' in which correct decisions can be deduced from predetermined 
legal rules by logical means alone.’22 Within this paradigm, the legal order is 
conceived not only as a rational arrangement of things but as a design and ‘an 
absolute proposition of reason.’23 It is a ‘closed logical system,’ whose 
foundation is self-evident and therefore ‘absolute and immutable.’24 In the final 
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 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, trans. M. Hartney (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 256. 
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20
 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2
nd
 eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 239. 
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analysis, legitimacy and other normative considerations are subsumed in legality 
in both Kelsen and Hart. Legality, then, is the ‘polar star’ that is called upon to 
elevate law above the fray of politics and the perpetual battle that circulate 
within society and divides it along a binary line. Despite the various fictions 
they provide to justify their conclusion, both Kelsen and Hart will say once again 
with Austin that: ‘A law, which actually exists, is a law.’ 
 
The convergence between the methodology of legal positivism and capitalism’s 
demand for certainty, stability, and order further reinforced law’s claims to 
rationality, autonomy, objectivity, and universality.25 Alexis De Tocqueville 
provides a compelling account of this alliance and how the legal profession and 
individual pursuits of lawyers ‘gives an aristocratic turn to their ideas.’26 Legal 
positivism- the form of rationality and mode of reasoning that underpins the 
positivist method – is central for installing a notion of law as objective, rational, 
universal, autonomous, and value-neutral. Otto Kirchheimer singles out the 
triumph of legality and legalism as instrumental to the ‘elimination of the right 
of resistance’ and locate the emergence of this mode of thought in the 19th 
century rationalization project.27 The rule of law, democracy and the 
constitutional state, he argues, came to signify the fulfilment of the right to 
resistance. Arguing against this constitutional containment of resistance, 
Stephen Carter laments the tendency of the constituted authorities to treat 
dissent as a criminal conduct.28 Reflecting on the history of dissent in the USA 
and analysing landmark cases on dissent, he identifies the principle of legality 
as the enemy of resistance. He writes, ‘The United States of America was 
scarcely a decade old when it enacted the Seditions Acts, which were 
immediately applied as a political tool for silencing dissent.’29 The 
Constitution’s commitment to ‘order,’ ‘a more perfect union,’ ‘posterity,’ and 
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‘institutional security’ silently erases and excludes the Declaration’s 
enunciation of the ‘fundamental right to revolution’—‘it is their right, it is their 
duty.’ 
 
Unable to resist the truth-bearing discourses of legality and legalism, and no 
longer an intelligible political ideal, resistance silently disappears from the 
formal structures of power by the end of the 19th century. Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos traces this constitutional containment and expulsion of resistance from 
the juridical universe to the project of rationalization and formalization that 
started around the end of the 18th century.30 By the end of the 19th century, he 
notes, law ‘gave up resistance in docile submission to the whole range of values 
and beliefs.’31 No longer a weapon of struggle; Santos argues, ‘law becomes a 
lion of negativity.’32 But in order to appreciate the discursive field and 
institutional framework within which juridical power formulates, accumulates, 
and circulates power, brute force, in the name of law, truth, order, reason, and 
etcetera,  let us begin at the beginning—at the constituent point of politics 
itself.  
 
2.3. Foundations, Intelligibility, and the Logos33 of Politics 
Let us begin at origin, the constituent point of politics and the birth site of 
justice and injustice. Referring to the Iranian Revolution, Foucault notes, 
‘Justice and injustice are the sensitive point of every revolution; that is where 
they are born, and often it is also where they lose their way and die.’34 Indeed, 
it is here, at the very beginning that society plants the seeds of exclusion, 
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usurpation, violence and injustice. Every new beginning, which is at the same 
time an end, takes off the ground with a menacing germ that both secures it 
and returns to haunt it. Whatever authority law summons to render this violence 
rational, justified and legitimate, authority cannot cleanse itself off the 
usurpation and exclusions that contaminate its root: ‘Even the most just social 
order excludes that which does not fit into its view of the world.’35 
 
The origin marks the birth of three fundamental things: a new body politic, a 
new mode of knowing, and a new rule of action. This is the moment at which 
the constituted institutes a new grid of intelligibility for the constituent—a 
signifying form that organizes and structures what Jacques Rancière identifies 
as the ‘the order of saying, the order of doing, and the order of being.’36  It is 
the inaugural moment of law and politics – a moment that allocates the 
distribution of speaking positions according to force relations, and inscribes the 
terms of visibility and hearing in discourse, law and history. Despite this 
dissymmetry at the heart of foundations, late modern political theory privileged 
normative conceptions of the social contract and made this moment the 
foundational point of truth and reason.37 Hannah Arendt describes these truths 
as ‘pre-rational—they inform reason but are not its products—and since their 
self-evidence puts them beyond disclosure and argument, they are in a sense no 
less compelling than . . . the axiomatic verities of mathematics.’38 It is this 
essentialized truth that provided the basis for power’s desire to ground itself in 
perfectly ordered, stable, rational, and true foundation since Nietzsche’s 
declaration of ‘the death of God.’  At the same time, it is at this point that 
‘reason’ became, as Achille Mbembe argues, ‘one of the most important 
elements of both the project of modernity and of the topos of sovereignty.’39  
 
Against the constituent, the constituted inscribes its exclusionary rules of 
intelligibility into laws, institutions, discourses and history; normalizing its 
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violence and rendering it an expression of reason. In Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History, Foucault characterizes the origin as ‘a place of inevitable loss, the 
point where the truth of things corresponded to a truthful discourse, the site of 
a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured and finally lost.’40 Sovereign 
power articulates a truthful discourse that erases the aporetic contradiction and 
the violence of usurpation that marks this moment. Its usurpation of the logos of 
its parts, what Rancière calls ‘the part of no part’ who are invisible, 
unspeakable, and uncountable, beings incapable of voice and articulation, are 
concealed by measured truths of this moment and the grand historical 
narratives that perpetuate them. The discourse of origin frames and determines 
our ways of being, acting, and speaking. It conditions and regulates what we 
recognize as true and false, rational and irrational, good and evil. It is a master 
discourse that controls the production, accumulation, circulation, and diffusion 
of other discourses. It controls the rules of right that sets out what is legally 
speakable and punishable, what is legitimately contestable and beyond the 
horizon of contestation. It regulates, and filters cultural codes and social rules 
that determine ‘which statements most people recognize as valid, as debatable, 
or as undoubtedly false.’41  
 
To put this in the Foucauldian schema, the discourse of origin formulates a 
signifying power-knowledge complex that establishes: (1) a ‘code’ — ’an 
ensembles of rules, procedures, means to an end’—that institutes the limit of 
acceptable conduct and; (2) truth-bearing discourses necessary ‘to found, 
justify, and provide reasons and principles’ for these codes of conduct.42 In 
short, it institutes domains according to which true and false, right and wrong, 
acceptable and debatable are distinguished, ways of being and acting that 
reference, reiterate, and reaffirm the original force configuration.43 It is 
through this power-knowledge complex that constitutes and regulates the 
practices of knowing and acting that individuals perceive and sense the political 
universe. Though everything is not a discourse, everything is conditioned by 
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discourse. As Roland Bleiker, drawing on Nietzsche and Foucault, writes, ‘we 
can only assess [things] through the lenses of discourse, through the practices of 
knowing, perceiving, and sensing, which we have acquired over time.’44 This, as 
will be argued in the next chapter, is a performative violence that sustains itself 
and its sense of certainty and stability by treating those who do not share its 
truths and views of the order as evil, irrational, perverse, and with threat of 
force and destruction.  
 
It is on the basis of this exclusionary logic that signifies the constituted as 
rational and universal that sovereign power has been able to articulate a 
depoliticized notion of the sovereign, the political, and the subject; depleting 
the emancipatory potentials of politics itself.45  As a master-signifier, 
sovereignty codes the juridical universe in terms of the right of the sovereign 
and the duty of the subject. Its logic is one of closure, a concealing orthodoxy 
that forecloses spaces of thinking and acting: claims incompatible with the 
system’s grid of intelligibility, claims that seek to break off from its ‘economy 
of representation,’ will run into its obdurate premise—closure.46 In hiding and 
masking its truths from being perceived and recognized, it forecloses or mutes 
immanent possibilities that seek to break free from its logics and frameworks.  
In this way, sovereignty effectively sucks up whatever transformative 
opportunities the juridical framework promises.  
 
As a signifier, sovereign power determines what the signified is, can, says and 
does. As such, any claim against the system, whatever its form, must not only 
be ‘legal,’ it must also be intelligible within the system’s genre of discourse. 
The instituted mode of legal intelligibility requires the subject- the subject that 
resists this mode of construction and framework of subjection- to conceptualize 
and articulate his grievance against the state within the frameworks of what the 
state recognizes as legally valid and plausible. Before the substantive questions 
of what is true and false, right and wrong, legitimate and illegitimate are taken 
to task, the law requires resistant interventions to be within the true. Through 
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these exclusionary discourses, law decides not only the question of what is 
legally intelligible and speakable but also what is socially recognized as valid, 
arguable or outright false. It determines what legitimately belongs to the realm 
of contestation and the epistemic standards that set out the parameters of that 
contestation. By excluding the subject from participating in the production and 
circulation of resistant discourses, sovereignty dissipates the possibility of 
change and becoming. 
 
When power inscribes relationship of exclusion and inequality in the juridical 
edifice—institutions, laws, the discourse of rights and the instituted scale of 
justice—to preserve the original force configuration, how does resistance 
infiltrate these buffer zones to register its objections? If sovereignty encodes 
this founding violence into laws, rights and legal institutions to dissolve and 
erase this violence; simultaneously inscribing and demarcating its exteriority, 
what is left of resistance? Against the dominant mappings of the fields, 
reference points, and frameworks of meaning and interpretation that take 
juridico-political discourses as their points of departure, the thesis situates law 
and its foremost institution—the trial—at the interstices of domination and 
resistance. I am therefore interested not only in the originary violence of 
exclusion but also in the strategic coupling of silencing conventional 
historiography with what I refer to as gate-keeping juridico-political discourses 
(the reason of state, law and order, national security, crimes against the state 
(espionage, treason, sedition etc)) in order to mute and paralyze political 
critique. But before that, let me introduce, briefly, how legal technologies of 
sovereign power encode these founding logic and rationality into laws to mute 
and paralyze political critique and resistance.  
. 
2.4. Gate-keeping Legal Technologies of Power 
 
For the function of violence in lawmaking is twofold, in the sense that 
lawmaking pursues as its end, with violence as the means, what is to be 
established as law, but at the moment of instatement does not dismiss 
violence; rather, at this very moment of lawmaking, it specifically 
establishes as law not an end un-alloyed by violence, but one necessarily 
and intimately bound to it, under the title of power. Lawmaking is power 
making, and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence. 
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Justice is the principle of all divine end making, power the principle of all 
mythical lawmaking.47 
 
  Walter Benjamin, Critique of Violence, 295 
 
Law, to be sure, is the prominent—some would even argue the pre-eminent—
discourse at the heart of projects of oppression and domination from slavery, to 
colonization, from totalitarianism to dictatorship, and the liberal state. As 
Friedman aptly stated, law ‘is not a tangible object of the real world.’48 It 
consists of conceptual assemblages, unfinished and flexible rules, open-ended 
principles, processes, and arbitrary practices.49 Every time law is interpreted 
and applied, it is produced and elaborated.50 As Derrida notes, neither public 
authority nor the judge follows the law and its principles to the letter.51 In 
confirming, elucidating, or rejecting the law, the judge reinvents the law.52 
Every major decision ‘must conserve the law and also destroy it or suspend it 
enough to have to reinvent it in each case [and] re-justify it.’53 This act of 
interpretation, which is at the same a reinvention, is not ‘the slow exposure of 
the meaning hidden in an origin.’54 As Foucault put it, ‘interpretation is the 
violent and surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules . . . in order to 
impose a direction, to bend it to a new will, to force its participation in a 
different game.’55 Insofar as law is power’s foremost vehicle of self-
reproduction and re-assertion, law is a condensation of power, and an 
ideological reflection of force relations.  Law produces and disseminates this 
power and ideology as law – investing the power it reflects and transmits with 
an aura of truth and rationality.   
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To preserve the order and its founding presuppositions, to safeguard its 
vulnerable frontiers against those who seek to change it, law projects an 
appearance of necessity, naturalness, and universality. Gate-keeping legal 
technologies—juridification, ‘law and order,’ ‘reasons of state,’ ‘national 
security,’ and ‘crimes against the state’ such as treason, espionage, sedition, 
etc—function to safeguard this claim to rationality and necessity. They produce 
and generate an alternative reality that conceals and hides the contingent and 
complex origin of the order while protecting its vulnerable frontiers from 
subversive interventions. What is more, these gate-keeping discourses contain in 
bellicose relations both inclusion and exclusion. Those who are denied voice and 
excluded from the political process are at the same time included- they are 
subjects of the law and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the very power 
that excluded them. They are included as excluded. It is this discursive paradox 
that allows performative sovereignty to operate at different levels of legality 
and evade, conceal, and mask the contingencies and heterogeneities underlying 
its façade of coherence and unity. If sovereignty can operate at different, 
perhaps multiple, levels of legality, it is because, as William Connolly maintains, 
it has ‘a plurality of forces’ that functions ‘through and under the positional 
authority of the official arbitrating body’ external to the sovereign.56 By drawing 
a straight line between one of gate-keeping discourses such as national security 
and instituted order of legality, performative sovereignty authors a decision 
that is neither legal nor illegal, a decision that is at ones inclusive and 
exclusive, and one that oscillates, at will, between legality and illegality, 
exclusion and inclusion—a zone of extralegality.  
 
By closing the becoming potential of sovereignty, the subject, and the political, 
law circumscribes the terms for activating its space, the conditions under which 
admission is granted or indefinitely deferred, re-enacts conflicts according to its 
rules of intelligibility, and sets out the terms under which one enters its space. 
Following Derrida’s reading of Kafka’s Parable ‘Before the Law,’ Agamben 
contends that ‘nothing and certainly not the refusal of the gate-keeper-prevents 
the man from the country from passing through the door of the law if not the 
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fact that this door is already open and that the Law prescribes nothing.’57 There 
is no outside of law. Law is all around us and there is no escape from it. For 
Agamben, one is always before the law, one is always already before the law as 
one of the governed, the represented, the excluded, etc. Whatever the terms of 
entry, whatever the man who stands before the door assumes; law’s truth is 
always anticipatory, open-ended, and can never be definitively realized.58 On 
the basis of this exclusionary exercise of jurisdiction over life and death, law 
circumscribes the transversal relationship between resistance and domination 
and depletes the transformative potential of politics through closure, reduction, 
and juridification.59 
 
To prevent the disruption of the circularity and self-reference that guarantees 
the system’s remarkable resilience; law deploys gate-keeping discourses and 
rules to render political intervention impossible. These discourses protect law’s 
discursive boundaries from subversive intrusions; drawing permeable but ever-
shifting boundaries between inside and outside, the stranger and the familiar, 
the legal and the political, through systemic distinction between democratic 
public spheres available for legitimate contestations, on the one hand, and the 
juridical sphere where action is juridically deactivated, on the other. 
Irrespective of the egalitarian and progressive character of the formal juridical 
architecture, power preserves its domain by transgressing and overstepping 
these seemingly egalitarian frameworks. Moreover, despite its egalitarian 
appearance, the juridical framework is underpinned by disciplinary mechanisms 
that ‘guarantee the submission of forces and bodies.’60 If the rule of law, 
legality, judicial independence, and fundamental freedoms and liberties 
constituted the formal frameworks of what we call democratic politics, ‘the 
tiny, everyday, physical mechanisms’ of micro-power infiltrate and colonize 
their spheres of operation.61  
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Within this paradigm, even the most glorious ideals of the rule of law and 
equality can be reinvented and used to achieve a radical inequality. The rule of 
law, ‘the central jewel in liberalism’s crown,’ may be seen as an ‘unqualified 
human good’ but when law is used as a tactic, and as a technique of power, it 
becomes insidiously concealing. Writing on the power-struggle at the heart of 
the Chicago Conspiracy trial, Pnina Lahav observes, ‘Few would disagree that 
the rule of law, as an abstract ideal, is glorious. The dialogue’s considerable 
appeal may lie precisely in the fact that it does not engage in making the 
invisible visible, but rather in a cover up.’62 To recall Foucault’s poignant 
formulation: ‘Humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat 
until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces 
warfare; humanity installs each of its violence[s] in a system of rules and thus 
proceeds from domination to domination.’63 
 
Today, the elimination of resistance from law is justified by positing sovereignty 
as the exercise of ‘public reason’ on behalf of autonomous rational subjects. 
This representation of sovereignty and the democratic process as the exercise of 
public reason is one of the ways by which normative theories of law and 
democracy juridified and depoliticized the public sphere, depleted the agency 
of the subject and effectively closed off the possibility of change and becoming. 
Through juridification and depoliticization, law dislocates the spontaneity, and 
contingency inherent in social conflicts, reducing complex relations into 
productive classifications and categorizations.64 In that way, law pre-empts, 
distorts, and disfigures, at the level of discourse, the intelligibility of resistant 
discourses that contest the terms of political engagement. Commenting on this 
dialectic, Gunther Teubner writes: ‘the ambivalence of juridification, the 
ambivalence of a guarantee of freedom which is at the same time a deprivation 
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of freedom, is made clear in the telling phrase, ‘the colonization of the life-
world.’’65 
 
2.4.1.  The Judicial Apparatus  
Institutions are the macro-objects within which the fine-grained workings of 
power take place. In Foucault’s schema, institutions are neither the sources nor 
the origins of power relations.66 Instead, institutions are already situated within 
the all-encompassing web of power relations. If knowledge is ‘what power 
relations produce in order to spread and disseminate all the more effectively,’ 
institutions are the means by which dissemination and circulation takes place. 
This knowledge produces itself through institutions such as schools (which 
‘transmit ideology masked as knowledge’), psychiatry, (‘all the psychiatric 
components of everyday life which form something like a third order of 
repression and policing’), and prisons (which reinforces the distinction between 
good and evil, normal and abnormal, guilt and innocence) and the judicial 
apparatus (elevated from partisan considerations and ‘arbitrating conflicts in 
the realm of the ideal’).67 While prisons, schools, and psychiatric and medical 
institutions play a central role, Foucault identifies the judicial apparatus as the 
most concealing and normalizing institution that must be an object of critique 
and confrontation. In ‘Truth and Juridical Forms,’ Foucault identifies judicial 
practice as the template by which ‘society defined subjectivity, forms of 
knowledge and relations between ‘man and truth.’68 Given its central 
importance in perpetuating existing relationships of domination and inequality, 
Foucault called for its ‘radical elimination.’69  
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In his 1975-76 Lectures, Foucault launches a stinging rebuke against ‘the system 
of rights and the judiciary field.’70 Conceiving the judiciary and the rights 
discourse as the epistemological registers of violence, the originary violence 
inscribed in ‘institutions, laws, economic inequalities,’ Foucault identifies the 
rights discourse and the judiciary as technologies of legitimation, the reservoir 
that contains, through its ritual operations, the violence and excesses of 
sovereignty.71 The judicial apparatus preserves the violence of lawmaking and 
law preserving by arbitrating claims about the usurpation of voice and the very 
legitimacy of the law in the realm of reason and rationality. Through 
interpretation and application, the judiciary re-invents and re-situates the 
originary violence according to the evolving discourse of political truth. In his 
own words: ‘The system of right and the judiciary field are permanent vehicles 
for relations of domination, and for polymorphous techniques of subjugation.’72  
 
Foucault’s analysis emphasizes not on the questions of normativity and 
legitimacy that underpins its operations but on the ‘procedure[s] of subjugation’ 
its discourse implements.73 The essential functions of the rights discourse and 
the judiciary field is to channel conflicts into the system’s normalizing and 
constraining procedures to preclude the possibility of resistance to its stifling 
categories and binaries. Instead of challenging the power relations it is there to 
secure, the judicial apparatus renders these power relations rational and 
legitimate.74 By pretending to be a neutral and expert arbiter of conflicts 
according to reason and justice, the judiciary dissolves radical inequality into 
juridical abstraction and ultimately legitimizes the system, its truths, and 
modes of arbitration.75 This claim to neutrality and truth allows the judiciary to 
dispel the shock of usurpations and inequalities within society. Through these 
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truth claims, the judiciary transforms ‘the most frenzied manifestation of power 
imaginable’ into a question of law and justice.76  
 
In a commentary on Philippe Boucher’s book, Le Ghetto Judiciare, Foucault 
writes, ‘the legal system is a bit like the penalties it inflicts: it doesn’t much 
like to display itself. Its rituals no longer serve to impress the parties to a 
dispute [justiciables] but to give a little comfort to the judiciaries . . . it is no 
longer the grand social theatre that it was for centuries.’77 Foucault emphasizes 
on the invisible ‘operational mechanisms’ of the judicial system wherein 
‘disorder’ determines its operational logic.78 He says, ‘[I]f you look at the 
apparatus in motion, with its ins and out, you notice that the violence done to 
the law obeys the principle of protection of order.’79 As formations that obey 
multiple configurations and reconfigurations of their content, gate-keeping legal 
discourses constitute the single most important politico-juridical instrument 
used by the state to reinforce the will of the constituted order. The judiciary 
precludes the possibility of action and real struggle not only through 
confinement but also through the production of truth and normalization. 
 
The question, then, is: What does resistance become when law becomes both 
the form and vehicle of violence and domination? As Benjamin usefully put it, 
law is the material and symbolic condensations of force whose rationality and 
modes of reasoning is ‘necessarily and intimately bound’ with violence.80 But 
power is the signifying force that determines its particular configurations and 
effects.81 How does resistance takes off the ground when power manifests itself 
as law to exclude, dominate, dehumanize, and oppress? To put it more 
succinctly, how do we resist the power relations law codifies and circulates 
through the court—a truth-bearing institution—for a maximum effect? In what 
follows, I suggest that we rather view law and its modes of reasoning as non-
normative.  
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2.5. Beyond a Normative Conception of Law and Sovereignty 
If normativity is the central feature of law, it is because law is conceptually tied 
to notions of ‘obligation’ and ‘authority, i.e., the authority of the state to 
impose obligations and the duty of the subject to obey. Normative facts are 
distinguished from descriptive facts. They are considered necessary, intrinsic, 
and natural.82 They are ‘a priori than a posteriori,’ ‘conceptual rather than 
synthetic,’ and internal rather than external.83 ‘While obligations are 
presumably imposed by norms,’ Stefano Berta writes, ‘the fact of there being 
any such things as obligations would seem to require that the norms which 
impose them should be capable of generating the requisite critical reaction in 
others.’84  
 
Writing on the relationship between law, norms, and authority, George Christie 
laments what he regards as the arbitrary juxtaposition of rules and norms in 
juridical thinking.85  The conflation of ‘legal rules’ which are not yet normative 
with ‘norms’ in juristic thought creates ‘the unfortunate consequence of turning 
questions about the binding quality of law into logical questions.’86 While there 
are legal rules that have crystallized into norms, becoming part of the 
normative system, Christie’ point is suggestive of the ways in which this mode of 
thought reduces substantive claims about the validity of law into a logical and 
procedural question. Christie suggests that the ultimate normative force of the 
law is not a given that already is and cannot be otherwise. The normativity of a 
given legal proposition, he argued, is ‘posited by the speaker by means of a 
statement expressing the belief that the purported norm is part of a normative 
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system.’87 Those who invoke the law are not describing the law; they are 
making a claim about its normative quality.88 
 
Normative theories of law conceive law as ‘an extension of practical reason,’ 
thereby annihilating the contingency that empirically contaminates law all the 
way through and transform it into some neutral, autonomous, and impersonal 
enterprise elevated from the adulterating effects of history, politics, and 
power.89 As Joseph W. Bendersky noted, normativism, the term Schmitt uses to 
refer to this mode of ‘juristic thought,’ ‘transforms a legal norm into an 
absolute, claiming for itself the status of superiority and eternal universality.’90 
As Schmitt observes, normativity ‘elevates itself above the individual cases and 
above the concrete situation and thus has, as ‘norm,’ a certain superiority and 
eminence above the mere reality and factual nature of the concrete individual 
case, the changing situation and the changing will of men.’91 Yet, despite these 
ideal promises of ‘impersonal, objective justice,’ the normative cannot 
adequately explain law’s empirical investment in power and domination.  
 
At the most basic level, a conception of law as a normative system identifies 
law with reason, truth and rationality. The judicial apparatus provides the 
template according to which society conceptualizes and articulates relations 
between man and truth.92 This, of course, has the consequence of elevating law 
and sovereignty beyond contestation; paralyzing claims by the marginalized and 
usurped—those who have no fixed place within social order. It has the effect of 
rendering sovereign violence and practices of exclusion and domination rational. 
It de-historicizes subjectivity and sovereignty, and de-politicizes politics. In 
fact, as Rancière argues, politics is always already de-politicized by its original 
contradiction and what we ordinarily call politics has little or nothing to do with 
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the logos proper to politics.93 By identifying law with reason and truth, 
normativism perpetuates this originary violence.  
 
In reality, however, law does not have empirically tangible and sociologically 
intelligible inner truth of the kind normativity and positive legal theory bestows 
upon it. In various interrogations into the domain of law, sovereignty, 
subjectivity, and politics, several thinkers including Benjamin, Foucault, 
Derrida, and Butler have decentred law’s claims to normativity, truth, 
rationality, and objectivity; destabilizing the conceptual correlation claimed to 
exist between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is,’ i.e., between the supernatural force 
that ‘appears as an absolute’ and compels the sovereign subject to act 
according to its will. Rejecting the essentialist claim about the existence of an 
intrinsic nexus between the internal ‘ought’ and the external behaviour of the 
subject, they offered a different way of conceiving sovereignty, politics, and 
the subject—a conception that reconfigures and turns inside out the political 
ontology of these formations. Let me introduce, briefly, Benjamin and Foucault, 
to show that beneath law’s measured truths, there is a ‘proliferation of error’ 
that cannot be refuted. I will return to Derrida and Butler in the next chapter to 
suggest a performative conception of law. 
 
In ‘Critique of Violence,’ Walter Benjamin offers a genealogical 
problematization of violence and its internal relationship with law and justice. 
Calling for a non-essentialist starting point and explicitly locating his critique 
outside the domain of both natural law and positive legal theory, Benjamin 
approaches his analysis of violence from what he calls a ‘historico-philosophical 
view of law.’94 Dismissing ‘the end justifies the means’ maxim of the French 
revolutionaries; Benjamin’s critique seeks to analyze ‘violence’ in itself, 
irrespective of its normative ends. Benjamin’s insights are crucial to my 
argument, not only because he situates sovereignty and the legal subject at the 
heart of his analysis but also because he engages with notions of significant 
implications for law’s claims to normativity such as legitimacy, legality, validity, 
and power. Central to his framework is the distinction between ‘lawmaking’ 
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violence and ‘law preserving’ violence.95 Whereas lawmaking violence is an 
inaugurative violence that calls the political order into presence, law preserving 
violence is a violence deployed to preserve what has been instituted.96 In his 
own words, violence is ‘lawmaking, for its characteristic function is not the 
promulgation of laws but the assertion of legal claims for any decree, and law-
preserving, because it is at the disposal of these ends.’97 
 
Contrary to the claims of mainstream legal jurisprudence, Benjamin sees 
violence as the essential principle that explains the obedience of the subject 
and the workings of organized political communities. Despite his analytic 
distinction, both forms of violence serve the ends of protecting the concrete 
order by preserving existing force relations within the body-politic. Although the 
normative explanation behind founding acts invariably invokes 
humanist/Enlightenment ideals of social contract, truth, liberty, morality, 
justice, freedom, and etc; Benjamin argues that lawmaking ‘establishes as law 
not an end unalloyed by violence but one necessarily and intimately bound to it, 
under the title of power.’98 Benjamin offers the operations of police and the 
military as a site that displaces the distinction between the two forms of 
violence: ‘the ‘law’ of the police really marks the point at which the state, 
whether from impotence or because of the immanent connection within any 
legal systems, can no longer guarantee through the legal system the empirical 
ends it desires.’99 This transgression marks a break in law’s retroactive 
justification of its normative foundation. The contemporary operation of police 
and military beyond the realm of legality, i.e., in sphere of extra-legality, is 
tantamount to ‘a suspension of legal authority’ and therefore lawmaking 
violence.100 As a form of violence that at once transgresses and preserves law, 
the protection and primacy of order breaks the chain of regressive reasoning 
that establishes the normativity of law by tracing it to its source. For Benjamin, 
then, there is no a priori truth, no constitutional convention or natural rights 
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discourse that explains the origin of law and sovereignty. What compel the 
subject to obey the law is not the appearance of the absolute but the naked 
facticity of force, raw brute force- violence. In his own words: ‘For in the 
exercise of violence over life and death more than in any other legal act, law 
reaffirms itself.’101 
 
Calling, famously, for the cutting off of the ‘King’s head’ in political theory, 
Foucault’s historico-political critique begins by dislocating normative theories of 
legitimation and juridico-discursive formations as the starting point of 
analysis.102 In ‘What is Enlightenment,’ he rejects, rather forcefully, normative 
theories of rights and legitimacy as points of departure for analysis and political 
critique: ‘Criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal 
structures with universal value but, rather, as a historical investigation into 
events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as 
subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.’103 Criticism cannot be 
transcendental and its objective is not metaphysical.104 Criticism, Foucault 
insists, is historical: ‘it is genealogical in its design and archaeological in its 
method.’105  
 
In his 1975-76 Lectures published as ‘Society Must be Defended,’ he opens up a 
site of historical inquiry by suggesting ‘the model of war,’ as ‘a principle that 
can help us understand and analyze political power.’106 Conceiving the modern 
state as a product of battles, confrontations, and struggles, Foucault rejects 
normative theories whose primary concern is to outline the terms of legitimacy 
and proposes an understanding of ‘political power in terms of war, struggles, 
and confrontations.’107 He rejects turning to law and rights against sovereignty 
or turning to sovereignty against discipline.108 As philosophico-juridical concepts, 
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the discourse of law and rights does not provide the language for 
conceptualizing, understanding and critiquing ‘the state, its institutions and 
power mechanisms.’109 Arguing against juridico-philosophical discourses, 
Foucault calls for historico-political analysis of rights and the judicial apparatus 
if critique is to decipher and outwit the measured truths of juridical norms.110 
For Foucault, the discourse of rights must not be analyzed to uncover a stable 
foundation and an essential truth of law but with the view to unearthing ‘the 
procedures of subjugation it implements.’111  
 
For Foucault, it is not a ‘foundational juridical convention,’ or an ‘explicit body 
of laws’ that constitutes the body politic, but violence, ‘a stable dissymmetry,’ 
or what he calls a ‘congruent inequality.’112 Neither Kantian metaphysical 
universals nor the Lockean social contract; neither the Machiavellian politics of 
the prince nor the Hobbesian ‘war of all men against all men’ provides the 
analytic grid for understanding society.113 It is war and war-like relations.114 The 
fundamental laws of the state do not eradicate force relations; they merely 
reinscribe, codify, and legalize it: ‘the use of civil institutions was  . . . purely 
instrumental and the war was still basically a war’115 even long after the dust of 
revolution and state formation has settled. In ‘Truth and Juridical Forms,’ he 
contends that ‘Germanic law . . . assumed that law was a special, regulated 
way of conducting war between individuals.’116 As instruments of revenge, law 
and the courtroom are thus regulated and ritualized technologies of war.117  
 
Inverting Clausewitz and identifying violence, (‘war’ is Foucault’s preferred 
metaphor) as a ‘grid of intelligibility,’ as ‘an essential condition,’ Foucault 
reveals law as a register of violence.118 Instead of being something outside of 
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civil society, war is a strategic grid and constitutive principle of civil society. 
Here is Foucault: 
 
War obviously presided over the birth of States: right, peace, and laws 
were born in the blood and mud of battles . . . The law is not born of 
nature, and it was not born near the fountains that the first scarpereds 
frequented: the law is born of real battles, victories, massacres, and 
conquests which can be dated and which have their horrific heroes; the 
law was born in burning towns and ravaged fields.119  
 
Given this inextricable nexus between law and violence, the task of 
performative genealogy is to discover ‘beneath the forms of justice that have 
been instituted,’ the battle cries that unsettles the coherence and normative 
claims of the system. In his famous formulations, ‘Law is not pacification, for 
beneath the law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even 
the most regular. War is the motor behind institutions and order.’120 In her 
reading of Foucault, Marianna Valverde opines that a politico-historical 
framework of analysis offers sociologically intelligible conceptual tool for 
understanding the constitutive and regulative conditions of sovereignty and 
subjectivity ‘than the standpoint of liberal thinkers from Locke to Rawls.’121   
 
To sum up, then, let me identify two significant features common to both 
Benjamin and Foucault. While violence in Benjamin provides the analytic grid 
for the foundation of the body politic, in Foucault, violence offers a ‘principle 
for the analysis of power relations.’ Foucault conceives power in terms of two 
markers or limits: ‘the rules of rights that formally delineate power, and . . . 
the truth effects that power produces.’122 So we have essentially a triangular 
relationship between the three elements—power, right/law, truth— where 
power occupies the apex of the triangle and ‘the rules of right’ and truth the 
two ends of the triangle. Mediating the three elements within the triangle is 
discourse- in which power and knowledge articulate each other to generate 
truth-effects. For Foucault, then, it is not abstract normative ideals but 
                                         
119
 Id at 50. He argues that ‘The social order is a war, and rebellion is the last episode that will put an end to 
it. 
120
 Id at 50. 
121
 Mariana Valverde, Society Must be Defended, 1 Law, Culture, Humanities, 119 (2005), 120. 
122
 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 27. 
40 
 
  Chapter 2: Law and Resistance 
confrontations, the war that goes on ‘continuously and permanently’ through 
these formations that offer a point of reference and a fruitful illumination of 
society and relations of domination. Although Benjamin’s critique is tailored 
towards the analysis of violence in its own, a critique that breaks with the 
normative dimensions of both positive legal theory and natural law, like 
Foucault, he sees ‘power’ as a signifying force that animates the form a 
particular deployment of law assumes. He writes: ‘Lawmaking is power making, 
assumption of power, and to that extent an immediate manifestation of 
violence.’123 Deploying the disclosure space opened up by historico-political 
critique, both Foucault and Benjamin reject normative universalisms and offer 
the idea of war—contestations, confrontations, and struggle—as strategic grid 
and a constitutive principle of civil society.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter addressed three main themes: the volatile relationship between 
law and resistance; the various discursive and institutional means by which law 
institutes a grid of intelligibility that determines the mode of being, knowing, 
and acting, and therefore foreclose resistance; and finally a non-normative 
account of law and sovereignty that provided a counter-narrative of the 
normative. By providing a brief account of the volatile relationship between law 
and resistance, I argued that legalism and its form of rationality and modes of 
reasoning are instrumental for the elimination of resistance. As a mode of 
thought, the normative conceals the contingent and complex articulation of the 
present. By providing a façade of coherence and unity to the contingent 
production, interpretation and application of laws, normativity forecloses the 
possibility of change and becoming. As the constituent moment of politics, the 
founding act is central to my analysis. I argued that its normativity is 
established and sustained by grand historical narratives and gate-keeping 
discourses that formulate and circulate juridical knowledges that legitimize, 
justify and rationalize it. Through Benjamin and Foucault, I tried to bring 
historical inquiry into the orbit of law and sovereignty to account for what 
normativism submerges, misrecognizes, and excludes. 
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In short, the normative account privileges a very particular view of law, 
sovereignty and subjectivity, and therefore of the political. The juridical codes 
that cite, reiterate, and invoke the founding act preserves the original force 
relation its configuration reflects. By providing empirically unintelligible and 
historically inaccurate account of law and legality, normativism turns its back to 
the realities of power and domination. Drawing on Derrida and Butler, the next 
chapter provides a performative account of sovereignty and subjectivity to put 
forth a performative epistemology of law.  
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Chapter Three 
 
3. Law and Resistance: Toward a Performative 
Epistemology of Law 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
My thesis—that law and legal discourses are inherently performative—is 
fundamentally at odds with law’s claim to normativity. Law not only lays claim 
to normativity but claims a distinctively juridical normativity that bestows it 
with a façade of rationality, neutrality, autonomy, and universality. Law’s 
unqualified claim to normativity is one of the key ways by which law neutralizes 
and defends its investment in politics, history, economics, and power-relations. 
Against the prescription of normative theories of law as the privileged 
vernacular for conceptualizing sovereignty, the political, and the subject, this 
chapter proposes a performative epistemology of law that contests 
normativity’s closure of sovereignty, the political, and the subject. If there is a 
normative dimension to law, I argue, it is because of performative iterations: 
performativity generates and presents law’s normative materiality. Calling into 
question law’s temporal, material, and spatial indifference to its normative 
claims, working through the Derridean and Butlerian account of performativity, I 
argue that law’s signifying moments are performative par excellence. From the 
constitution of sovereignty to the formation of the subject, from the rituals of 
legislation to the ceremonials of adjudication, a performative logic undergirds 
and animates law’s modalities of signification. 
 
My aim in this chapter is to engage in a genealogical problematization of two 
constitutive moments—the constitution of the body politic and the legal 
subject—not merely with the view to subverting or vindicating the normative 
reality of these moments but also to make intelligible the performative that 
contingently conditions the realities of the present. Drawing on the Derridean 
insight that—‘the founding and justifying moment that institute law implies a 
performative force’—that law performatively produces the ‘we’ it governs; 
interpellating us as ‘subjects’ to its jurisdiction—the chapter seeks to 
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demonstrate how sovereignty came to have the kind of normative reality it has. 
Working through Butler’s ‘political genealogy of gender ontologies’ — ‘that the 
gendered body . . . has no ontological status apart from the various acts which 
constitute its reality,’—I will show the performative logic that undergirds the 
formation of legal subjectivity—the legal person—to demonstrate how the legal 
subject came to have the kind of depoliticized reality it has. By unearthing the 
contingency and complexity underneath the rationality and autonomy of 
sovereignty and the subject, the chapter concludes with some thoughts on the 
conditions of possibility immanent in a performative reconceptualization of law.  
 
3.2.     Performativity: The Genealogy of the Concept 
 
In his Harvard Lecture posthumously published as ‘How to Do Things with 
Words,’ John L. Austin introduced the notion that language is not merely 
descriptive but also constitutive.1 Arguing that speech is action, Austin 
formulated a speech act theory that conceives language as a generative and 
transformative enterprise. Austin classified linguistic utterances into 
‘constatives’ and ‘performatives.’ Performative utterances are categories of 
utterances that perform action rather than describe, where, as he writes, ‘the 
issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action.’2 He argued, 
performatives ‘are not true or false,’ they ‘do not ‘describe’ or ‘report,’ or 
‘constate’ anything at all; the ‘uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the 
doing of an action.’3 In his formulation, ‘I do, [take this woman to be my lawful 
wedded wife],’ ‘I give and bequeath my watch to my brother’—as occurring in a 
will,’ ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth,’ and ‘I sentence you’ when the 
judge pronounces sentence, are instances of utterances that effect the very 
thing they appear to describe and ‘would not normally be described as ‘just’ 
saying something.’4 In these situations, Austin argued, ‘to utter the sentence 
(in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing of 
what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it 
                                         
1
 John L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 5-6. 
2
 Id at 6.  
3
 Id at 5. 
4
 Id. 
44 
 
  Chapter 3: Toward a Performative Epistemology 
is to do it.’5 Through these analytic distinctions, Austin liberates performative 
utterances from the confines of meaning and truth-values and reveals the 
‘force’ implicit in utterances.6  
 
Coined and introduced to language philosophy in 1955, neither Austin nor his 
contemporaries who completed or reworked aspects of Austin’s conceptual 
architecture saw the disruptive and utopian thrust inherent to the notion of 
performativity.7 Two decades later, however, Austin’s grammatical formulation 
becomes a critical intellectual tool for problematizing the political ontology of 
sovereignty and the subject; and for conceiving and disclosing a new and 
different subject and political universe.8 Popularized primarily through the 
works of Derrida and Butler, performativity is now one of the key deconstructive 
and interventionist conceptual and analytic tools that functions somewhere in 
between Derridean deconstruction and Foucauldian genealogy.  
 
Writing on the political potential of performativity, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
describes the kind of Manichean split that she finds in performativity as ‘kinda 
hegemonic, kinda subversive.’9 But performativity is primarily a hegemonic tool 
– a neutralizing logic that imposes a particular mode of acting and being in the 
world as natural and universal. It is an instrument of legitimation that creates ‘a 
context of legitimate, legitimizing, or legitimized convention’ for eventalization 
of sovereign enunciation.10 By neutralizing the contingencies and complexities 
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underneath the event of enunciation, it creates conditions of possibility for 
iteration and repetition of the code enunciated by the event. However, 
performativity can also work in the opposite direction. While the performative 
is at the heart of authoritative and signifying practices central to the 
constitution of domains of knowledge and regimes of truth, it is also a reflexive 
concept that can be deployed from the opposite direction and for an entirely 
different agenda.11 If the original appropriation conceals, submerges and 
neutralizes the violence of exclusion and inequality at the heart of constitutive 
moments, its subversive appropriation reveals the violence at the core of its 
constitutive and regulative conditions. If the original hegemonic deployment of 
performativity presents the present as constative, rational, and self-evident, its 
subversive redeployment exposes its rationality and self-evidence as contingent 
and heterogeneous; creating conditions of possibility for a different way of 
being and acting, for perceiving and naming the world differently.  
 
3.2.1.  Performativity as Deconstruction 
In series of landmark texts, Derrida reverses performativity’s grammatical 
impulse and explicates its deconstructive impetus.12 In ‘Signature, Event, 
Context,’ he notes, ‘the performative does not have its referent outside of 
itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does not describe 
something that exists outside of language and prior to it. It produces or 
transforms a situation, it effects.’13 While the constative refers to the self-
evident, the necessary, and the irresistible, the performative calls into presence 
the very act it names. It is an action of a very particular character capable of 
generating effects-political or otherwise. A decade later, Derrida deploys this 
generative conceptual architecture in his deconstruction of the American 
Declaration of Independence, arguing that, the Declaration is a performative 
document that brings into being the very truths and ‘The We’ it speaks about. 
He writes: ‘The ‘we’ of the Declaration speaks ‘in the name of the people.’ . . . 
                                         
11
 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 241; Butler, Gender Trouble, 189. 
12
 Derrida, Declarations of Independence, 8; Derrida, ‘The Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of 
Authority,’ in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, ed. David Gray Carlson, Drucilla Cornell, and 
Michel Rosenfeld (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
13
 Derrida, Signature, Event, Context, 13. 
46 
 
  Chapter 3: Toward a Performative Epistemology 
If it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as a possible signer, 
this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the signer.’14  
 
Neutralizing the politics at the core of the event of signing, i.e., the dubious 
legality of the signer creating itself with his own signature, the performative 
presents the constitutive moment as a freestanding and extra-discursive 
moment.15 In this, it brings into being, a new body politic and a new grid of 
intelligibility that institutes the mode of being, speaking, and thinking that 
excludes those who do not share the views of the constituted. 
 
Redirecting its destabilizing impetus against the very order that deployed it to 
constitute its normative reality as self-evident, Derrida here recounts a 
different story of the Declarations of Independence, a story that creates 
conditions of possibility for questionability and contestation. The self-evident 
truths that the Declaration refers to cannot of themselves generate a new body 
politic nor are they sufficient justifications for brining into being a new order 
that did not exist before. There is something more at work.  
 
By explicating the dubious legality that inaugurates law’s founding moment; 
Derrida here imports a destabilizing contingency into the coherent terrain of 
sovereignty to expose its arbitrary constitution made possible only through 
repetition. The Declaration is a performative act that retroactively acquires its 
normative force through repetition of an iterable code. Derrida asks, ‘Could a 
performative utterance succeed if its formulation did not repeat a ‘coded’ or 
iterable utterance . . . if it were not identifiable in some way as a ‘citation’?’16 
The success of the performative is contingent on the possibility of repetition of 
the iterable code which goes to constitute the signifying form. In his own words: 
‘the signifying form only constitutes itself by virtue of its iterability, by the 
possibility of being repeated in the absence not only of its ‘referent’  . . . but 
also a determinate signified.’17  
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In ‘Force of Law,’ Derrida offers the most the definitive philosophical account 
of the performativity of law yet. In this account, Derrida is interested in 
opening up conditions of possibility, the possibility of justice. For Derrida, the 
performativity of law reveals its deconstructability – which in turn constitutes 
law’s conditions of possibility for justice. He says, ‘The fact that law is 
deconstructable is not bad news. We may even see in this a stroke of luck for 
politics, for all historical progress.’18 Law is always a codification of power 
relations, necessarily informed by and embedded in interest and ideology.19 
Deconstruction creates the conditions of possibility for justice beyond the 
instituted interests and ideologies.  
 
By working at the margins, its borders and unstable frontiers, deconstruction 
threatens to denaturalize as to destabilize the mythical convention that holds 
law’s ideological edifice together. Deconstruction identifies the disjuncture 
between law and justice as site for the possibility of a justice to come. If law is 
constructed, rationalized, and legitimized through a performative coup de 
force, Derrida notes, it can be equally deconstructed. If the self-evident truths 
referred to in the Declaration of Independence are performatives that the 
Declaration presents as constative, things that already are and cannot be 
otherwise, Derrida’s performative intervention reconfigures the Declaration’s 
constative—the new body-politic—as performative, a being that can be 
otherwise. In raising the stakes and calling for ‘increase in responsibility,’ 
deconstruction provides access to the inaccessible vicissitudes of law, to the 
disjuncture between law and justice, by unravelling the contingency and 
complexity underlying the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present. 
By stripping law of its neutralizing and sanitizing truths, deconstruction 
generates discourses and domains of consequence on justice. Contra normativist 
arguments, his intervention provides a counter-hegemonic account of institutive 
violence that is not merely a historical description of dissymmetry of forces and 
relationships of inequality and injustice but also a prescriptive form of 
knowledge that can be used as a weapon of political struggle. In his own words, 
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‘Deconstruction, while seeming not to ‘address’ the problem of justice, has 
done nothing but address it, if only obliquely, unable to do so directly.’20  
 
Working somewhere between Foucault and Derrida, Butler situates 
performativity, particularly the ideas of iterability and signification within the 
Foucauldian power-knowledge apparatus to problematize the political ontology 
of the subject.21 Building on Nietzsche’s claim that ‘there is no ‘being’ behind 
doing, working, becoming; ‘the doer’ is a mere appanage to the action, a fiction 
imposed on the doing,’22 Butler launches her own gendered corollary: ‘there is 
no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is 
performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its 
results.’23 In Gender Trouble, Butler writes: ‘gender proves to be performance—
that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be. In this sense, gender is 
always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist 
the deed.’24 Pointing to the constitutive and regulative force of language and 
discourse, Butler persistently denies the existence of a subject that predates its 
constitution in language and discourse.25 Instead, she argues, gender acts 
‘performatively constitute a subject that is the effect, rather than being the 
cause of discourse’: ‘that the gendered body is performative suggests that it has 
no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality.’26  
 
The subject, called into presence within an interpolative framework, ‘at once 
acts out and constitutes’ its identity within normative structures tainted by 
existing networks of power relations. In a characteristically Foucauldian mode 
of analysis, Butler insists, ‘[g]enders can be neither true nor false, but are only 
produced as the truth effects of a discourse of primary and stable identity.’27 
Put simply, Butler’s contention is that there is no natural gender identity—a 
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masculine man or a feminine woman—that is pre-linguistic or pre-social and that 
our gender identity is a reality performatively constructed within a power-
discourse-knowledge constellation.28 Gender is an ‘act,’ a performance that 
calls into being the very thing it names. Like Derrida, Butler too, emphasizes 
iterability as the central mode by which the subject comes into being. As Elin 
Diamond notes, ‘gender is relentlessly exposed as performativity, as a system of 
regulatory norms which the subject cites to appear in culture.’29  
 
In ‘Performative Knowledge,’ Vikki Bell suggests a conception of performativity 
as an epistemic domain.30 As a counter movement to the Cartesian notion of 
agency, Bell argues, performativity breaks the Cartesian link between ‘thinking’ 
and ontology: ‘performativity names an approach that refuses to tie the fact 
that ‘there is thinking’ to identity or ontology.’31  By disentangling thinking from 
being, performativity reveals the constitutive and regulative conditions that 
contingently constitute the subject. ‘The subject,’ Bell argues, ‘is co-extensive’ 
with the external environment that conditions his or her subjectivity.32  As an 
epistemic domain, then, performativity problematizes not only the complex and 
contingent conditions out of which the subject emerges but also the means by 
which and the ways in which non-normative, i.e., causal, sociological or 
empirical facts have been transformed into normative facts that are said to be 
inescapable, binding and compelling.  
 
Situating the performative at the interstices of the event and theories of 
legitimation, Derrida shows how performativity creates opportunities for 
reopening spaces totalized by ‘the authoritative forces of signification.’33 By 
exposing the incoherence and contingency that underpins America’s much 
revered birth certificate, he uses the performative to give intelligibility to 
claims against the Declaration, opening it up to future contestations and 
                                         
28
 Butler, Gender Trouble, 24-26. 
29
 Tracy C. Davis and Thomas Postlewait, eds., Theatricality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 207. 
30
 Vikki Bell, Performative Knowledge, 23 Theory, Culture & Society, 214 (2006), 214. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
33
 Derrida, Performative Powerlessness, 467. 
50 
 
  Chapter 3: Toward a Performative Epistemology 
resignifications.34 Here, we see performativity’s condition of political possibility: 
if there is no guarantee the original performative will be repeated, there is a 
possibility of reimagining and reconfiguring present configurations of 
sovereignty, the political, and the subject and the whole series of relations that 
constitute and regulate them. In her deconstructive genealogy of the subject, 
Butler credits Derrida for offering ‘a way to think performativity in relation to 
transformation, to break with prior contexts, with the possibility of inaugurating 
contexts yet to come.’35 This break, this possibility of disjuncture between the 
original inscription and a particular invocation, constitutes the subject’s 
limitless potentials for being otherwise. Reading the possibility of a disjuncture 
between signification and context, Janelle Reinelt writes, ‘Iteration means that 
in the space between the context and the utterance, there is no guarantee of a 
realization of prior conditions, but rather of deviance from them, which 
constitutes its performative force.’36  
 
3.2.2.  Law’s Performativity  
Let me begin by reiterating two questions emblematic of a central paradox in 
jurisprudence suggestive of law’s oscillation between normativity and 
performativity. One is the eternal debate between legal theorists whether we 
should consider states as artificial products of individuals or the individual as an 
artificial product of the state. Another equally foundational paradox for 
jurisprudence and juridical discourse is the question of whether rights originate 
in a state of nature, or were they really created by governments.’ 
Jurisprudence does not provide a theoretically adequate and empirically 
intelligible answer to its central organizing precepts: sovereignty, the subject, 
and right (law). Both Natural Law and Legal Positivism approach these questions 
from different perspectives and arrive at different answers.37  
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There are at least two paradigms of normativity that dominate philosophical 
reflection in law. Joseph Raz, for example, distinguishes between ‘justified 
normativity’ and ‘social normativity’ whilst Gerald Postema distinguishes 
between ‘the normative thesis,’ and ‘the social thesis.’38 Within both 
paradigms, law is conceptualized as referential, in the sense of having a 
referent outside itself, and autonomous; as something with its own inner truth.39 
While justified normativity takes a priori facts as its point of departure and 
claims the existence of a conceptual link between law and morality40; social 
normativity departs from the social domain and claims that law’s criterion of 
validity comes from the social domain.41 Perhaps the foremost normativist legal 
positivist, Hans Kelsen, belongs to the former category. In accounting for the 
normativity of law, Kelsen turns to the Ten Commandments to explain the 
regressive logic at work in an explanation of normativity. ‘The reason for the 
validity of the Ten Commandments,’ Kelsen writes, ‘is that God Jehovah issued 
them on Mount Sinai’; or: ‘‘men ought to love their enemies, because Jesus, Son 
of God, issued this command in his sermon on the mount.’’42 Accordingly, the 
normative force of a legal proposition drives from these categories and 
established through a regressive reasoning that traces the norm to its source. 
 
Departing from different referent points, and adopting different modes of 
reasoning, both paradigms regard law as a normative system and conceptualize 
it as a proposition of reason that gives individuals and officials ‘reason for 
action.’43 It is precisely this rationalization of law that posits law as an 
‘extension of practical reason’ and dissimulates its violence in the realm of the 
rational that Carl Schmitt attacked in his survey of ‘The Three Modes of Juristic 
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Thought.’44 In his critique of legal normativism, Schmitt writes, 
‘Normativistically: Only law, not the necessities of the momentary, continually 
changing situation or even the choices of men, should be allowed to ‘rule’ or 
‘command.’’45 Whatever the sociological facts in the concrete order, 
irrespective of the domination and subjugation it underwrites and erases, law is 
independent of the claims of history, politics, and power. These empirical facts 
cannot of themselves refute claims about the normativity of law.  
 
In the last few decades, there have been several attempts at reformulating and 
elucidating these questions from a broader disciplinary perspective. Gunther 
Teubner for example made a crucial intervention from a systems theoretical 
perspective. In ‘How the Law Thinks,’ he asks, ‘What is the precise meaning of 
the somewhat ambiguous statement that law constitutes an autonomous reality? 
What is meant by saying that the individual is a mere construct of society and 
law?’46 Calling into question the normative presupposition that pervade the 
dominant conception of law, Gunther Teubner proposes a conception of law 
premised on communication: ‘law is communication and nothing but 
communication.’47 Drawing on Foucault, Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann—
Teubner singles out communication as ‘the cognitive instrument by which the 
law as social discourse is able to ‘see’ the world.’48 But communication is too 
narrow a concept and too neutral a notion to account for the strategic, the 
deliberate concealing and the deadlock by which law achieves things. The 
notion of communication Teubner advances does not adequately account for the 
strategic, discursive, historical, and political means by which law codifies its 
violence—economic, political, and social—into system of rules to constitute and 
regulate its juridical universe.  
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In an essay titled ‘Legal Performance Good and Bad,’ Julie Peters goes back to 
the story in Exodus when God introduced the Jews to the Ten Commandments.49 
By reading ‘the ‘spectacular sound and light show’ that inaugurated the moment 
of lawgiving as speech act, Peters shows the irreducibly performative logic that 
displaces law from within its normative basis: ‘law is the ultimate performative 
institution.’50 Performativity encapsulates not only the communicative in law 
but also the discursive, bodily, ritualistic and literary aspects of language that 
are much more strategic and cannot be accounted for within the communicative 
paradigm. Whatever law’s ambivalent relationship to its performativity, law is 
performative through and through. Law’s schematics of enunciation and 
execution, its modes of assertion and expression, its re-enactment of social 
conflict and their dramatization, are all performative. Without recalling the 
claims of the normativist camp, this thesis argues that the normative in law is 
simply a placeholder for the performative.51 Law thinks performatively: a 
performative logic and mode of reasoning frames and determines law’s 
constitutive and regulative moments—foundation, subject-formation, 
legislation, and adjudication. In the rest of this chapter, I will try to establish 
this claim by looking at two profound moments: foundation and subjectification.  
 
3.2.3. The Performative Constitution of Sovereignty 
Although Hans Kelsen returns to ‘The Ten Commandments’ to account for law’s 
normativity, Julie Peters offers a rigorously non-normative (performative) 
reading of ‘The Ten Commandments’ itself.52 Re-reading the story in Exodus 
with the view to extrapolating the performative rationality that undergirds it, 
she writes: 
 
Thunder and lightning appear in the skies, and suddenly the voice of a 
trumpet ‘exceeding loud’ can be heard. Trembling, the people are led 
by Moses to the foot of Mount Sinai . . . they see a vast smoky cloud. 
Suddenly, flames burst forth and the mountain begins to quake. Enter: 
God from the ‘heavens’ in the form of fire (the original deus ex 
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machina). The trumpet gives one long blast, getting louder and louder. 
And a dialogue between God and Moses begins, as God descends onto 
the mountain and Moses climbs up it. . . . ‘I am the Lord thy God, which 
have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of 
bondage.’ And then he lays down the law.53 
 
Drawing on Montaigne’s most rehearsed phrase—‘fondement mystique de 
[l’]autorité’— Peters reads the thunder, lightning and the smoke, as an ‘ocular 
spectacle in which God frames his giving of the law.’54 Peters states that the 
underlying rationale for the thunder, lightening, and the trumpet, is to render 
‘authority visual, palpable, bodily (accessible to the senses).’55 Through such a 
performative speech act, Peters argue, ‘God effectively establishes the mystical 
or occult nature of legal authority.’56 Instead of providing a transcendent 
referent for the normative source of its authority, the performative coup de 
force of the thunder, lightning and the smoke functions to ‘transcend[s] the 
demand for rational justifications.’57 This ‘coup de force,’ coupled with the 
‘replay of violence,’ ‘Ye have seen what I did unto the Egyptians,’ constitutes 
‘both a legal order and a nation.’58 In Peters’ schema, therefore, it is the 
performative speech act (God’s speech act through thunder, trumpet and 
smoke) that authenticates ‘the invisible and unspeakable’ foundation of 
authority in Judeo-Christian tradition.59 In this account of foundation that 
displaces law’s normative claims, Peters eloquently reminds us how, even when 
deconstructive analysis excavates the hidden roots of the law, its ‘foundation 
remains ultimately inaccessible, too dazzling to gaze upon and thus concealed 
just out of view.’60  
 
In ‘Declaration of Independence,’ Derrida draws on the notion of performativity 
to disrupt the transcendent referents named in the Declaration as the 
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foundations of the new body politic. He asks, ‘who signs, and with what so-
called proper name, the declarative act that founds an institution?’61 In 
disrupting the normative link between the ‘We’ of the Declaration and the new 
body politic, Derrida writes:  
 
The ‘we’ of the declaration speaks ‘in the name of the people.’ But this 
people [do] not yet exist. They do not exist as an entity; it does not 
exist, before this declaration, not as such. If it gives birth to itself, as 
free and independent subject, as possible signer [of the declaration], 
this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the 
signer. This signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he or 
she has come to the end, if one can say this, or his or her own 
signature, in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.62   
 
The ultimate moral or legal authority of the Declaration, Derrida argues, is 
neither the self-evident truths nor ‘Nature’s God.’63 It is the will generating 
signature that generates the signer ‘in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.’64 
However, Derrida does not consider the ‘we hold’ of the Declaration as a pure 
performative. In his account, the undecidability that obscures the nature of the 
utterance, i.e., the ‘we hold,’ accounts for the ‘rhetorical force’ the 
Declaration enjoys: ‘this obscurity, this undecidability between, let’s say, a 
performative and a constative structure, is required in order to produce the 
sought after effect.’65 Insofar as it is not obvious whether the utterance is 
expressive or productive of ‘independence,’ Derrida claims, the ‘we hold’ is 
neither exclusively performative nor fully constative.66 However, others disagree 
with this reading of the key justificatory statements of the Declarations. 
Comparing Arendt’s and Derrida’s readings of the Declaration, Bonnie Honig 
argues that the ‘we hold’ of the Declaration is a performative speech act that 
constitutes the ‘we’ it speaks about. 
 
Here, we witness a performative utterance, ‘an action that exists in words,’ 
neither true nor false, that doesn’t refer to any prior principle, with no 
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antecedent referent or a first instance, but nevertheless calls into being the 
‘We’ that never existed before the utterance. The reference to ‘nature’s god’ 
and ‘self-evident truths’ as ‘transcendent sources of authority’ are meant to 
anchor the new body politic and its authority in a normative fact. These are the 
factual presuppositions that validate the founding act and the authority of the 
sovereign as legal. For the authors of the Declaration, these transcendent truths 
belong to ‘empirically inaccessible’ category of facts that are not ‘part of the 
ordinary stream of explanation.’67 These truths—life, liberty, and the pursuits of 
happiness—drive their criterion of validity from conceptually constituted 
domains capable of compelling those to whom the norm is addressed both as 
included and excluded. However, Derrida’s performative deconstruction denies 
that there is any transcendent universal that justified the founding act and 
argues that the transcendent is simply a placeholder for the performative fact 
of iteration that generates itself in a sort of ‘fabulous retroactivity.’68 In the 
same way that the theological order that Peters so vividly elaborates is justified 
via a performative coup de force, i.e., a performative knowledge that 
legitimizes the foundation of authority, Derrida’s account reveals the 
performative violence that both institutes law’s authority and keeps it 
inaccessible.  
 
Derrida emphasizes another key moment in the Declaration where the ‘we’ 
drives political authority from the pure ‘performativity of institutive language’: 
‘We, . . . the Representatives of the United States of America, . . . appealing to 
the Supreme Judge of the world . . . , do, in the Name, and by Authority of the 
good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare.’ Although the 
earlier speech act—‘We hold these truths to be self-evident’—is a performative 
speech act that, instead of asserting that they are self-evident, transforms the 
truths it speaks about into self-evident facts, it is this last moment in the 
Declaration – ‘we, . . . the representatives of the United States of America . . . 
appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world . . . declare and publish’– that 
institutes, authenticates and vindicates the new polis and defines its 
participants. In Vikki Bell’s schema, there is a cogito that ties ‘thinking,’ the 
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‘we hold’– to ‘identity or ontology’ – the new body-politic.69 If, as Derrida 
contends, the invocation of ‘nature’s God’ is a ‘game’ meant to transform the 
performative into constative, or the performative into the normative, the 
Declaration’s performative, a Cartesian Cogito, is the colonies’ constative. This 
groundless act of founding that posits the performative as normative constitutes 
the material fabric for relationships of domination and resistance within the 
new body politic.70  
 
In the ‘Force of Law,’ Derrida offers one of the most incisive theoretical 
articulations of this concealing domain that legitimizes institutive usurpation: 
‘The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying moment 
that institutes law implies a performative force.’71 In this rather definitive 
formulation of the performative logic that undergirds and animates juridical 
discourses, Derrida demonstrates that the ‘operation that amounts to founding . 
. . justifying law’ constitutes a performative coup de force. He writes:  
 
Its very moment of foundation or institution (which in any case is never 
a moment inscribed in the homogeneous tissue of a history, since it is 
ripped apart with one decision), the operation that amounts to 
founding, inaugurating, justifying law (driot), making law, would consist 
of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore interpretive 
violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and 
no previous law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or 
contradict or invalidate.72 
 
If Derrida’s emphasis here is on the logic of justification that underwrites the 
institutive moment, it is precisely because he views the founding act as a 
formative moment that configures the constituent elements of our political 
universe: the state, sovereignty, politics, and the subject. In this passage, and 
throughout this work, Derrida makes visible the contingent foundations of these 
elements and shows us that the political practices of the present were not 
inevitable and that things could have been different. When he writes that ‘the 
founding and justifying moment that institutes law implies a performative 
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force,’ he is clearly displacing the normative claims of this moment. The ‘force 
of law’ that justifies the founding moment that institutes legality and the 
conditions of intelligibility are not the Kantian transcendent referents but 
linguistic games that present the performative as constative. 
 
‘Force of Law’—the force that validates law as lawful—has its origin in a non-
normative source. ‘The Force of Law’ makes visible, if not accessible, the coup 
de force of a performative that institutes and justifies a normative fiction that 
anchors our system of law and justice. Indeed, the origin of law is extralegal: 
‘the position of the law can’t by definition rest on anything but itself.’73 It is an 
aporetic moment which ‘no justice and no previous law with its founding 
anterior moment could guarantee.’74 No regressive reasoning traces the 
normative validity of the law to a set of pre-constituted conceptual domains 
that are valid beyond empirical recognition. As Montaigne’s famous formulation 
elucidates, law is anchored in a fiction of a particular kind, a fiction that 
generates a domain of knowledge and truth and ensures the consolidation of 
order: ‘even our law, it is said, has legitimate fictions on which it founds the 
truth of its justice.’75 It is this performative formation, variously referred to as 
‘fiction,’ ‘fetish,’ ‘magic,’ ‘myth,’ etcetera, that powerfully explains law’s 
normative conundrum and its ambivalent relationship with ideals of justice, 
equality, and dignity.  Emphasizing the displacement of justice from the orbit of 
performative sovereignty, Derrida reiterates Montaigne’s famous statement: 
‘laws keep up their good standing, not because they are just, but because they 
are laws . . . that is the mystical foundation of their authority . . . Anyone who 
obeys them because they are just is not obeying them the way he ought to.’76  
 
For Derrida, the institutive function of performativity and the iterability of the 
signifying form is the starting point. He writes that the ‘theories of the 
performative are always at the service of powers of legitimation, of legitimized 
or legitimizing powers.’77 They inaugurate a politico-economic system that 
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preserves and guarantees the right of sovereignty and the relationship of 
domination it underwrites. It is a reductive moment that institutes a grid of 
intelligibility consistent with the juridical theory of sovereignty, inscribes a 
discourse of right and justice subject to the right of sovereignty. It is a moment 
that delineates the scope of the political, usurping citizen’s right of resistance 
through juridical codes whose central project is the preservation of the status 
quo. Derrida’s deconstruction of this moment is a political-intellectual 
intervention aimed at disrupting essentialist-normative discourses that conceal 
law’s technologies of truth generation, revealing the myth that legitimizes 
sovereign technologies of truth and injustices of inaugural usurpations. For him, 
the proper question of validity lies not in the normative force of law but in the 
performative force- a felicitous performative that repeats itself as a ‘sort of 
fabulous retroactivity.’78  
 
3.2.4. The Performative Constitution of the Subject  
 
We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a 
constitution of subjects 
 
—Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, 1976 
 
 
[T]he subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices 
of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something that the 
individual invents by himself. They are patterns that he finds in his 
culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his 
culture, his society, and his social group.79 
        
      —Michel Foucault, Interview, 1984 
 
In ‘Law and the Stranger,’ the editors reiterate Derrida’s thesis in the ‘Force of 
Law’: ‘law constitutes the ‘we’ it governs, hailing us as those subjects to its 
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power, naming us as the group under its jurisdiction.’80 The law interpellates 
the individual as a ‘legal person,’ hailing it as a bearer of rights and duties, and 
subject to its jurisdiction. Problematizing the ontology of the subject and 
decentering its ‘centre of cognition,’ Butler rejects the idea of the autonomous 
and rational subject law claims to deal with, arguing that, ‘Juridical power 
inevitably ‘produces’ what it claims merely to represent.’81 The ‘I’ that the law 
refers to as sovereign is not sovereign indeed. The ‘I,’ according to this logic, is 
revealed to be a construct; which in Butler’s thesis, acquires its reality/identity 
from discursive and linguistic performativity.82 Alluding to this generative 
operation of law, Teubner writes, ‘The human subject is no longer the author of 
discourse. Just the opposite: the discourse produces the human subject as a 
semantic artefact.’83 Let me return to Butler’s ‘political genealogy of gender 
ontologies’ to account for discursive and institutional processes within which 
law produces and presents the subject as the effect of discourse. 
 
Invoking the Nietzschean idea that ‘there is no being behind doing,’ Butler 
launches her own genealogical formulation of the gendered subject: ‘There is 
no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is 
performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its 
results.’84 The gender identity that one has is not ‘something one is, it is 
something one does,’ a ‘doing’ rather than a ‘being.’85 Butler further argues 
that ‘Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts 
within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the 
appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.’86 A series of iterative 
practices within strictly regulated normative structures, the feminine identity of 
the women or the masculine identity of the man, Butler argues, is a construct 
within these regulated frames rather than a fact expressive of its essence.87 In 
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the Butlerian framework, gender performativity produces the liberal subject 
that speaks in discourse: ‘The ‘I’ only comes into being through being called, 
named, [and] interpellated.’88 This discursive constitution, Butler claims, ‘takes 
place prior to the ‘I’ . . . precedes and conditions the formation of the 
subject.’89 As a performative discourse, Butler claims, gender, brings into being 
the very stuff it names: ‘feminine’ woman or ‘masculine’ man.90 Reading Butler, 
Sarah Salih argued, ‘Since identity is a signifying practice, culturally intelligible 
subjects are the effects rather than the causes of discourses.’91  
 
Arguing that gender acts ‘performatively constitute a subject that is the effect 
of discourse rather than the cause of it,’ Butler claims, ‘That the gendered body 
is performative suggests that it has no ontological status apart from the various 
acts which constitute its reality.’92 Performativity is, therefore, the discursive 
instrument by which the gendered, sexed, and the racialized subject is 
constituted, partly through his own actions but importantly through practices, 
as Foucault said, ‘proposed, suggested and imposed on him by his culture, his 
society, and his social group.’93 Subject formation is an ongoing and never-
ending process.  
 
As Butler writes, it is ‘at once a becoming of the subject and the process of 
subjection.’94 The subject produced through technologies of subjection ‘is not 
produced at an instance in its totality.’95 It is in the process of repetition that 
the subject continues to consolidate his subjecthood and subjection. But how 
does this concept of gender performativity help us explain the transformation of 
the messy, living, concrete, and socially embedded human being into a fiction 
called ‘legal person’ and its nexus with questions of agency and resistance?  
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3.2.5.  The Performative Generation of the Legal Person 
 
 
The human person is the subject of rights and duties from birth to 
death.96 
      
      —The Ethiopian Civil Code, Art. 1, 1960 
 
To be a legal person is to be the subject of rights and duties. To confer legal 
rights or to impose legal duties is therefore to confer legal personality.  
 
              —Gray Chipman, 1921 
 
The corporation is no fiction, no symbol, no piece of the state's machinery, no 
collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real person with a 
body and members and a will of its own. 
 
                                                                                         —Bryan Smith, 1928 
 
 
‘Legal Personality’ is the primary device through which law codes and regulates 
the juridical universe.  It is the foremost cognitive instrument by which law 
produces actors and assigns duties and obligations. As L. C. Webb usefully notes, 
legal personality is ‘the gift of the legal sovereign.’97 It is the means by which 
the state grants recognition to its subjects and compels the subject to yield to 
prescribed norms of behaviour. It is ‘the means by which the state has regulated 
the activities of social groups and made them conform to its order.’98 Teubner 
refers to this indispensable device through which the law ‘sees the world’ as 
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‘the atoms of classical jurisprudence.’99 The person in law is not the human 
being with its own ontological existence. It is an ‘artificial semantic product’ 
internally constructed within law’s self-referential and self-replicating 
discourses.100 Even the foremost normativist legal scholar, Hans Kelsen, sees 
legal personality as a semantic artefact. Legal personality, like the 
‘Grundnorm,’ is ‘a social construction, created by the science of law.’101 Kelsen 
goes on to state that ‘The assumption that the legal person is a reality different 
from individual human beings, a reality, yet curiously imperceptible to the 
senses . . . is the naïve hypostatization of a thought, of a heuristic legal 
notion.’102  
 
My interest here is not to restate the much stated claim that legal personality is 
an artificial construct of the law. Rather, I am contending that legal personality 
is a performative discourse that brings into being the very thing it names. Just 
like sovereignty in Derrida or the gendered, sexed or racialized body in Butler 
comes into being through performative signification; the legal subject (the legal 
person) too comes into being through law’s performative speech act.  
Reiterating the feminist contention that ‘law does not merely represent physical 
bodies but actually produces them,’103 Kristen Savell’s informative essay, ‘The 
Mother of the Legal Person,’ conceives legal personality as a formative moment 
of legal subjectivity.104 The law hails us: ‘The Human Person is the Subject of 
Rights and Duties from Birth to Death.’ To state so is not to describe something, 
it is do something, to effect action, as Austin says. It is ‘an action that exists in 
words.’ In the Butlerian schema, this statement is a performative speech act 
that transforms, in the constitutive sense, the human being it speaks about into 
a bearer of rights and duties to create a new reality. As a performative speech 
act, the action brings into being a subject with a distinct identity that does not 
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have an ontological status separate from the series of juridifications ‘that 
constitute its reality’ as a subject. The juridical identity to which the action 
refers comes into being through the action itself. In Butler’s formulation, this 
ontology is ‘manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other 
discursive means’ and ‘has no ontological status apart from the various acts 
which constitute its reality.’105  
 
The person in law is everyone and specifically no one. The human being, not 
born a person, becomes one through law’s performative signification. An 
example will illustrate this constant becoming: Alice Nelson Anderson was born 
on 10 January 1975 as a human being, a person of blood-and-flesh 
unencumbered by legal obligations. At the moment of birth, that performative 
speech act that interpellates all ‘human persons’ as ‘the subject of rights and 
duties from birth to death’ transforms Alice into a legal person that is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the sovereign. The law consolidates this transformation of the 
human being into the legal person by granting her inaugurative credentials such 
as birth certificates, passports, National Insurance Numbers or Social Security 
Number or other credentials that makes her visible and intelligible in the 
system. These credentials are material instances of what Butler refers to as 
‘written discourses’ or ‘bureaucratic discourses’ that invest the body and mark 
out the inauguration of the subject. 
 
In our example above, the Anderson N. Alice that appears on her birth 
certificate, passport, Bank Account, Driving License, National Insurance Number 
(Social Security Number) and other necessary credentials is different from the 
Alice Nelson Anderson that is born free. While the former is a juridical figure 
brought into being through law’s performative production, the latter is a human 
being with its own ontological existence, arguably, dating back to conception. 
In acting out the identities of a legal person, Alice N. Anderson simultaneously 
constitutes herself and sustains her construction as a subject. In performing her 
legal duties, Anderson constitutes herself as legal subject- subjecting herself to 
the legal structure. As Butler points out, ‘by virtue of being subject to them,’ 
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subjects are ‘formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the 
requirements of those structures.’106  
 
This transformation of Alice Nelson Anderson—the universal, messy, living, 
concrete, socially embedded human being—into Alice N. Anderson, a seemingly 
sovereign, autonomous legal person, inscribes discursive ensembles that 
determine what Alice is, can, and does. It determines her mode of knowing, 
acting and being in the world. It is a discourse that renders practices of 
domination intelligible and accepts, and masks the performative logic through 
which it is constituted and framed. Because it is the only register that the 
discourse of right is capable of recognizing, the category of the person is not 
just some exploitative device, it is also a precondition of visibility and hearing. 
It is something claimed by everyone—from the embryo in the womb to the most 
gigantic of institutions like the UN and EU. Legal personality is not merely about 
legal standing, the capacity to sue and be sued, it also involves a much deeper 
question of who is visible in law and under what conditions.107 Reflecting on 
law’s treatment of African American subjectivity, McHugh claims that 
personality determines ‘the fundamental legal and political concept of 
membership within a liberal society.’108 Legal personality, therefore, not only 
constitutes us as subjects visible in law, it also determines the question of who 
is ‘recognized as an active participant in the polis.’109 
 
The legal principle that ‘the human person is the subject of rights and duties 
from birth to death’ is a performative speech act that constitutes a political 
ontology of the subject. It is in this sense that that formative/generative 
encounter between law and the human being brings into being a new juridical 
‘subject’ that never existed before that formative encounter. Instead of merely 
‘causing,’ ‘determining’ or superimposing disciplinary norms, these discursive 
ensembles constitute legal subjectivity reaching deeper into our lives and 
conditioning our desires, knowledges, and values. This brings us to one of the 
                                         
106
 Butler, Gender Trouble, 3.  
107
 J McHugh , ‘What is the Difference Between a ‘Person’ and a Human Being’ within the Law,’ 
108, What is the Difference Between a ‘Person’ and a ‘Human Being’ within the Law?, 54 Review of Politics 
445 (1992), 456.  
109
 Id. 
66 
 
  Chapter 3: Toward a Performative Epistemology 
most puzzling aspects of subjectivity and the central antinomies of our political 
rationality: subjectivity generally and legal subjectivity specifically is at once 
the becoming of the subject and a process of subjectification. As Butler notes, 
‘one inhabits the figure of autonomy only by becoming subjected to a power.’110 
Finally, since legal personality is the fundamental premise upon which law 
confers rights and imposes duties, this performative architecture reverberates 
across the legal system shaping and informing our conceptions of sovereignty, 
politics, society, and agency. It is a vector and instrument for both technologies 
of domination and resistance.  
 
3.3.  Toward a Performative Epistemology of Law 
 
Performative writing refuses an  . . . easy and  . . . false distinction 
between performance and text, performance and performativity . . . 
writing as doing displaces writing as meaning.  
 
                                —Della  Pollock, ‘Performing Writing,’ 1998 
 
 
Why a performative Epistemology? What are these performances that 
performativity consists in, and what explanatory/interventionist work do these 
acts do? How do the explanations that performative acts provide differ from or 
relate to explanations of normative facts? My argument is that the normative 
thesis is a metaphysical fiction incompatible with the actual materiality of 
political life within the concrete order. The normative thesis—’Law is a form of 
practical reasoning; like morality and prudence, it defines a general framework 
for practical reasoning’—does not give a satisfactory account of the relationship 
between the framework of practical reason that guides the legal norm and the 
ability of the norm to generate the corresponding will that directs the subject. 
The identification of law with the realm of practical reason not only conceals 
the historical and political dimension of law, sovereignty, rights, and 
subjectivity, it also prevents the possibilities of change and becoming. Once law 
is identified with reason itself, shrugging off, historical, political, social, and 
economic facts of constitutive effect, this submits the subject to norms of 
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intelligibility that pre-emptively forecloses alternative modes of being, 
knowing, acting, and belonging.   
 
Once law is conceived as a product of reason, that conception has the effect of 
naturalizing the present—investing practices of deprivation, occupation, 
domination, and inequality, with self-evidence and necessity that are grounded 
in reason. It defines the terms of political and cultural intelligibility, the terms 
under which one can speak and give account. By foreclosing the very notion of 
change and transformation (because you cannot argue against reason), it closes 
off sovereignty, the political and subjectivity from political contestation. 
Whatever power it serves, the congruity between reason and legal norms is 
precisely the justification summoned by authority to abdicate responsibility and 
turn its back against injustice, violence, and oppression. By making itself appear 
obvious, natural, necessary, and even absolute, law forecloses the possibility of 
imagining otherwise where, empirically speaking, there is no reason why the 
exact opposite of the present is not possible.  
 
A performative epistemology begins from the view that an ethical and 
responsive politics emerges out of the destabilization of this shackling 
essentialism, and the ‘fissuring of the subject.’ Toward that end, it attempts to 
demystify the normative thesis, i.e., the inherent nexus between reason and 
law, by demonstrating the unwarranted nature of the assumption and its 
incompatibility with the actual materiality of life. Apart from the non-
referential claim, law cannot offer any empirical evidence that expresses its 
self-evident character or its obvious conformity with reason. To the extent that 
there is any appearance of necessity and naturalness, it is generated through 
our individual and collective repetition of prescribed non-referential codes.  
 
Insofar as the performative generates and presents law’s normative materiality, 
animating its central organizing moments—foundation, subjectification, 
legislation, and adjudication—a normative analysis of law cannot adequately 
account for law’s characteristics, processes and institutions. If the ‘we’ in 
whose name the founding act constitutes the legal order and the ‘legal person’ – 
‘cognitive instruments’ through which law codes and subjectifies those under its 
jurisdiction—are both brought into being through performative signification, 
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then, performativity becomes fundamental to any theoretical project aimed at 
understanding and articulating law and its discursive operations. As a concept 
that involves a double movement, of signification and re-inscription, it is critical 
not only for understanding the rationality and modes of thought underlying the 
framework of production and subjection, but also for theorizing a discourse of 
rights emancipated from the colonizing logic of sovereignty. A performative 
rethinking of the law creates spaces of intervention and ensures the resistibility 
of normalizing and invasive norms.  
 
Central to the operations of the performative is the discursive transformation of 
the causal and the sociological into the normative.111 The performative 
appropriation of language and discourse transforms the sociological fact of 
state, law and legality into some intrinsic and necessary fact that determines 
our way of being, knowing and acting. As the primary instrument of 
legitimation, the performative justifies sovereignty, validates its authority, and 
makes it culturally intelligible. The performative force undergirding ‘the 
founding and justifying moment that institutes the law,’ Derrida notes, 
‘maintain[s] a more internal, more complex relation with what one calls force, 
power or violence.’112 By concealing the iterability that constitutes the unity of 
the signifying form, law claims conceptual continuity with practical reason. The 
transcendent validity that law claims—a validity that transcends what people 
recognize as valid—fundamentally conceals the complex and contingent 
foundations of sovereignty, politics, and subjectivity. By neutralizing these 
contingent foundations with normative discourses and representing them as 
natural, self-evident, necessary, compelling, inescapable etcetera, the law 
closes possibilities of change and becoming. A performative reconceptualization 
allows us to engage in a subversive and disruptive resignification of prior 
significations. 
 
The performative marks the birth of justice and injustice, equality and 
domination, oppression and liberation. In inaugurating a body politic and 
constituting the legal subject, the performative reduces, manages or suppresses 
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contingency. For example, the reduction of the constituent to the constituted, 
the political to politics, and the human being to a legal person functions to 
subject the individual to series of subjectifications.113 The performative logic 
that justifies these reductions institutes a ‘grid of intelligibility’ and idioms of 
judgment through which it suppresses subjection, obscures exclusions, and 
prevents change and becoming, closes down spaces of contestation, precludes 
political action, and legitimizes a violent suppression of resistance against 
exclusion and injustice.  
 
This exclusionary ‘grid of intelligibility’ operates through exclusionary regimes 
of truth that Foucault formulated in ‘The Will to Truth.’ According to this 
formulation, ‘the will to truth’ is an ‘institutionally constraining system of 
exclusion that regulates what sorts of statements can appear as truth-bearing 
events—what can and cannot be intelligibly said in any given social 
formation.’114 ‘[L]ike other systems of exclusion,’ the ‘will to truth’ ‘rests on an 
institutional support: it is both reinforced and renewed by a whole strata of 
practices, such as pedagogy . . .  But it is also renewed, no doubt, more 
profoundly, by the way in which knowledge is put to work, valorized, 
distributed.’115  
 
In ‘From Bakunin to Lacan: Anti-Authoritarianism and the Dislocation of Power,’ 
Saul Newman makes this revealing observation about essentialist discourses: 
‘Essentialist identities limit the individual, constructing his or her reality around 
certain norms, and closing off the possibilities of change and becoming.’116 As I 
argued through the concept of personality in the previous section, by conferring 
legal personality on the human being and transforming it into a person, the legal 
discourse constructs the individual’s identity/reality ‘around certain norms’ and 
‘closes off the possibility of change and becoming’117 ‘[A] whole series of 
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institutional practices which dominate the individual in multitude of ways,’ 
continues Newman, ‘are brought into play by essentialist logics.’118 In this way, 
essentialist discourses foreclose the intelligibility of resistant discourses. It 
perpetrates what Miranda Fricker refers to as ‘epistemic injustice.’ 
Performativity alerts us to the micro-practices that invest and pervade the body 
to get hold of it from within. 
 
My contention is that while performative knowledge plays a central role in 
constituting the ‘legitimate fiction’ necessary for the operation of essentialist 
discourses, particularly the law, it is a form of knowledge capable of 
reconfiguring that formative configuration of power-knowledge constellation 
and interrupt gate-keeping discourses. As a strategic instrument that functions 
across the power-knowledge complex and informs their particular configuration, 
performativity has a potential to configure and reconfigure the universe of 
domination and resistance. In other words, it is a hinge essential to the workings 
of the politics of truth and the perpetual war that rages between discourses of 
domination and resistance. It is the configuration and reconfiguration of this 
‘hinge,’ this fulcrum, that is key for understanding not only the logic of 
subjection that traverses the legal order but also for articulating an action that 
‘registers as resistant, neither reducible to—nor co-optable by—the order [and 
the discourse] it seeks to resist.’119 
 
A performative conception of law recognizes practices of domination, 
subjection, and the fiction underlying our instituted forms of justice. It enables 
innovative interventions that expose the contingency of juridical discourses and 
biopolitical technologies that animate the subject’s identities. Performative 
knowledge ‘recognizes disciplinary power, enables action in the face of that 
power, enables innovation in deliberation, and thus allows us to see the world 
of political action differently.’120 Such reconceptualization allows us to trace 
the genealogy of what Montaigne calls ‘legitimate fiction of justice’ and ‘the 
mystical foundation of authority’ to its source and problematize their historical 
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inscription to illuminate the present. Whatever emancipatory potential one 
ascribes to this approach, no matter how contingent performativity’s 
transformative promise, one thing is clear: performative knowledge is a 
resistant knowledge.  
 
In this sublime age of ours, performative knowledge provides epistemic resource 
for those who fight. In fact, by its very existence and circulation in the social 
body, this knowledge engages in an epistemic resistance against hegemonic and 
juridical forms of knowledge. By displacing the self-evident, natural and 
inevitable character of the present, it enables action. In dislocating the self-
evidence and naturalness with which the constituted order legitimizes its laws 
and system of justice, the performative articulates a different narrative of 
sovereignty, a narrative that rejects the founding moment as a foundational site 
of truth. The myth that undergirds the moment of foundation, a moment that 
inscribes a grid of intelligibility and is both a site of truth and justice, is 
characterized by this paradox that Montaigne called ‘legitimate fictions.’  
 
Law, to be sure, is illegal at origin. Tracing law to its origin does not lead to any 
presupposed norm of validation or justification, not as such. But it reveals a 
performative fiction that retroactively validates the institutive moment. A 
performative epistemology understands this fiction placed at the very core of 
the legal system and crafts a new performative fiction to counter the earlier 
fiction: fiction against fiction. By breaking the illusion of coherence, 
naturalness, and apparent necessity said to ground law’s moment of origin, the 
performative allows us to speak of a different form of law, a higher law, and 
the law to come, politically responsive and responsible law that leads to justice, 
equality and dignity. By dislocating justice from the orbit of the law, 
performativity unleashes the interruptive force of justice to make law 
responsive and responsible. It subjects law to the endless demands of justice, 
humanity, and dignity. As courtroom strategy, performative knowledge can be 
deployed as a critical resource to destabilize, decentre, reconstitute, and 
transform normative closures and gate-keeping discourses Christodoulidis 
identifies as ‘law’s power of homology and deliberate deadlock.’121 Finally, a 
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performative epistemology of law does not seek to do away with the normative. 
By recognizing the contingent and complex foundations of sovereignty, and 
subjectivity, a performative epistemology creates conditions of possibility for a 
normativity that is open-ended and breaks with the edifice of sovereignty. By 
acting with an awareness of the contingency of the present, it does not seek to 
do away with normativity and the discourse of rights: It conceptualizes the 
normative as an ongoing formation; it aims to create a new discourse of rights 
that is anti-disciplinarian and emancipated from the dazzling light of 
sovereignty. In aspires to reclaim the reign of justice from the hermeneutic 
monopoly of the state.   
 
3.4. The Transformative Promise of a Performative Epistemology 
 
Performativity is now deployed as a method, a conceptual device, and strategy 
attentive to contingent histories undergirding origins, subjectification, ‘truth 
generation,’ and ‘knowledge production.’ As a tool of political struggle, its 
value lies in the disruption and subversion of normative ideals that infiltrate, 
control and dominate the individual. Its political promise lies in its ability to 
‘open the political to unprefigurable future significations’– denaturalizing the 
natural, historicizing the self-evident, exposing the singularity of the universal, 
revealing the heterogeneity, complexity, and contingency that proceed and 
animate the necessity, inevitability and universality of politico-juridical 
formation.122  
 
Performativity is not a discourse but operates within and across multiple 
discursive registers. It is not an ideology but functions within ideology; 
informing multiple configurations of power-knowledge constellations that 
Foucault so brilliantly articulated in his genealogical investigations. Not being a 
discourse, performativity is a free floating signifier open for signification and re-
signification. Because of its ‘open temporality,’ the sign can be appropriated by 
both hegemonic and subversive discourses. As Butler, via Nietzsche, argues, ‘the 
uses to which a given sign is originally put are ‘worlds apart’ from the uses to 
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which it then becomes available.’123 However, there is no symmetry between 
the appropriation of the sign by sovereignty and those who resist sovereignty 
from the margin. Nevertheless, the ‘open temporality’ of the sign central to 
signifying practices means that domination and subjection are not inevitable 
consequences of the natural order of things. The temporal and spatial openness 
of the sign suggests a condition of possibility for reflection and intervention. 
 
It is my contention that despite the invasive and capillary nature of modern 
apparatuses of subjection, performativity offers a resource for reflection and 
intervention. Performative problematization demonstrates that there is nothing 
natural or inescapable about the inequalities and exclusions of the present. 
Performative reflection suggests that power is far from omnipresent and 
subjection is never total. Insofar as the success of the performative rests on its 
repetition of an iterable code, there is a possibility for subversive intervention. 
As I have argued, between signification and context, there is a possibility of 
disjuncture that creates opportunities for being otherwise. Arguing against the 
system’s reduction of complexity and contingency, Christodoulidis writes, ‘The 
irreducibility of the political to politics, of the constituent to the constituted, 
underpins our ability to break from, to imagine otherwise, and to renew beyond 
modalities of what has already been instituted.’124  
 
Central to Butler’s concept of performativity is the view that the subject is a 
project of becoming. In ‘Excitable Speech,’ Butler takes subversive 
resignification beyond gender and extends its transformative capabilities to 
spheres of democracy and justice.125 In recognizing the endless contestation that 
a performative resistance presupposes, she points to potential surprises that 
performative resistance might register against a politics of domination. Here is 
Butler: ‘the political promise of the performative is one that positions the 
performative at the centre of a politics of hegemony, one that offers an 
unanticipated political future for deconstructive thinking.’126 In rejecting the 
claim that performative discourses effect what they name only when uttered by 
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the hegemonic group, Butler calls attention to ‘the expropriability of the 
dominant, ‘authorized’ discourse’’ with built-in subversive potential.127 We are 
animated, repressed, and attached by dominant norms to the point that this 
attachment is perhaps the very condition for disruption and resignification.128 In 
‘Bodies That Matter,’ she argues, ‘performativity implies that discourse has a 
history that not only precedes but conditions its contemporary usages, and that 
this history effectively decentres the presentist view of the subject as the 
exclusive origin or owner of what is said.’129 
 
As a tool of resistance, performative knowledge contests practices of oppression 
by tying the personal to the political and the pedagogic. It returns the body, 
race, community, culture, language and all those discursive and non-discursive 
practices that codify and vitalize existing force-relations back into an arena of 
visibility.  In short, it formulates and circulates a discourse that makes 
resistance possible through reflection (by revealing the originary violence) and 
intervention. In Butler’s optimistic formulation: ‘A political genealogy of gender 
ontologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct the substantive appearance of 
gender into its constitutive acts and locate and account for those acts within 
the compulsory frames set by the various forces that police the social 
appearance of gender.’130 If subjectivity is ‘a becoming, a constructing that 
cannot rightfully be said to originate or end,’131 it becomes a process open to 
‘intervention and resignification.’ It is this possibility for a resignification of the 
constitutive and regulative conditions of sovereignty and subjectivity that 
provides a way of a conception of the political as open and indeterminate. It is 
precisely this open temporality that is crucial to the logic of law, sovereignty 
and the subject that constitutes ‘the subject’s agency within the law,’ the 
possibility of subverting law from within.132 In the world of performative 
sovereignties and subjectivities, transgressive resignification becomes the new 
strategy and performative transformation the new form of resistance.  
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3.5. Conclusion 
While performativity may be traced to Austin’s grammatical excavation of 
utterances, its political/critical currents are formulated in the works of Derrida 
and Judith Butler who deployed its reflexive offshoot to destabilize normative 
presuppositions. By unearthing the contingency of the truths upon which 
sovereignty is anchored, Derrida offers an account of performativity that breaks 
with its institutive context and functions as a liberationist counter-history. 
Butler’s account of gender performativity shows how the law, pretending to be 
merely regulative, in reality frames and determines the subject’s mode of 
being, knowing and acting.   
 
If the emphasis is on sovereignty, and the subject, it is because how one 
conceptualizes and articulates the two discursive ensembles determines the 
ways of being and action in the political universe. If modernity privileged a 
normative reading of these formations, it is because such a reading allowed 
late-modern capitalism to submerge and conceal relationships of domination 
and inequality behind a façade of transcendent universals. As a subversive 
device, performativity is consequential because performative knowledge makes 
things happen. It unlocks closed normative meanings. It historicizes history, 
imagines scenes of liberation and performs liberated subjectivities; generating 
critical cultural spaces for a politics of possibilities.  
 
If the legal discourse is performative and neutralizes the politics that constitute 
its centre of gravity, what emancipatory purchase does this knowledge bring to 
bear on strategic engagements with law? If the performative reduction of 
contingency and complexity constitutes the key ways by which law inscribes 
those founding exclusions and guards its most vulnerable frontiers from 
subversive interventions by those it excluded and silenced, what critical 
resource can a performative knowledge bring to bear in struggles to enhance 
law’s revisability and responsiveness; in opening up spaces for interventions, 
critique and transformation? What resources can we craft out of the raw 
materials of historic knowledges that speak of, as Foucault says, ‘the battle 
cries that can be heard beneath the stability of law and order’?  If we know that 
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our system of justice is being sustained by ‘fictions,’ what does this add to 
struggles from within to redress injustices that are urgent and cannot wait? In 
Chapter four, I want to extend this analysis to the contested space of the 
political trial. 
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Chapter Four 
4. Law and Resistance: Toward a Performative 
Epistemology of the Political Trial  
4.1. Introduction 
One of legal positivism’s essential characteristics, perhaps its fundamental 
axiom, is the separability thesis- the separation of law from everything that is 
not legal. Contradictory and hypocritical, the separability thesis insists on the 
necessarily autonomous quality of legal decisions posited in contingent positive 
laws.1 Precisely because of the centrality of the separability thesis, law has 
continued to assert its claims to neutrality and autonomy from inescapable 
sociological and historical realities. Equally important for at least a certain 
strand of legal positivism is the view that law is a normative system that 
generates sound reasons for action. In explaining law’s normativity, legal 
positivists such as Kelsen, Hart, and Raz situate themselves in between the 
classic positivism of Austin and Bentham, and natural law theorists.2 For them, 
law is normative without being necessarily moral. Within this paradigm, the trial 
is a legal act. In fact, as Judith N. Shklar notes, it is ‘the supreme legalistic 
act.’3  
 
For normativists, the whole concept of the ‘political trial’ is a contradiction in 
terms—a misnomer that designates nothing more than ‘a cheap stock in trade of 
a sensationalist newspaper or a disgruntled loser’s gratuitous self-indulgence.’4 
For normativists, the conceptual distinction between the spheres of the legal 
and the non-legal—political, social, economic, and cultural—guarantees law’s 
inviolable independence and value-neutrality.5 Rejecting the concrete 
                                         
1
 See Vittoria Villa, Neil MacCormick’s Legal Positivism, in Maksymilian Del Mar and Zenon Bankowski, 
Law as Institutional Normative Order, (Surrey: Ashgate, 2009), 48. 
2
 Frederick Schauer, Positivism as Pariah, in Robert P. George, eds. The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal 
Positivism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 36 
3
 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1984), 144.  
4
 Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedures for Political Ends (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961), 48. 
5
 Gerald J. Postema, Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reason, in The Autonomy of Law, eds., 82-85. 
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materiality of power and inescapable sociological and political facts of power 
and legitimacy, inequality and domination, normativists deny the real political 
battle that goes on within laws and courts and ultimately bear on law’s 
relationship with broader issues of history, morality, politics, and society. 
Laying claim to comforting but untenable normative ideals of objectivity, 
impersonality, and universality, law neutralizes its political and ideological 
orientations.  
 
This continued claim to objectivity and value-neutrality is blindly used by ‘men 
of Law Immaculate’6 to deny the political dimension of law generally and the 
trial specifically. For this strand of legal thought, the existence of general rules 
used to distinguish truth from falsehood, the distribution of speaking positions 
with equality of arms between the parties, the rigorous conformity of courts to 
‘time honored and generally recognized trial standards,’ the meticulous rituals 
and ceremonials that enchant and reinforce the court’s façade of neutrality and 
independence, and the standard of guilt and innocence effectively eliminates 
‘the intercession of political motivations and aspirations.’7 It is a narrow 
reductionism that precludes the possibility of a political objective in a legal 
procedure and regards politics in the legal domain as pejorative and negative. 
So for a normativist who sees the ‘ought’ as a supernatural force or a social 
force that internally compels the subject to act accordingly, the political trial is 
not a trial at all. For them, trials cannot be at once legal and political, and 
cannot be fair without strict compliance with the rules of the game. If the 
political trial signifies anything, they argue, it is the exception - that aberration 
of law and justice reminiscent of Stalinist show trials aimed at total control.8 
 
Contrary to these abstract normative claims, history is replete with instances of 
nation-shaking trials that cannot be reducible to the mere question of law and 
legality. Indeed, from the ancient trials of Socrates (corrupting the youth) and 
Jesus of Nazareth (blasphemy and sedition) to the medieval European inquisition 
of Joan of Arc (heresy and witchcraft) and Galileo Galilei (1633, heresy), from 
                                         
6
 Kirchheimer, Political Justice, 47. 
7
 Id at  4. 
8
 See Judith Shklar’s criticism of an ideology she calls legalism, Judith N. Shkalr, Legalism, 110-13; 144-45. 
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the 18th century trial of Louis XVI (treason) to the nineteenth century trials of 
Alfred Dreyfus (treason) and Suzanne Anthony (for attempting to vote), from the 
Moscow Show Trials to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, from Nelson Mandela’s 
trial (for sabotage and incitement) to the recent trial of Bo Xilai of the Chinese 
Communist Party, the courtroom has been used for purposes incompatible with 
their normative inscription:  as platforms for the politics of domination and 
resistance. As the Frankfurt Jurist Otto Kirchheimer wrote, ‘With or without 
disguise, political issues are brought before courts and weighed on the scales of 
law, much though the judges may be inclined to evade them. Political trials are 
inescapable.’9 In particular, since the onset of the 20th century, the courtroom 
has become an indispensable weapon of oppression and liberation.  
 
This chapter will begin by giving an account of the political trial- what it is and 
what it does. Through a consideration of landmark texts on political trials, I will 
try to retrieve or determine the most salient features of the political trial or 
those features that ‘figure most prominently in an explanation’ of the concept.  
Arguing against the normative conception of the political trial, it will claim how 
a performative reconceptualization of the political trial reveals something 
paramount and essential about the nature of the institution (the trial), and the 
politics of power-struggle the concept of the ‘political trial’ denotes. 
Conceptualizing the political trial as a power-discourse-knowledge constellation 
that operates at the interstices of the normative and the performative, the 
chapter will give an account of how the power-knowledge ensemble is 
formulated, reconfigured and put into circulation in the courtroom.  
 
Finally, the political trial is presented here both as a performative formation 
and as a concrete instance of law’s indifference to its normative claims. Rather 
than asking the labyrinthine question of what constitutes the political trial, I 
will re-conceptualize the political trial both as an effect of power struggle, and 
a mode of ‘political action’ proper to unpack the modes of thought and forms of 
rationality that constitute its centre of gravity. In particular, I am interested at 
a point where the political trial comes in a direct and immediate relationship 
with the politics of domination and resistance.  
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4.2. The Political Trial: From Domination to Resistance 
The political trial is a surface manifestation of a deeper political struggle 
between the established authorities and their foes. What makes the trial 
‘political’ is not its distance from formal legality so much as the aporia that 
threatens to disrupt, as to unmask, the court’s power rationalizing and order-
legitimizing functions. Unlike the ordinary criminal trial, it brings into the 
courtroom two individuals with an irreconcilable or antithetical notion of law 
and society or the very meaning of the ‘common good’ and how to realize it.10 
Whatever the precise substance of its politics, the political trial is a pivotal 
moment that unravels submerged conflicts that rage just beneath the calm 
order of sovereignty; a crystal moment that unearths a problem both at the 
depth and on the surface and makes it conceptually visible and accessible. 
‘Political trials,’ as Foucault put, ‘are always touchstones.’11  
 
Otto Kirchheimer’s seminal scholarship, ‘Political Justice: The Use of Legal 
Procedure for Political Ends,’ is the most comprehensive scholarly attempt at 
providing a near definitive account of the political trial.12 In this rather rich 
treatise on political justice, Kirchheimer dismisses the abstract independence 
and neutrality of law and excavates the interface between the sphere of the 
legal and the political as a limit situation. He writes, ‘In the simplest and 
crudest terms, disregarding for a moment the embellishments, enlargements of 
functions, and safeguards of the age of constitutionalism: the courts eliminate a 
political foe of the regime according to some prearranged rules.’13 By tracing 
significant political trials in both Anglo-American and continental traditions, he 
extrapolates features he identifies as central to political trials. Conceiving the 
political trial as ‘struggle in power-relations,’ and as a mode of ‘political 
participation’; Kirchheimer’s ‘Political Justice’ is an inquiry into the strategies, 
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tactics, and the means by which the synchronization of politics with the legal 
form generates political effects sought by political actors.  
 
Kirchheimer identifies three categories of political trials: politicized criminal 
trial, the classic political trial, and the derivative trial.14 The first category 
involves ‘a common crime committed for political purposes’ with an eye toward 
using the trial for political purposes.15 The second category, the classic political 
trial, consists in ‘a regime’s attempt to incriminate its foe’s public behavior 
with a view to evicting him from the political scene.’16 The third category, ‘the 
derivative political trial,’ involves the weaponization of juridical devices such 
‘defamation, perjury, and contempt . . . in an effort to bring disrepute upon a 
political foe.’17 While this is by no means an exhaustive list, it does tell us 
something essential about the means by which ‘the judicial machine is set in 
motion.’ Crucial to all the three categories is the friend-foe distinction, where 
the ‘foe,’ an enemy from within, is transformed into a public enemy and 
evicted from the democratic public sphere.18 In a political contestation between 
those who seek to preserve and consolidate the order, the status quo, and those 
who refuse what is and resist sovereignty’s exclusionary logics, its excessive 
overreach, and deployment of law as a tactic in the service of governmentality; 
the judicial machinery is activated to attain a determined political end.19  
 
Identifying ‘power struggle’ as the animating principle and an essential feature 
of the political trial, Kirchheimer argued, 
 
The judicial machinery and its trial mechanics are set into motion to 
attain political objectives which transcend both the bystanders’ 
curiosity and the governmental custodian’s satisfaction in the 
vindication of the political order. Court action is called upon to exert 
influence on the distribution of political power. The objectives may 
be to upset—fray, undermine, or destroy—existing power positions, or 
to strengthen efforts directed at their preservation. Again, efforts to 
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maintain the status quo may be essentially symbolic, or they may 
specifically hit at potential or full-grown existing adversaries. 
Sometimes it may be doubtful whether such court action really does 
consolidate the established structure; it may even weaken it. Yet 
that it is in both cases aimed at affecting power relations in one way 
or another denotes the essence of a political trial20.   
 
Here, Kirchheimer provides one of the most salient features and animating 
rationalities of the political trial: struggle in power-relations within the social-
body. Whether it is the ancient trials of Socrates and Jesus, or the Inquisition of 
the medieval and Spanish prototypes, whether it is the Stalinist Show trials or 
McCarthyist communist trials, whether it is the trial of the freedom fighter by 
the colonial master or the trial of a political adversary by an authoritarian 
regime, or trials of dissenters by liberal democracies, there is a single thread 
that cuts across all categories of political trials: ‘trial mechanics are set into 
motion to attain political objectives.’21 The specific ‘objectives may be to 
upset—fray, undermine, or destroy—existing power positions, or to strengthen 
efforts directed at their preservation.’22 It may be orchestrated by the regime or 
by their foes. It might succeed in evicting the foe and consolidate existing 
structures or it might backfire.23 Yet, that it is power struggle as a mode of 
political action that animates the activation of the judicial machine ‘denotes 
and marks out’ its ‘peculiar problem area.’24 Whether it is a politics of 
domination or resistance, ‘power struggle’ constitutes the epicentre of the 
political trial. It is contestations between those who control the emblem of 
sovereignty and therefore seek to preserve existing force relations within 
society, and those who have no fixed place within society and therefore seek to 
interrupt and transform the status quo. 
 
Kirchheimer’s other important insight is his conception of the political trial as 
an act of political participation.25 Beyond the elimination of the political 
adversary, political trials also serve as instruments of policy-authentication and 
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order vindication.  In articulating this judicialization of mega-politics, 
Kirchheimer writes, ‘In proceedings to which the public has some access, 
authentication, the regularizing of the extraordinary, may under favourable 
circumstances be transformed into a deeper popular understanding and political 
participation.’26 By synchronizing politics with a whole series of politico-juridical 
discourses, the political trial serves not only as a blunt instrument of terror and 
elimination but also as a device of authentication, vindication, legitimation, and 
transformation. Opining on this rather creative dimension of the trial, 
Kirchheimer notes, ‘such an undertaking—the vicarious participation of a 
virtually unlimited public in the unfolding of political reality, re-created and 
severely compressed for trial purposes into categories within easy reach of the 
public’s understanding—fashions a new political weapon.’27  
 
Writing few years after Kirchheimer, Judith N. Shklar suggested a conception of 
the political trial as a political event.28 She defines the political trial as ‘a trial 
in which the prosecuting party, usually the regime in power aided by 
cooperative judiciary, tried to eliminate its political enemies.’29 The political 
trial, Shklar notes, ‘pursues a very specific policy—the destruction, or at least 
the disgrace and disrepute, of a political opponent.’30 Far from legalism’s 
normative claim about law’s autonomy from politics, Shklar claims, law is 
complicit in the politics of force relations. Not just law generally, even the 
trial, what Shklar calls ‘the supreme legalistic act,’ ‘like all political acts,’ 
serves a political agenda since ‘it does not take place in a vacuum. It is part of a 
whole complex of other institutions, habits and beliefs. . . . Law, in short, is 
politics, but not every form of politics is legalistic.’31 There, she asserts, ‘Law, 
in short, is politics’ and unpacks this assertion as a critique of a legal ideology 
she refers to as ‘liberal legalism.’32 Situating the trial within a whole series of 
inescapable historical and political realities that ultimately bear on it, she 
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displaces liberal legalism’s naïve assumptions about law’s inviolable separation 
from politics and other inescapable social formations.33  
 
The relevant question, Shklar contends, is not whether law is political, this 
being a foregone conclusion, it is, rather, ‘what sort of politics can law maintain 
and reflect?’ or what ‘legalistic values’ the political trial pursues.’34 ‘It is the 
politics of persecution which political trials serve that is the real horror,’ she 
contends, ‘not the fact that courts are used to effect it.’35 Her reflections on 
the prosecutions of the Nazis at Nuremberg and their counterparts in Tokyo are 
used to establish the reflexivity of legal discourses manoeuvred to justify the 
prosecution of offenses contrary to the principle of legality.36 For Shklar, this is 
a key moment where political expedience replaces the rule of law, eviscerating 
legalism’s normative claims and vindicating her contention that ‘Law, in short, 
is Politics.’37 As a result of the ambivalent positioning of the political trial 
between the realms of the legal and the political, Shklar claims, nowhere else is 
the ‘conceptual narrowness’ and ideological blindness of legalism is ‘most 
starkly confronted’ than in the interrogation of the normative landscape of 
political trials.38 As such, the ideological insistence of legalism on the water-
tight separation between law and politics is no longer tenable. 39  
 
The political trial is an event.40 Some of them become cultural artefacts capable 
of transforming and reformulating the law itself. As microcosms of conflicting 
narratives about the collective, the political trial presents us with an event – 
nation-shaking narratives that transform the way people think and act as 
members of a political community. The Dreyfus trial, to use Hannah Arendt’s 
characterization, was ‘a fore-gleam of the twentieth century.’41 Robert M. W. 
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Kempner, one of the prosecuting attorneys at Nuremberg, described the 
Nuremberg trials as ‘the greatest history seminar ever held in the history of the 
world.’42 Nelson Mandela’s Rivonia trial has been recognized as the ‘the trial 
that changed South Africa.’43 The trial of Klaus Barbie was described as ‘an 
enormous national psychodrama, psychotherapy on a nationwide scale’ while 
the Papon trial was dubbed as ‘the trial of the Vichy government.’44 The 
Eichmann trial, Shoshana Felman notes, represents ‘‘monumental 
contemplation of the past,’’ a ‘dramatic’ and ‘totalizing’ deployment of the 
trial as a stage for ‘historic justice.’45  
 
This notion of the trial as cultural artefact of unparalleled historical and 
political significance is the thesis developed in Ron Christenson’s ‘Political 
Trials: Gordian Knots in the Law.’ In his poignant formulation, political trials 
‘embody such paradigmatic and society shaking stories’ that ‘society’s common 
understanding of basic issues of politics drives from them.’46 A sphere of 
communicative action sanctioned by supposedly rational system of rules, the 
political trial confronts fundamental questions of justice, value, and political 
loyalty capable of engaging the common deliberation of the body politic.47 In 
that, they ‘reflect the human condition’ and perform political imperatives that 
cannot be validly explained within law’s normative coordinates.  
 
Attentive to the ensemble captured by the subtitle of his book, Gordian knots in 
the law48, Christenson emphasizes on the power of stories. He writes: 
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No matter how distilled the stories become and how thick the code books, 
the spirit, if not the body, of the law is in the stories. Certain stories, that 
is. They are the ones that shape our thinking about the dilemmas of law, 
influence our sense of justice, and change our morality. They do more. They 
provide the crucible for defining and refining its identity.49 
 
Central to Christenson’s framework is a normative distinction between political 
trials which promote legalistic values and those enterprises of terror and 
elimination written off as political par excellence.50 By identifying political trials 
that confront the basic dilemmas of law and politics—representation, 
responsibility, nationalism, dissent, and former regime officials—he 
demonstrates the hegemonic and transformative potential of narratives in 
political trials. Through this emphasis on the transformative power of stories, 
Christenson urges us to move away from a pejorative conception of the concept 
of political trials.51 While most political trials are indeed authentic political 
events the sole purpose of which is repression and domination,  Christenson 
argues, there are transformative political trials that ‘shape our thinking about 
the dilemmas of law, influence our sense of justice,’ and refine our identity as 
people.52 He writes, ‘Certain political trials are creative, placing before society 
basic dilemmas which are clarified through the trial.’53 They are profound 
moments that provoke public reflection on basic but neglected questions of 
foundational significance, and compel the public to examine its founding values 
and principles.  
 
Trials are also inherently intertwined with the clarification of the historical 
record, the edification of history and memory. Although law is not a particularly 
effective instrument for comprehending history and memory, the courtroom has 
become one of the most significant institutional vehicle for the edification of 
history and the construction of collective memory. In coming to terms with 
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‘momentous events’ of profound reverberation in the lives of political 
communities— ‘wars, revolutions, economic depressions, large-scale strikes and 
riots, and genocides’—trials are effective sites of power-struggle over the terms 
of history and memory. Richard Wilson writes: ‘criminal trials are now prime 
venues at which . . . history is investigated . . . and eventually stamped with 
the imprimatur of a legal judgment.’54 In ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials,’ 
Martti Koskenniemi argues that ‘The engagement of a court with ‘truth’ and 
‘memory’ is . . . always an engagement with political antagonism, and nowhere 
more so than in dealing with events of wide ranging international and moral 
significance.’55  
 
From a different angle, Vivian Curran, argues that ‘The trial can be an ideal 
medium for representing memory, so long as the concern is to control meaning 
according to present perspectives, to concretize a normative position.’56 
Whatever the limit of law’s ability of representation and disclosure of the past, 
this representation is necessarily partial and selective. The past becomes a 
privileged site of inquiry, history becomes an object of power-struggle over 
what must be actualized and repressed in the selective recounting.57 As a 
vehicle for representation of collective trauma, and guilt, regimes deploy their 
courts as technologies of power for crafting an uncontested official history and 
‘the cultivation of collective memory.’58 
 
This is the thesis put forth by Lawrence Douglas, in The Memory of Judgment: 
Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust.59 Cutting through the 
major trials of the Holocaust from the Nuremberg to the Eichmann trial, from 
the trial of John Demjanjuk to Klaus Barbie’s and Ernst Zundel, Douglas 
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conceives perpetrator trials as necessarily tied to the collective interest and 
therefore to history and memory.60 Emphasizing the use of perpetrator trial as a 
vehicle for ‘historical instruction and memory reconstruction,’ Douglas suggests 
a pedagogic conception of the trial that he terms ‘didactic legality.’61 In his 
view, perpetrator trials necessarily transcend the narrow question of guilt and 
regress into the terrain of history and memory.62 He writes, .’ . . courts are 
invariably thrust into the position of looking into the larger sweep of history and 
making visible the efficacy of the law as a tool of such inquiry.’63 
Notwithstanding Douglas’s hegemonic account of law and history, his notion of 
didactic legality offers an interesting insight into the notion of what he refers to 
as ‘narrative jurisprudence.’64 
 
4.3. Beyond a Normative Conception of the Political Trial 
The subject-matter of the political trial is as vast as politics itself. The key texts 
devoted to the study of the topic differ in their normative orientations, subject-
matter emphasis, and framework of analysis. As their analytic framework and 
normative assumptions vary, so does their consideration of the utility of a 
political trial in the pursuit of a politically just society. Although they recognize 
and probably justify political trials in situations of ‘necessity,’ they have 
differing views of whether a political trial can contribute to the pursuit of a 
more perfect political polity. Despite obvious differences, however, there are 
theoretical and methodological parallels that shape and inform their approaches 
to the political trial. They all privilege juridico-philosophical approach, and 
overemphasize the juridical and institutional dimension of the trial.  
 
Although the most comprehensive account of the political trial yet, 
Kirchheimer’s ‘Political Justice’ remains a normative critique that places too 
heavy an emphasis on the vehicle, the court.  As he put it, ‘rather than giving a 
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panorama of the major political contests which have passed across the legal 
stage,’ ‘Political Justice’ ‘relate[s] the political content to the juridical form 
under which it takes place.’65 While I want to hold on to his central insights, 
namely, the political trial as struggle in power-relations, and as a political 
participation, Kirchheimer’s account of the political trial remained strongly 
normative, places too much emphasis on the vehicle, and adopts too juridical a 
conception of power—power as repressive and prohibitive. As a result, 
Kirchheimer’s account ignores another important dimension of the courtroom: 
the courtroom as one of the most productive spaces of resistance and 
transformation. If, as Kirchheimer aptly put it, ‘court action is called upon to 
exert influence,’ that is, ‘to upset—fray, undermine, or destroy—existing power 
positions,’ surely it is the political dimension that constitute the epicentre of 
the political trial, and gives it its distinctive colour.66 In a world in which power-
relations are discursive, where power-struggles operate through truth-bearing 
discourses that are effects of the power-knowledge regimes, this framework for 
understanding and articulating the political trial does not offer an adequate 
explanation of the transversal relationship between domination and resistance.  
 
The political trial is a manifestation of a long submerged crisis of sovereignty, 
politics, and society. The moment of the political trial signifies the surface 
appearance of a problem that is both at the depth and at the surface. My aim is 
to problematize this crisis that appears on the surface with the view to 
understanding the constitutive conditions that condition the present. This 
requires, not a juridico-philosophic inquiry, but a historico-political 
problematization of the present. Drawing on resources from Foucauldian 
genealogy, I want to capture –understand and articulate—this contingent and 
complex ensemble called the political trial according to the Foucauldian 
‘strategies of knowledge and power.’67 
 
In his genealogical investigation of sovereignty, Foucault distinguishes between 
juridical power, and disciplinary power. Foucault tells us that we should not 
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‘concentrate the study of the punishment mechanisms on the ‘repressive’ 
effects alone, or their punishment aspects alone, but situate them in a whole 
series of their possible positive effects.’68 He suggests that we ‘regard 
punishment as a political tactic’ of a very specific nature within the broader 
circuits of power-knowledge.69 To grasp the repressive-productive schematic at 
the hear of complex social relations such as punishment and discourses such as 
sexuality, domination, security, immigration, asylum, etc, ‘we must cease once 
and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes,’ it 
‘represses,’ it ‘censors,’ it ‘abstracts,’ it ‘masks,’ it ‘conceals.’ In fact, power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of 
truth.’70 While the political trial is predominantly repressive and aims at 
perpetuating and sustaining hegemonic relations, it is structurally productive. It 
produces meanings, truths, values, and other power-effects that undermine, 
upset, and displace the ‘multiple relations of power [that] traverse, 
characterize, and constitute the social body.’71 As struggle in relations of power, 
the political trial neatly fits into this Foucauldian schema.   
 
Extending this insight into the terrain of the political trial, I want to explore 
both the repressive and productive aspects of struggles in the courtroom, with 
emphasis on how power and knowledge articulate each other within legal 
discourses and generate truth effects. According to this logic, a political trial 
the explicit object of which is repression is not merely repressive, it is also 
productive: it produces legitimacy, visibility, voice, docile bodies etc. A 
political trial aimed at repressing the visibility and audibility of the foe is not 
only repressive, it is also productive: it produces audibility and visibility for the 
very foe it is meant to silence and suppress. The same can be said of a 
successful political trial the object of which is to produce transformative power 
effect. 
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This thesis seeks to go beyond a normative approach to political trials to shed 
light on the micro-politics of domination and resistance in the courtroom. Just 
as Foucault conceives politics as ‘the continuation of war by other means,’ we 
can conceptualize the political trial as a continuation of politics by a legal 
means. Inverting Clausewitz’s aphorism, Foucault says, ‘within this ‘civil 
peace,’ these political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these 
modifications of relations of force—the shifting balance, the reversals—in a 
political system, all these things must be interpreted as so many episodes, 
fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself.’72 In the same fashion—the 
increasing juridification of the friend-enemy relations in politics, the tactical 
deployment of the entire sovereignty of a nation against the political foe, the 
strategic use of the devices of justice as a technology of order-preservation and 
the biopolitical logic that organizes and structures its specific modality of 
deployment, the plasticity and inexhaustible richness of the legal discourse—all 
these discursive and institutional ensembles constituent of the political trial can 
be analyzed as a continuation of the struggle by legal means. Within this 
paradigm, the court is merely used as a vehicle to re-enact, amplify, filter, 
project and archive the battle-front that runs throughout the social-body; 
generating and presenting new domains of knowledge, politico-cultural 
meanings and values.   
 
4.4. Toward a Performative Conception of the Political Trial 
One of the most paradoxical legacies of the Enlightenment is the establishment 
of reason and objective truth as the central elements of modernity and the 
normative basis for the exercise of public authority.73 The institution of the 
judiciary is normatively inscribed as independent and guardian of individual 
freedom and liberty.74 The ‘triumph of Weberian legal-rational authority,’ 
further reinforced the centrality of reason and contributed to enhancing the 
legitimacy of courts.75 Within the Weberian paradigm, the trial is seen as the 
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public exercise of reason.76 The distribution of speaking positions within the 
deliberative paradigm of the trial guarantees the rationality and deliberative 
character of what Habermas calls the ‘ideal speech situation.’77 In reality, 
however, trials are less normative and more performative. Although modernity 
has invested the institution of the trial with an aura of rationality and reason 
that goes to account for its normativity, what happens in the courtroom—the 
story, drama, sarcasm, irony, narrative, the emotion, catharsis, etcetera—are 
inescapable performative facts that inevitably bear on the trial and affect its 
outcome. 
 
As ‘public narratives,’ and ‘ritualized and state-sanctioned’ contest, the trial 
does more than it says it does. It has an institutional life and meaning but it 
assumes both a dramatic and tragic form.78 Characterizing this century as ‘the 
century of the trial,’ Lindsay Farmer identifies both the virtues and dangers of 
our fascination with the trial.79 In our century, Farmer argues, trials are used ‘to 
establish an official historical account of certain events; to give voice to 
forgotten or silenced victims; and to reveal truths about our society and 
ourselves.’80 In serving as vehicles for writing history and reconstructing 
memory, the trial exceeds its normative inscription and institutional function. 
Farmer notes, ‘in a society obsessed by celebrity, gesture, and character, the 
trial may be doing little more than’ holding perpetrators accountable.81 As re-
enactments of social and political dramas of life, trials cannot be explained in 
purely normative terms. In fact, if we take the actual materiality of the trial 
seriously, its central appeal lies not in its normative architecture but in its 
performative ordering. As Judge William Dwyer writes, ‘Trial by jury succeeded 
in part because it appealed to the same irrational values that were served so 
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well by the old methods. It still does. Drama and catharsis are provided on a 
scale rivalling that of team sports.’82 
 
Political trials are not legal events in which self-evident rules are applied to 
inviolate sociological or historical facts. Although the legitimacy of the criminal 
trial depends on its ability to offer a speaking position to the defendant, this is 
not a communicative offer designed to produce ‘the best, most rational, least 
biased arguments that most precisely express an interlocutor’s ideas and 
interests.’83 In fact, given the performative politics characteristic of political 
trials, a politics that at once contests the normative legitimacy of the existing 
order and imagines a new political order, the very notion of ‘ideal speech 
situation’ inevitably excludes speeches that are not intelligible within the 
constituted order.  
 
In a revealing intervention in the Foucault - Habermas debate, Kulynych offers a 
critique of both approaches to political participation.84 Debunking the 
Habermasian account of an ‘ideal speech situation,’ she argues, ‘The ideal 
speech situation establishes a norm of rational interaction that is defined by the 
very types of interaction it excludes.’85 Kulynych’s point is a powerful 
illustration of the terms under which speaking positions are offered in the trial. 
A communication is rational and ideal only insofar as it confirms to the terms 
under which the system distributes speaking positions to speaking bodies. That 
is what qualifies ideal as ideal or rational as rational. Irrespective of normative 
ideals that govern and structure the domain of the trial, the excluded, the 
occupied, the colonized, the gendered and racialized subject enters the 
communicative landscape on a tenuous plane. Furthermore, the violence of 
exclusion that inaugurates the founding moment and forever instigates militant 
confrontations, the aporia that never ceases to expose the fictions on the basis 
of which instituted authorities form the truth of their justice, the performative 
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logic that traverses key moments of the legal landscape and dislocates the 
normative elements of law renders the courtroom a performative site that re-
enacts the deeper political conflict that runs through society.  
 
Let me identify three categories of performatives central to political trials. 
First, typically, political trials proper are contestations over power between the 
sovereign and the subject. The conflict moves beyond the juridical to history 
and politics, taking a performative turn, to unravel what Foucault called ‘the 
battle cries that can be heard beneath the formulas of right, in the dissymmetry 
of forces that lies beneath the equilibrium of justice.’86 Those engaged in the 
struggle for transformation of the status quo seek to summon the consciousness 
of the body politic by drawing attention to the myth, the fiction and the 
paradox that undergirds the imposed order of justice, and suggest that there is 
nothing inevitable about the present and that things could have been different. 
By revealing the contingency of origin, and the fiction that lies at the heart of 
the juridical order, they seek to make a new fiction conceivable and intelligible. 
This contestation that calls into being a new order is ‘non-referential,’ in that it 
does not refer to any ‘pre-existing conditions,’ does not have an antecedent 
referent that it expresses. In short, it is a performative act that imagines 
beyond instituted modalities to articulate a counter fiction to counter the 
original fiction; ‘fiction against fiction,’ to create the possibility, as Derrida 
says, for an ‘event, decision, responsibility, ethics, or politics.’87  
 
If the original hegemonic appropriation of the performative contributed to the 
dislocation of contingency and justice from the orbit of law, instituting a 
coherent unity at one with itself, its subversive deployment seeks to subject law 
to the interruptive and endless demands of justice, responsibility, dignity, and 
ethics. It is here, then, at this juncture, where a new fiction displaces the 
original fiction, that the political trial becomes subversively performative. By 
reactivating local knowledges to re-politicize the juridical space, those who 
seek to transform the present intervene to provide a different reading of 
sovereignty, subjectivity, and politics with the view to revealing the concealing 
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logic of the normative structure and its juridico-philosophical knowledges. 
Through performative reinscription, they aim to disrupt the ‘legitimate fictions’ 
on which the truth of its justice is founded.  
 
Let me offer the following courtroom exchange to illustrate this point further. 
The defendant is Nelson Mandela, and the space is the Old Synagogue Court, 
Pretoria: 
 
[M]y objection is that I consider myself neither morally nor legally obliged to 
obey laws made by a parliament in which I am not represented. That the will 
of the people is the basis of the authority of government is a principle 
universally acknowledged as sacred throughout the civilized world, and 
constitutes the basic foundations of freedom and justice. It is 
understandable why citizens, who have the vote as well as the right to direct 
representation in the country's governing bodies, should be morally and 
legally bound by the laws governing the country. It should be equally 
understandable why we, as Africans, should adopt the attitude that we are 
neither morally nor legally bound to obey laws which we have not made, nor 
can we be expected to have confidence in courts which enforce such laws.88 
 
Here, we have a narrative that invokes the discourse of freedom and justice to 
denounce and protest authority, to attack it and make demand on it. It is a 
paradigmatic story of the political trial that marks, as Kirchheimer says, ‘its 
peculiar problem areas.’89 Speaking in the name of and on behalf of Africans, 
deploying meta-level discourses of freedom and justice that are beyond 
Apartheid’s determinate legality, Mandela destabilizes the normative basis of 
Apartheid to sit in judgment over him. By disturbing the normative basis of 
Apartheid’s infelicitous performative, Mandela calls into being a new conception 
of the normative that discloses a different kind of world, a new form of subject, 
and a new normative standard. In challenging the authority of the court to sit in 
judgment over those who have no representation, those subject to the violence 
of exclusion and dispossession, Mandela uses what Christodoulidis calls ‘a logic 
of dislocation’ to unsettle the system from underneath its ‘normative mainstay 
and explanatory schemas.’90 This, then, is not a normative intervention, but a 
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performative resignification that appropriates historical knowledges to activate 
politics and ask questions that are world disclosing. As a story that speaks of 
‘rights’ in strategic political terms, his contestation cannot be explained in 
normative terms for its very objection is to reveal the contingency of the 
normative and suggest an alternative meaning of the normative.  
 
Second, notwithstanding the politics of the trial, the trial itself is 
performative—as in theatrical. As Milner Ball argues, the trial is a judicial 
theatre that performs ‘perceptual judgments of past events.’91 The narrativity 
of the trial is central to its ability to historicize, educate, and pontificate. As 
Alasdair Macintyre writes in ‘After Virtue,’ ‘Man is, in his actions and practice, 
as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.’92 From the opening 
statement to evidence, to direct examination, cross-examination, and verdict, 
the stories filtered into the courtroom perform the parties’ account of events.93 
The opening statement performs the truth of the evidence that will be 
presented by both sides. Mediated and constrained by procedural and 
evidentiary rules- these narratives dramatize and perform innocence or guilt. As 
Ball further notes, evidence is ‘a peculiar performance that both complicates 
the tension between the competing stories and creates tension within each 
side’s version of its own story.’94 The same thing can be said of the closing 
argument, the verdict, and the judgment.  
 
The discursive universe that frames these performative moments—words, forms, 
ways of thinking, rituals and ceremonials—are inherently performative. Far from 
being the ‘ideal speech situation’ that normativists imagine, the narrative form 
that structures the communicative offer in the courtroom is embodied, 
‘exclusive, learned, and gendered.’95 They are dramatic, emotive, politicized, 
racialized, ethnocentric, and ‘richly colored with rhetoric, gesture, humor, 
spirit, or affectation.’96 As Kulynych argues, ‘The literary aspects of debate—
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irony, satire, sarcasm, and wit—work precisely on the slippage between what is 
said and what is meant, or what can be said and what can’t be conceived.’97 As I 
argued above, the stories recounted in political trials are recounted differently. 
From the opening statement to the direct examination, and cross-examination, 
‘recounting differently’ is not a mode of deliberation. It is an agonistic 
expression of a claim that cannot be captured or exhausted within the realm of 
deliberative rationality.98 Indeed, strategies used by lawyers to frustrate, 
misdirect, and confuse, the jury and the bench such as humour are visceral and 
cannot be sufficiently explained in normative terms. 
 
Third, the trial is performative in a related but slightly different sense. Perhaps 
this relates to the rituals and ceremonials built around courts. In ‘Democracy in 
America,’ Alexis De Tocqueville offers an emblematic account of this 
performative authority vested in courts: ‘It is a strange thing what authority the 
opinion of mankind generally grants to the intervention of courts. It clings even 
to the mere appearance of justice long after the substance has evaporated; it 
lends bodily form to the shadow of the law.’99 Here we have an image of a 
judicial space with a ritual power of a distinctive quality - one that generates 
and presents its own truth not reducible to the actual events of the trial.100 The 
narratives filtered into the public register continue to act even long after the 
substance of the verdict is eviscerated as ‘wrongful’ or ‘miscarriage of justice.’ 
The image of the court generates and presents law’s normativity, lending 
‘bodily form to the shadow of the law.101 It is a ritual moment where the 
adjudicative act of the court retains a ‘life’ and ‘history’ of its own, breaking 
from the instance of its invocation and ‘clings,’ as Tocqueville says, to the 
memory of the subject ‘long after the substance has evaporated.’102 Speaking of 
a ritual moment, Judith Butler writes, ‘The ‘moment’ in ritual is a condensed 
historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and 
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future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance.’103 It is 
a discursive space capable of performing politics, history, memory, justice, and 
generating politico-cultural meanings. Indeed, nowhere else is this historicity 
evident than in world famous political trials. They are microcosms of the era 
and the generation in which they took place. Who can account for the history of 
political philosophy and the tradition of enlightened inquiry without regard to 
Socrates’ Apology, or Christianity without an account of the trial of Jesus, or for 
that matter the history of France, South Africa, and Israel without an account of 
the trials of Alfred Dreyfus, Nelson Mandela, and Adolf Eichmann respectively?  
 
Finally, if the trial is performative, the political trial is a double performative. 
In the political trial, it is not merely the trial that is performative, but also the 
politics that is at once at the depth of the order and all across the entire 
structure of the trial. To appreciate the multivalent ways in which ‘historically 
significant trials’—those which ‘transcended time and space’ and secured a 
separate life of their own—have been redeployed as strategic resources in 
similar struggles, one only need to look at the trials of Socrates, Jesus, Joan of 
Arc, Suzanne Anthony, Nelson Mandela, and Eugene Debs.104 In what is now 
known as ‘Letter smuggled from Birmingham City Jail,’ Martin Luther King Jr. 
invokes Socrates’ testimony in the Apology:  
 
Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so 
that individuals could arise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to 
the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, we must 
see the need of having non-violent gadflies to create that kind of tension in 
society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism 
to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood.105  
 
As will be discussed in chapter seven in detail, Marwan Barghouti, for example, 
invited Nelson Mandela to draw parallel between his trial and Nelson Mandela’s 
trials under Apartheid. From Socrates’ Apology to Jesus’ ‘pleading before 
Pilate,’ from the trial of Joan of Arc in the 15th century to the trial of Suzanne 
Anthony in the 19th century, from Eugene Deb’s testimony in 1918 to Martin 
                                         
103
 Judith Butler, Excitable Speeches: A Politics of the Performative, (New York: Rutledge, 1997), 3.  
104
 For an account of these trials, see generally, Christenson, Political Trials.  
105
 James M. Washington, I have A Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World (New York: 
HarperColins Publishers, 1992), 87 
99 
 
  Chapter 4: The Political Trial as Performative 
Luther King’s ‘Letter from Birmingham City Jail,’ from Nelson Mandela’s ‘I am 
Prepared to Die Speech’ to the eventful spectacles of the Chicago Eight 
Conspiracy Trial, from the trial of Slobodan Milosevic to the trial of Saddam 
Hussein, we bear witness to something far more profound and enduring than the 
life and liberty of the litigants on trial. Underneath the politics of domination 
and resistance that frames, and animates the turn to this new weapon is a 
politics of ‘knowledge production and truth-generation’ that taps the discursive 
environment created by the event to filter new images and alternative realities 
into the public domain.  
 
Any convincing conception of the political trial must take a nuanced and 
complex account of the mechanics of this ‘weapon’; how it is articulated, what 
strategy it deploys, what form of knowledge and discourse informs it, who 
participates in the production of historical narratives, who controls the means 
of narrative production, and what effect all these produce. I am interested 
here, therefore, not in the political use of the courtroom as such, but in the 
configuration and reconfiguration of the power-knowledge-discourse matrix to 
generate discourses and truths of domination or resistance. If both technologies 
of domination and resistance are bound up with certain forms of knowledge and 
deployed by forms of power mutually at odds with one another, in what terms 
can we explain the discourse these two technologies invoke? 
 
4.5. The Power-Knowledge-Discourse Complex in the Courtroom 
So far, I have presented the case for a performative conception of the political 
trial. In the first section, I have explored landmark scholarship on the political 
trial to extrapolate two salient features of the political trial: an understanding 
of the political trial as struggle in power-relations, and the political trial as a 
mode of political participation. Arguing that contemporary power operates 
through the production of domains of knowledge and regimes of truth, I 
suggested a conception of the political trial as a power-knowledge –discourse 
constellation central to the politics of domination and resistance. Working 
through Foucault, this section will try to show how the power-knowledge-
discourse constellation is ‘formulated, circulated and set to work’ and generate 
hegemonic or subversive effects of power in the courtroom.  
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In ‘The History of Sexuality,’ Foucault formulates a ‘rule’ that explicates ‘the 
tactical polyvalence of discourses.’106 There, he argues for a conception of 
discourse that goes beyond the established hierarchies, dualisms and binaries 
and pays attention to the polymorphic strategic convergence of ‘discursive 
elements.’107 The ‘tactical polyvalence’ of a discourse requires, he argues, a 
reconstruction of ‘discursive elements’ according to what it reveals and 
conceals; the enunciation it supports and subverts, the specific technology that 
governs its spatial-material-temporal configuration.108 He says, we must 
reconstruct particular discursive ensembles according to ‘who is speaking, his 
position of power, [and] the institutional context in which he happens to be 
situated . . . the shifts and reutilizations of identical formulas for contrary 
objectives that it also includes.’109 In his own words: 
 
Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against 
it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the complex 
and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an 
effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of 
resistance and a starting point for opposing strategy. Discourse transmits 
and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, 
renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.110 
 
This political-strategic thinking that conceives discourse in terms of its strategic 
relationship with power is a textbook case of how the power-knowledge-
discourse matrix informs technologies of domination and resistance in the 
courtroom. The legal discourse is a paradigm case that embodies this reflexivity 
that Foucault calls ‘tactical polyvalence.’ The indeterminacy of legal discourses 
provides the raw material that keeps law open to unprefigurable future 
possibilities of resignification.  
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With the appearance of the new subject in history who began ‘to speak in 
history, to recount history . . . reorganize the past, events, rights, injustices, 
defeats, and victories around himself and his own destiny,’ as Foucault writes, 
the same discourses that were once used to dominate, colonize, and oppress 
have begun to be resignified as ‘a starting point for opposing strategy’ and 
redirected against the colonizer and the oppressor.111 Slavoj Zizek for example 
speaks of the ways in which the universal in the discourse of universal human 
rights has been turned against the very forces that formulated and imposed this 
discourse: ‘something that was originally an ideological edifice imposed by 
colonizers is all of a sudden taken over by their subjects as a means to 
articulate their ‘authentic’ grievances.’112 
 
This ‘tactical polyvalence’ extends well beyond legal discourses, and pervades 
the legal space. In his critique of the French criminal justice system, Foucault 
writes, ‘The judicial system is neither a ghetto nor a fortress, that it is fragile, 
permeable, and transparent, in spite of its fogs.’113 It is reflexive, ‘as flexible as 
one pleases,’ to admit the configuration and reconfiguration of its temporal, 
material, and spatial coordinates.114 Although these attributes of the legal 
space—fragility, permeability and flexibility—can be appropriated by power to 
perpetuate existing relationships of domination and inequality, Foucault’s 
observation points to another significant dimension: the state cannot totalize 
the political appropriation of these polyvalent qualities of legal discourses and 
its spaces. The system is replete with cracks, incongruities, and fissures that 
form the material fabric of contestation in political trials. In spite of its heavily 
policed borders, gate-keeping discourses are not fortresses that cannot be 
infiltrated by subversive discourses.  
 
No longer ‘a daily and permanent display of royal power,’ the courtroom has 
become, as Kirchheimer observed, the ‘new dimension through which many 
types of political regimes, as well as their foes affirm their policies and 
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integrate the population into their political goals.’115 While performative 
sovereignty still determines what can be legitimately speakable and what must 
not, it does not really claim hermeneutic monopoly over the domain of justice 
and discourses of the rule of law, legality, legitimacy, public safety, national 
security, etc, at least within liberal constitutional democracies. As Hans Lindahl 
writes, ‘the idea that the interpretation favoured by the legal authority—and 
only that interpretation—flows inexorably from the applicable norm, is an 
illusion that merely masks the discretionary power exercised by legal 
authorities.’116 If we put this in Foucauldian terms, we may say, the legal 
discourse is not merely ‘an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for 
opposing strategy.’117 In fact, the normalizing and disciplinary mechanisms that 
Foucault traces to the 17th century, those mobile and tactile mechanisms 
designed to operate underneath the formal juridical frameworks; colonizing 
discourses of rights and investing the body to interiorize hegemonic norms, are 
not exclusively repressive. As Timothy Mitchell reminds us, ‘Disciplines can 
break down, counteract one another, or overreach. They offer spaces for 
manoeuvre and resistance, and can be turned to counter-hegemonic 
purposes.’118  
 
It is this historico-political critique and struggle that synthesizes historical 
knowledges and legal discourses to generate and transmit power effects that I 
have been trying to describe. How it is that juridical power synthesizes political 
practices of the present with regimes of truth to sustain and consolidate an 
‘apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power’ to generate hegemonic effects of 
power? How it is that resistant discourses activate politics, resist the dazzling 
light of sovereignty, reinvent themselves and their political universe? If the 
political trial is a power-knowledge formation, what legal strategies and tactics 
transform discursive dynamics—fissures, indeterminacies, discontinuities, 
cracks, myths, incongruities, and weak points—into what Kirchheimer called a 
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‘weapon’ of domination and resistance? Let us take a concrete example. Once 
again, the scene is the Old Synagogue Court, Pretoria, and the defendant is 
Nelson Mandela: 
In its proper meaning equality before the law means the right to 
participate in the making of the laws by which one is governed, a 
constitution which guarantees democratic rights to all sections of the 
population, the right to approach the court for protection or relief in 
the case of the violation of rights guaranteed in the constitution, and 
the right to take part in the administration of justice as judges, 
magistrates, attorneys-general, law advisers and similar positions.119  
Here is a classic account of what Butler would call discursive resignification.120 It 
is an intervention in which the defendant infiltrates Apartheid’s complex of 
subjection to resignify and expand the responsive range of the discourse of the 
rule of law. Reformulating the principle of ‘equality before the law,’ he 
constructs a claim Apartheid can neither ‘contain’ nor ‘repress’ within its 
power-knowledge dispositif. Mandela reinscribes one of the central legitimizing 
legal discourses and imbues it with a meaning capable of re-politicizing not only 
the trial but also the very idea of ‘equality before the law’ as a constituent 
element of the rule of law. By identifying the state’s discourse about the ‘rule 
of law’ as an object of intervention, Mandela ‘imports a specific reflexivity that 
does not necessarily fall within, but . . . situate[s] itself incongruently’ to the 
State’s discourse on the rule of law.121  
Using his speaking position as a defendant to expose Apartheid’s systematic 
deployment of the rule of law to produce ‘determinate effects,’ Mandela taps 
the rule of law, to ‘demand rights that have not been recognized’ while at the 
same time declaring war on the system through a declaration of rights. In the 
Foucauldian schema, Mandela’s political offensive ‘speaks of legitimate rights in 
order to declare war on laws.’122 In exposing how laws deceive and institutions of 
justice rationalize and justify technologies of domination, Mandela appropriates 
this legal discourse to transcend the questions of guilt and innocence; and 
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activate politics to reveal the violence of exclusion on which the system’s 
fictions of justice thrive.  
His contention is that Apartheid deliberately and wickedly instrumentalized the 
rule of law, and the idea of equality before the law to normalize its racist 
violence. Using the speaking position offered by the trial, Mandela reconfigures 
the content and meaning of equality before the law to shame and expose 
Apartheid in the worst moral light possible. One of the sine qua non conditions 
of the right to ‘equality before the law,’ he argues, is the ‘right to participate 
in the making of the laws by which one is governed, a constitution which 
guarantees democratic rights to all sections of the population.’123 The ‘right to 
equality before the law’ does not stand in isolation. Instead, it is grounded in 
and validated by a social contract—the Freedom Charter—that recognizes the 
rights of its people to representation, and participation in the affairs of 
government, ‘the right to approach the court for protection or relief . . . and 
‘the right to take part in the administration of justice.’124  
 
This, then, is not a juridico-philosophical discourse of sovereignty, but rather a 
performative-genealogical reconstruction aimed at resurrecting ‘the battle cries 
that can be heard just beneath’125 the codification of Apartheid legality. Using 
the principle of equality before the law as a starting point, his intervention 
reactivates historical knowledges of violence, and dispossession to infiltrate the 
racist order and disturb ‘the knowledge of the system.’ The deployment of 
historical knowledges of dispossession and inequality to reconfigure the meaning 
of ‘equality before the law’ generates a domain of knowledge and regimes of 
truth that will shape the terms of political debate both within and beyond South 
Africa. This knowledge aims at constituting and circulating a true discourse, a 
repertoire of liberation that compels people to register their objection against 
Apartheid, and move to act and transform it. 
 
Of course, for Apartheid, equality before the law designates something much 
more specific and must be subject to the integrity of the concrete order.  As 
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Schmitt writes in ‘The Concept of the Political,’ ‘the rule of law means nothing 
else than the legitimation of a specific status quo, the preservation of which 
interests particularly those whose political power or economic advantage would 
stabilize itself in this law.’126 According to this philosophic-juridical approach, 
the rule of law and equality before the law do not exist outside the concrete 
political order and could not have precedence over order. Their meaning is 
contingent on the existence of order. For the system, equality before the law is 
coded and that internal code does not recognize claims of constitutional 
significance such as representation, recognition, and participation. In spite of 
the principle of equality before the law, repressive and overtly racist laws 
specifically made to dehumanize Africans are deployed under the guise of law 
and legality. In Apartheid South Africa, the rule of law and equality before the 
law are not inconsistent with the ‘anti-constitutional constitution’ of the Boer 
republic and its codification and institutionalization of racial inequality. The 
‘rule of law’ and ‘equality before the law,’ in this sense, simply degenerates 
into the rule of brute force. For the individual judge who conceives law as ‘a 
closed logical system,’ as H. L. A Hart does, Mandela’s pleas, however true, are 
‘objections that cannot be heard.’127   
 
4.5.1. The Political Trial as a Site of Domination and Resistance 
          
Every tool is a weapon if you hold it right. 
                                                                                                                               
            —Ani DiFranco 
 
The deployment of the trial as a ‘political weapon’ is a practice as old as 
antiquity.  In his historico-political critique of sovereignty, Foucault considers 
the court as the mask for power. He says, ‘The court’s essential function is to 
constitute, to organize, a space for the daily and permanent display of royal 
power. The Court is basically a kind of permanent ritual operation that begins 
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again every day and re-qualifies . . . the sovereign.’128 ‘No matter whether the 
jurists were the king’s servants or his adversaries,’ Foucault continues, ‘the 
great edifices of juridical thought and juridical knowledge were always about 
royal power.’129According to this logic, then, the rituals and ceremonials of the 
courtroom have internal didactic logic that does not sit comfortably well with 
its normative inscription. By reiterating, reciting, and repeating the will of the 
sovereign and reinscribing it within the ambit of law, the court consolidates and 
secures sovereignty. As Foucault says, ‘The specific operation of court ritual and 
court ceremonial is to make his love affair sovereign, to make his food 
sovereign, and his going to bed ritual sovereign.’130 The sovereignization of 
political conflicts, rather than the exercise of ‘public reason’ constitutes the 
court’s ‘essential function.’ The courts are the key sites of legitimation, 
rationalization and justification of the sovereign’s right to ‘decide who may live 
and who must die.’ 
 
As a technology of domination, the political trial consolidates and secures the 
constituted authorities and their view of the world. It produces images and 
concepts in the image of the instituted power by reinscribing unequal 
relationship of force into legal discourses to sustain and preserve it.131 By 
‘enlisting the services of courts’132—institutions normatively inscribed as agents 
of justice—‘in behalf of political goals,’133 those in control of the emblem of 
sovereignty deploy gate-keeping technologies of power to preserve existing 
force relations.134 In a more pointed passage, Foucault writes, ‘The system of 
right and the judiciary field are permanent vehicles for relations of domination, 
and for polymorphous techniques of subjugation.’135 As the central ‘organizing 
principles behind the great juridical codes,’ sovereignty’s interest is nothing but 
the preservation of the status quo. By submitting the actions of its foes for 
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court scrutiny, the system at once eliminates its foes and vindicates the 
political order.136 By authenticating regimes alternative realities and affixing it 
with the imprimatur of the judiciary, courts construct legitimacy for the power 
that stands behind it.137 The participation of the judiciary in the disposition of 
regime adversaries ‘removes the fear of reprisals or liquidation from multitudes 
of possible victims.’138 By scrupulously adhering to the rituals and canons of the 
courtroom, the state conceals technologies of domination and repression that 
operate to criminalize dissent and silence critique.139 As Kirchheimer writes, 
‘The more elaborate the paraphernalia of authentication, the greater the 
chance of vicarious popular participation in its conundrums.’140 Whether it is 
aimed at the elimination of the foe, or the formulation, and circulation of a 
truthful discourse, whether it is intended to institute a particular interpretation 
of the past to construct an official memory, or the projection of a new reality in 
the image of the ruling class, one thing is certain: the courtroom is one of the 
most potent instruments of preservation.  
However, this ‘permanent ritual operation’ that reinvigorates and vitalizes the 
political order is no longer the exclusive domain of sovereignty. Indeed, it has 
never been so. Since the first recorded political trials of the antiquity, the 
deployment of the legal system to silence critique almost always generates the 
opposite effect- it provides a platform for the very voice it tries to silence. 
From the trial of Socrates in the ancient Greece to the 19th century trials of 
sedition and treason, from the 20th century Stalinist show trials to the trials of 
communists, and dissidents in liberal democracies, to ‘terrorism’ trials today, 
political justice hardly proceeds according to prearranged set of rules. The 
communicative offer that makes the trial such an irresistible site of political 
justice cannot be at once communicative and silencing. If the Athenian 
Assembly succeeded in putting Socrates to death, the latter’s Apology survived 
for over two millennia and served as the incarnation of Western philosophical 
thought. The same can be said of the trial of Galileo, the trial of Martin Luther 
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King, Suzanne Anthony, Mahatma Ghandi, Nelson Mandela, and several other 
trials of far-reaching and long-lasting effects on the future of political 
communities. While the trial in the short run vindicates the government by 
upholding its decisions and re-creating reality in its image, its long term effects 
are uncontrollable. Instead of simply producing normalizing truth effects that 
consolidate and sustain the status quo, trials become ‘crystals for society,’ 
provoking ‘the critical and ethical imagination’ of societies in crisis, and 
prescribing ‘a method of writing their psychic balance.’141 
With the radical transformations that took place in the legal discourse since the 
17th century, and the emergence of what Foucault refers to as the new subject 
in history, courts have become the primary sites of struggle against royal 
power.142 As Foucault writes in ‘Power and Strategies,’ in the eighteenth 
century, law ‘was a weapon of the struggle against the same monarchical power 
which had initially made use of it to impose itself.’143 Indispensable in this 
transformation is the Enlightenment that gave us the language of freedom, 
truth, reason, and normative theories of justice. The subject that is constituted 
within the post Enlightenment institutional terrains begun to appropriate the 
languages of freedom, rights, and equality enunciated in the social contract and 
other foundational juridical codes.144 From the Magna Carta to the French 
Declarations of the Rights of Man, from the American Declarations of 
Independence to the Universal Declarations of Human Rights, and several 
regional human rights instruments, there emerged new paradigms within which 
to understand and rework the rationality that organizes and structures the 
relationship between sovereignty, politics, and the subject.  
 
If the law is the pre-eminent instrument through which hegemonic norms are 
interiorized and relationships of exploitation and oppression legitimized, 
resistance against the oppressive effects of the law is most meaningful before 
the law. One submits himself to the very law he despises ‘not in the service of 
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the law’ but to summon the law itself as ‘he is summoned by it.’145 In here 
resides the opportunity to submit the law to the perpetually interruptive force 
of meta-level discourses such as justice, morality, responsibility and ethics, in 
strategic terms. In somewhat of a Foucauldian gesture, this contestation goes to 
demonstrate ‘the extent to which, and the forms in which, right (not simply the 
laws but the whole complex of apparatuses, institutions and regulations 
responsible for their application) transmits and puts in motion relations that are 
not relations of sovereignty, but of domination.’146 As they use the discourse of 
rights, they also contest it and transform it. They argue that the discourse of 
rights and the judicial apparatus constitute the penultimate frameworks of 
domination and subjection. Whatever the justice of the trial, this is the moment 
at which those who use the platform to resist domination and oppression seek to 
disentangle juridical knowledge from its regimes of truth and expose the 
violence it effects and sustains.147 With all the constraints in the courtroom, the 
trial provides a window of opportunity to tell the truth of law and the system of 
domination and exploitation concealed by the mechanism of rights.  
 
As a site of resistance, the courtroom provides the resistant subject—those who 
cannot directly activate the trial mechanics—with the much needed platform for 
visibility and hearing. The opening-up of this public space of contestation, 
offers the opportunity for the incitement of counter-hegemonic discourses and 
for a militant deployment of what Foucault calls ‘subjugated knowledges’ 
against truth-bearing discourses of the state. In trying to reconfigure the 
political map, they aim to lay the foundation for radical social transformation—
an awakening of consciousness for a politics of possibilities and a new politics of 
truth. Contesting the truth of the law and the truth of rights, they seek to 
constitute a new pedagogy of these juridical concepts, rights emancipated from 
the colonizing logic of sovereign power. As one of Foucault’s revealing insights 
state: ‘Truth is a thing of this world: . . . Each society has its regime of truth, 
its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourses which it accepts 
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and makes function as true.’148 It is this society specific truth resistant subjects 
seek to transform. For them, the courtroom offers a performative site for a 
genealogical reconstruction of the past and the economy exclusion that persists. 
By intervening at this ritual site, the genealogical subject seeks to desecrate the 
law from what is true and good, and offers a subversive account of law and 
order. For those who want to bring about a radical transformation and the 
awakening of consciousness, the ritual unfolding in the courtroom helps 
transform statements and utterances of the legal moment into poetry of 
movements to inspire generation of activists. The trial’s unique ability to 
‘elevate partisan happenings into a quasi-authoritative forum,’ to historicize, 
‘educate, excite, and pontificate,’ enhances its resistant and transformative 
capabilities. Successful courtroom acts of resistance become ‘public narratives 
par excellence, stories of societal and individual conflicts’ capable of 
summoning the empathy of the general public.149  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
Arguing that the political trial is performative both at the level (the trial) and 
the meta-level (the politics of the trial), this chapter suggested a 
reconceptualization of the political trial as a double performative. A 
performative reconceptualization of the political trial thus opens the possibility 
for a more complex understanding of the relations between the submerged 
problem that destabilizes the system from within and the surface effects that 
the courtroom seeks to frame in legal terms and settle.  
 
Since the core substance of the political trial resides in the contingencies and 
reductions that are submerged and concealed out of juridical view, the 
contestations straddle the depth and the surface, to unravel the abyss that 
opens beneath law’s self-referential unity and universality. The surface 
appearance of these long submerged problems can assume various formulations 
but it is often articulated as a disjuncture between the promise of the system 
and the demands of the concrete order. It is here, at this confluence, where the 
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tension between the ‘normative elements of justice’ and ‘the concrete order’ 
reaches its zenith, warranting court intervention, that the political trial 
functions as a continuation of political struggles between those who have no 
fixed place in society, and those who hold the emblem of sovereignty. While the 
former deploys historical knowledges of dispossession and struggle to 
reconfigure, disrupt, and transform sovereignty’s petrifying power of 
subjectivation and exclusion, the latter relies on gate-keeping philosophico-
juridical discourses to deny the former the opportunity to articulate its 
grievances. Seen from strategic point of view, as it were, the political 
deployment of court action and the devices of justice is a visceral exercise that 
cannot be contained by either sides and often generates consequences far 
beyond the expectations of its actors. It can denaturalize as to undermine the 
very order that deploys it, stripping it off its mask, and rendering it vulnerable. 
It is a risky and uncertain terrain where the innovative qualities of the strategy 
determines the power-effects a particular configuration of the power-
knowledge matrix generates.   
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Chapter Five 
 
5. Law and Resistance: Toward a Performative 
Genealogy of Resistance in Law 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction that concludes, 
‘this, then, is what needs to be done.’ It should be an instrument for 
those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in 
the process of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t 
have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in programming. It 
is a challenge directed to what is. 
 
 
                                         —Michel Foucault, Questions of Method, 1978 
 
Two central claims inform and structure my arguments in this chapter. First, 
conceiving the political trial as a contingent and contested space that confronts 
a conflict that is at once at the depth and across the surface of law’s normative 
structure, I will argue that a genealogical-performative defense strategy 
enables us to problematize and make visible this conflict that stretches from 
depth to surface. By displacing normative and essentialist discourses of law and 
sovereignty, the performative can import a specific contingency and historicity 
that situates itself at points of tension to open up space for contestation and 
transformation of the present.  
 
Second, insofar as law’s gate-keeping discourses and the deliberative paradigm 
of the trial proceeds by dislocating the possibility of communication and 
understanding between sovereignty and the subject, the chapter claims, the 
possibility of communication and understanding requires a performative-
genealogical resignification of law’s gate-keeping discourses and a strategic 
reinvention of new unprefigurable standards open to limitless possibilities. 
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Furthermore, such interventions enable us to re-imagine and reconfigure our 
relations to the political universe.  
 
Working via Foucault’s account of power and resistance, the chapter argues for 
a conception of resistance as performative. By identifying the linguistic and 
discursive conditions that create opportunities of intervention in the political 
trial, it will show how the conflict in a particular episode of confrontation is 
synchronized with the legal form to generate a resistant-transformative effect.  
 
5.2. Law, Resistance, and the Subject 
 
‘In being born,’ Paul Ricoeur claimed, ‘I enter into the world of language that 
precedes me and envelops me.’1 In ‘Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in 
Literature, Law, and Politics,’ James Boyd White extends this claim to account 
for language’s constitutive and regulative authority.2 He writes, ‘to be 
understood at all we must speak it as it is spoken by other people, employing its 
terms and categories and gestures; yet our experience is never exactly the same 
as that of others, we have our own thoughts and feelings.’3 Questioning the 
humanist notion of the sovereign subject, White identifies language as one of 
the social-cultural forces that constitute and dominate the subject. He asks, 
‘How adequate is our language to what we know, to what we have become? How 
far are we free, and able, to transform it?’4 If language alone can claim such a 
shackling power over the subject, how can subjects escape from complex 
normative and affective structures that constitute and regulate them? How can 
‘we rework,’ as Butler asks, the very power-knowledge regime ‘by which we are 
worked’? With reference to what ideals can we criticize, subvert, and transform 
the power-knowledge regime within which our normative intuitions are formed?  
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In ‘Domination and the Arts of Resistance,’ James C. Scott provides a refreshing 
reading of what he calls ‘fugitive political conducts’ by the enslaved, oppressed, 
excluded, and marginalized.5 By examining patterns of resistance by various 
subordinate groups—slaves, serfs, the colonized, occupied and the subjugated—
across time and place, he concludes: ‘Every subordinate group creates, out of 
its ordeal, a ‘hidden transcript’ that represents a critique of power.’6 Scott 
opposes what he calls the ‘hidden transcript’—consisted of the backstage 
discourse, to the ‘public transcript’ of the hegemonic group to retrieve the 
salient features of transcripts of power. By comparing these two transcripts and 
their respective strategies, tactics, and modes of thoughts, Scott emphasizes 
the relational character of domination and resistance.7  
 
By emphasizing contradictions, reversals, and tensions immanent in the public 
transcript, he demonstrates how these contradictions create immanent 
possibilities for the marginalized to create dissident spaces. For Scott, then, 
there is a strict relationality, in the Foucauldian sense, between domination and 
resistance; even in spaces of unfreedom such as slavery and serfdom. In spite of 
the elimination of resistance by the constitutional state from political discourse, 
there remain various discontinuous struggles against power and sovereignty. The 
question, then, is: if law is premised on closure, how does resistance takes off 
against ‘the totalizing and individualizing power of the state’?   
 
Situating ‘the theory of the subject’ at the heart of humanism and accusing the 
latter for concocting a fiction generative of truth and knowledge, Foucault 
suggests two modalities of resisting the effects of humanism on the subject: 
‘‘desubjectification’ of the will to power’ and ‘the destruction of the subject as 
a pseudosovereign.’8 In a 1971 interview, Foucault singles out humanism as the 
single most important factor behind the political ontologies of the present. He 
defines humanism as ‘the totality of discourse through which Western man is 
told: ‘Even though you don’t exercise power, you can still be a ruler. Better 
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yet, the more you deny yourself the exercise of power, the more you submit to 
those in power then, the more this increases your sovereignty.’9 Humanism, 
Foucault argued, invented ‘a whole series of subjected sovereignties’ who 
subjected themselves ‘to the laws of society and nature.’10 By withdrawing the 
subject’s will to power and his desire to seize power, humanism produces 
‘subjected sovereignties.’11 The subject of humanism claims to be a ‘sovereign’ 
agent capable of free will when in fact he is nothing more than the surface 
effects of the discourse that construct him.12 
 
Law is the primary humanistic discourse through which power masks a 
‘substantial part of itself’ and its techniques. The legal discourse and the 
judicial apparatus constitute the primary foils within which power enfolds itself 
to conceal, neutralize, rationalize, and ultimately ‘dispel[s] the shock of daily 
occurrences.’13 Because of the power effects generated by the discourses, 
notions, categories and institutions that transmit and perpetuate existing force 
relations, Foucault insists, we must obliterate not only the ideological 
foundation of those notions, categories, binaries, and definitions but also the 
institutions: ‘We wish to attack an institution at the point where it culminates 
and reveals itself in a simple and basic ideology, in the notions of good and evil, 
innocence and guilt.’14 He speaks of ‘local actions’ whose strategic purpose is 
not to reform these institutions but to attack the internal relationship between 
power and the knowledge they produce and disseminate. With regard to what 
psychiatry makes possible, for example, he suggests, learning from the 
experiences of the marginalized, the confined, and the subjugated to ascertain 
‘how they were divided, distributed, selected, and excluded in the name of 
psychiatry and the normal individual, that is, in the name of humanism.’15 Once 
                                         
9
 Michel Foucault, ‘Revolutionary Action: ‘Until Now,’’ in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected 
Essays and Interviews by Michel Foucault, Donald F. Bouchard, eds., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1977), 221.  
10
 Id. 
11
 Id at 222. 
12
 Michel Foucault, ‘The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with Michel 
Foucault,’ in The Final Foucault, James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, eds., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
1988), 11. 
13
 Foucault, ‘Revolutionary Action,’ 220. 
14
 Id at 228.  
15
 Id at 229. 
116 
 
  Chapter 5: Strategies 
we understand the particular patterns through which psychiatric knowledge and 
power articulate each other with legal and juridical discourse, we can intervene 
to cut the hinge between power and knowledge.  
 
Following Foucault, Butler locates resistance in the temporal gap between the 
original signification and the ‘possibility of reversal.’16 She argues that no 
matter how contingent our actions, contingency does not mean that we cannot 
act but only that our very actions are based on a contingent identity that comes 
into being through that very action.17 In ‘Contingent Foundations,’ she argues, 
‘the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of agency.’18 
This becoming potential crucial for re-subjectification is at the same time a 
condition of what Foucault calls de-subjectification. But how can the subject 
resist the normalizing effects of these categories, notions, and discourses in the 
name of law, justice or other moral codes? How can one resist a regime of 
knowledge and truth that conceives itself as self-evident? How can resistances 
take off against ‘reason’? Can the subject resist in the name of moral codes or 
ideals of justice drawn from the very constitutive principles he seeks to escape?  
 
5.3. Resistance in the Name of Law and Justice 
Foucault’s skepticism of normative foundations and ideal significations is very 
well known. For Foucault, to suggest that one can resist in the name of law or a 
new moral code and to achieve some emancipatory ends such as justice is not 
merely self-refuting and historically inaccurate, it is also theoretically 
incoherent. To try to hold sovereignty responsible for failing to uphold its law is 
an implicit affirmation of law: the very law that dominates and limits us.19 In 
the famous Foucault-Chomsky debate, Foucault repudiates the essentialist 
conceptions of ‘human nature’ and ‘justice’:  
 
 . . . these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realization of the 
essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts, which have been 
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formed within our civilization, within our type of knowledge and our 
form of philosophy, . . . and one can’t, however regrettable it may be, 
put forward these notions, to describe or justify a right which should—
and shall in principle—overthrow the very fundamentals of our society.20  
 
The distinction between good and bad, reason and unreason, and notions such as 
morality and justice, are nothing but technologies of rationalization.21 For 
Foucault, the individual has no irreducible core, no essence and true self 
constitutive of his identity; the subject is nothing more than a contingent 
articulation of power-knowledge constellation. The reality of the subject is the 
effect of the very power-networks that invest and constitute it. Foucault also 
repudiates the existence of moral codes that are intrinsic and necessary: ‘it 
seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been 
invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a 
certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power.’22 This 
skepticism toward essentialist identities and discourses leads Foucault to reject 
resistance in the name of a new law, the Higher Law or the Law to come. In ‘The 
Thought from Outside,’ he argues, ‘Anyone who attempts to oppose the law in 
order to found a new order, to organize a second police force, to institute a new 
state, will only encounter the silent and infinitely accommodating welcome of the 
law.’23  
 
We can still resist but we cannot resist in the name of law; whether the laws of 
the state and its animating principles or the ‘eternal laws of heaven.’24 In 
‘Intellectuals and Power,’ he claims that resistance is about struggle for power 
and against forms of power that subject and transform the individual ‘into its 
object and instrument.’25 It is not even ‘to awaken consciousness,’ for the notion 
of consciousness is itself a bourgeoisie construct, it is a struggle ‘aimed at 
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revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious.’26 One 
resists to take power- and it is in this struggle for power that Foucault locates the 
value of resistance. Whether it the creation of new sites of resistance; the 
disclosure of excess, the engendering of a culture of agonism or self-recreation, 
resistance cannot be undertaken in the name of a higher law or to achieve 
justice. For Foucault, the rejection of an essential core of a human being does 
not, of itself, reduce our ability to ask and experiment. In fact, it enhances it. 
What Foucault displaces is not action but the grounding of action in a particular 
understanding of humanness that limits action to that particular understanding. In 
‘What is Enlightenment?,’ he says, ‘the contingency that has made us what we 
are,’ should be distinguished from ‘the possibility of no longer being, doing, or 
thinking what we are, do or think.’27 ‘Genealogical critique,’ he insists, ‘will not 
deduce from the form of what we are what is impossible for us to do and to 
know.’28 Questioning the distinctions between good and evil, reason and 
unreason, guilt and innocence, the normal and the pathological, silence and 
articulation, history and metaphysics, Foucault accounts for the systems of 
meaning, the modes of reasoning and structures of thought ‘by which men, in an 
act of sovereign reason, confine their neighbours.’29 
 
5.4. Law, Power, and Resistance 
In a decisive conceptual break with the orthodox conception of power—a 
conception that ‘takes law as a model and a code,’ one that ‘has its central 
point in the enunciation of the law,’30 Foucault offers a more nuanced analytics 
of modern techniques of power that goes beyond the repressive hypothesis. To 
understand power in its complex, relational, concrete and historical operations, 
he argues, we must move away from an understanding of power as repressive 
and negative and situate it ‘in a whole series of their possible positive effects’: 
                                         
26
 Michel Foucault, ‘Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation Between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze,’ 
in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, 208. 
27
 Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment? In The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault’s 
Thought, Paul Rabinow, eds. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 46. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1977), xi. 
30
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge V.1, trans. Robert Hurley (London: 
Penguin Books, 1976), 90.  
119 
 
  Chapter 5: Strategies 
power excludes, represses, censors, and conceals.31 In fact, power produces; it 
produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth.’32 With the 
emergence of disciplines, power ceased to be merely ‘repressive’ but also 
permissive, not only negative, but also positive, not only prohibits but 
promotes, not only prevents but also invents.33 In fact, power is most productive 
when it is less repressive, and more productive and permissive.34 Arguing against 
the orthodox conception of power as ‘always juridical and discursive,’ a theory 
that takes ‘the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, . . . the state 
and sovereignty’ as its centre of gravity, Foucault identifies new sites and 
spaces of power ‘whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not 
by law but normalization, not by punishment but by control . . . and go beyond 
the state and its apparatus.’35  
 
It is important to note that the expulsion of resistance from the juridical 
discourse was accompanied by the appearance of disciplinary techniques of 
power.36 The ‘formally egalitarian juridical frameworks’ made possible by ‘the 
new theories of natural law and liberal political philosophies’ in the 18th century 
were colonized and undermined by the ‘asymmetrical and non-egalitarian’ 
disciplinary mechanisms.37 The coalescence of these ‘absolutely heterogeneous’ 
techniques—’the organization of rights around sovereignty’ and ‘the mechanisms 
of coercion exercised by disciplines’—created a normalizing power-knowledge 
regime that control and regulate the individual and therefore cannot be 
conceptualized, understood and resisted within the older paradigm.38 The old 
conception of power in terms of law and sovereignty no longer provides a 
nuanced understanding and analytics of the all-entangling web of relations that 
operate through the production and dissemination of knowledge, truth, and 
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discourse.39 An understanding of power in terms of institutions, laws, and rights, 
Foucault claims, conceals, normalizes, and erases the fundamental relationships 
domination law and legal institutions underwrite.40  
 
To account for the polymorphous techniques of subjugation that cut across 
society, Foucault proposes a new paradigm that goes beyond a conception 
of power in terms of law and sovereignty to ‘the multiple forms of 
domination that can be exercised in society’: not the king in his central 
position . . . not sovereignty in its one edifice, but the multiple subjugations 
that take place and function within the social body.’41 Institutions are 
conceived not as the sources of power but as infrastructures in which power 
transgresses the rules of right and inscribes itself and ‘acquires the material 
means to intervene, sometimes in violent ways.’42  
 
According to this paradigm, resistance is everywhere. The evidence of this, as 
one of Foucault’s much rehearsed insights suggest, is that ‘power is 
everywhere’: 
 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power. Should it be said that one is always ‘inside’ power, 
there is no ‘escaping’ it, there is no absolute outside where it is 
concerned, because one is subject to the law in any case? . . . This 
would be to misunderstand the strictly relational character of power 
relationships.43  
 
The entanglement of power and resistance means that power needs resistance 
in order for it to project itself and secure its interests. Resistance reinvigorates 
and legitimizes power. It instigates the formation of strategic knowledge and a 
discursive field which enables power to render its secrets inaccessible.44 This 
entanglement also means that resistance does not exist in a ‘relationship of 
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exteriority’ to power and ‘does not have to come from outside’ in order for it 
‘to be real.’45 It is already there within laws, discourses and institutions that 
power uses to reproduce and disseminate itself.46 The same institutions, laws 
and discourses breakdown and instigate resistance.47 Finally, the imbrications of 
power and resistance further suggests that one cannot account for the 
operations of power – its techniques, instruments, mechanisms, and effects – 
without an account of the plurality of resistances that exist in strategic 
relationship with power.48 
 
Genealogical critique assumes all human ‘relations to be relations of power, all 
relations of power to be relationships of force, and relationships of force to be 
relationships of war.’49 We are already in the battle field: ‘we are at war with 
one another; a battle front runs through the whole of society, continuously and 
permanently.’50 That is why critique must be local and must begin from the 
analysis of power relations at the local level. But what makes local critique 
possible is the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’- naïve knowledges and 
‘historical contents that has been buried or masked in functional coherences or 
formal systematizations.’51 If knowledge, discourse, and truth are the raw 
materials of power, the efficacy of critique and/as resistance turns on the 
exhumation of knowledge ‘which owes its force only to the harshness with 
which it is opposed by everything surrounding it.’52 If resistance is to avoid 
becoming another normalizing gesture, if it is to unmask the play of power 
concealed by law’s ‘functional arrangements and systematic organizations,’ it 
must begin with the analysis, not of institutions and laws per se, but with the 
confrontations and struggles that goes on within laws, discourses, practices and 
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institutions.53 According to this framework, a critique of law begins, not from 
the analysis of legal rules, principles, discourses, categories, hierarchies, and 
institutions per se, but rather from a historical analysis of their interpretations, 
applications, and deployments in struggles over power.  
 
I find this paradigm extremely helpful for understanding and problematizing the 
unease underlying the discourse on law and resistance. First, Foucault goes 
beyond the orthodox definition of power and offers a nuanced understanding of 
the instruments, mechanisms, and techniques by which modern power 
reproduces and disseminates itself. In doing that, he suggests conceptual tools 
and languages that help infiltrate the volatile and troubled dynamics between 
law and resistance.  
 
Secondly, and most importantly, juridical power, or ‘the rules of rights that 
formally delineates power,’ constitutes one of the two pillars of Foucault’s 
conceptions of power and resistance. Foucault approaches the mechanism of 
power according to two ‘markers, or limits’: ‘the rules of rights that formally 
delineate power, and the truth effects that power produces.’54 Since power 
cannot operate without ‘a certain economy of the discourse of truth’; power 
must produce and disseminate a true discourse on the basis of which it can 
project and secure itself. This true discourse, Foucault claims, is traditionally 
produced by juridico-philosophic discourses that claim to ‘establish the limits of 
power’s right.’55 Foucault mocks the philosophico-juridical discourse for asking a 
question that departs from a presumption that truth limits power. Against the 
backdrop of this empirically unfounded assumption, philosophico-juridical 
discourse asks: ‘how does the discourse of truth . . . establish the limits of 
power’s rights?’ According to this discourse, truth is outside of power and 
beyond power. By definition, it is objective, universal, neutral, autonomous, 
and elevated beyond the expediency of power and politics. It resides in the 
realm of the ideal and discovered through philosophical reflection. More 
significantly, these truths claim to lay down the rules of right that ‘establishes 
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the limits of power’s right.’56 Hannah Arendt’s account of the self-evident truths 
invoked by the US Declarations of Independence as a justification for its 
authority is a revealing case in point. Referring to these truths as ‘pre-rational,’ 
Arendt writes, ‘these truths’ . . . inform reason but are not its products—and 
since their self-evidence puts them beyond disclosure and argument, they are in 
a sense no less compelling than . . . the axiomatic verities of mathematics.’57 
 
By formulating the question in this way, and by conceiving its own fictions as a 
priori fact, the performative as constative, something that already is and 
cannot be otherwise, philosophico-juridical discourse formulates a normative 
theory of sovereignty, the subject, and the political; foreclosing their potential 
for change and becoming. Once something is identified with reason, it cannot 
be contested and questioned, it is ‘beyond disclosure and argument,’ as Arendt 
put it. It is precisely the triumph of this kind of logic, rationality and mode of 
reasoning following a rapid formalization and rationalization of law by the 
bourgeois in the nineteenth century that ultimately eliminated resistance from 
the juridical domain.58  
 
Foucault’s reformulation of this question suspends the mythical unity of the 
juridical discourse, exposes its contingency, and ensures its criticizability. To 
reveal the play of power concealed by this system of thought, ‘to show that 
things are not as self-evident as one believed,’ Foucault poses an empirical 
question from below: ‘What are the rules of rights that power implements to 
produce discourses of truth? Or: What type of power is it that is capable of 
producing true discourses of power that have . . .  such a powerful effect?’59 
Here, rather than the Arendtian self-evidence that puts the truths it speaks 
about ‘beyond disclosure and argument,’ truth is a product of power, a ‘thing of 
this world’ that every society produces and circulates in the social body. 
Contesting the self-evidence and rationality of the foundational truths, 
categories, discourses, and institutions that produce, accumulate, and circulate 
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a discourse of truth, Foucault’s account opens up new sites of critique and/as 
resistance. By unmasking the contingency underneath the coherence and self-
evidence of philosophico-juridical discourse and its mode of reasoning, 
genealogical critique builds a strategic knowledge of the juridical approach for 
critique and struggle. 
 
5.5. Strategies of Resistance: From Agonism to Genealogical 
Critique 
While Foucault does not provide a formula or a theory of resistance, he offers 
strategies and tactics that can be used in struggles at the local level. From the 
elaboration of agonism and transgression in his early work to the formulation of 
genealogical critique and the ‘aesthetics of self-creation,’ Foucault offers 
strategies that break off from the power-knowledge regime to open up new 
sites and avenues of struggle. In ‘Madness and Civilization,’ resistance is 
conceived as struggle against the limit imposed by culture.60 Resistance resists 
what is –the limit conditions proposed and imposed on the subject by culture.61 
During the genealogical period, when power emerged as a central concept, 
resistance went beyond the affirmation of difference to an attack against the 
notions (humanist conceptions of human nature, legitimate truth, reason, 
justice, the rule of law, morality, etc) and institutions (schools, universities, 
prisons, factory, the judiciary) that ‘function as the instruments, armature, and 
armour’ of power-relations.62 Let us take three of the most notable forms of 
resistance elaborated in his work.  
 
5.5.1.   Agonism: Contestations and Transgressions 
The first explicit account of resistance is developed in ‘Madness and 
Civilization.’ In the preface, Foucault says, ‘we have yet to write the history of 
that other form of madness, by which men, in an act of sovereign reason, 
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confine their neighbours.’63 Foucault is troubled by dichotomies and categories, 
particularly the distinction between reason and unreason, and the merciless 
social relations it entrenches and sustains.64 By unearthing the confrontation 
that lies beneath the language of reason, Foucault identifies ‘limit’ as the key 
factor behind the ‘Reason-Madness nexus.’65 He says, what is in question is 
‘neither the history of knowledge nor history itself,’ but limit.66 Beginning from 
the Middle Ages, the distinction between reason and unreason served as the 
normative basis for imposing limit on madness; for confining, punishing, and 
silencing madness.67 Foucault here speaks of the contestation of unreason and 
the excess it makes possible:  
 
Ruse and new triumph of madness: the world that thought to measure 
and justify madness through psychology must justify itself before 
madness, since in its struggles and agonies it measures itself by the 
excess of works like those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud.68 
 
The works ‘of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud’ – ‘those barely audible voices 
of classical unreason’ – compel the world, and its ‘limit,’ to recognize what it 
authorizes, marginalizes and fully excludes.69 Speaking from within the shadows, 
unreason amplifies madness, what was mute gives itself expression as ‘shrikes 
and frenzy.’70 In this way, unreason reveals a different kind of madness, a 
madness that speaks the language of discourse, reason, truth and rationality. 
Like those voices of unreason before him, Foucault wanted to redeem the 
depleting culture of agonism that ‘makes possible all contestations as well as 
total contestations.’71 At this stage, resistance is primarily against the ‘limit.’ 
Two years later, Foucault writes an essay titled: ‘A Preface to Transgression.’72 
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Drawing on Bataille, Foucault argues against the discourse of God and the 
various distinctions and categories it animates and makes palpable. He says, ‘at 
the root of this discourse of God, which Western culture has maintained for so 
long—without . . . any clear sense that it places us at the limits of all possible 
languages—is a singular experience shaped: that of transgression.’73  
 
Transgression is here defined as a negation of the limit. But it is not in itself 
negative. He writes, ‘Transgression contains nothing negative but affirms 
limited being.’74 It has a complex relationship with the limit, neither white nor 
black, but a sort of permanent entanglement: ‘[t]ransgression incessantly 
crosses and re-crosses a line which closes behind it in a wave of extremely short 
duration, and thus it is made to return once more right to the horizon of the 
uncrossable.’75 Transgression does not speak in the name of another principle 
such as reason, truth, or humanity; it does not seek to dismantle stable 
foundations; it does not fight the law with a higher law; it does not transform: 
‘its role is to measure the excessive distance that it opens at the heart of the 
limit and to trace the flashing line that causes the limit to arise.’76 Without 
claiming any positive or transformative role, transgression undermines and 
weakens those limits culture imposed on us as absolute and inevitable to 
marginalize and exclude those who don’t fit into the world views of the 
hegemonic group.77 Foucault held these views until the early Seventies when a 
major shift occurred in his intellectual thought.  
 
5.5.2. Genealogical Critique as/and Revolutionary Agitation 
In early 1970s, Foucault abandons his ‘excavations of the epistemological 
foundations of the modern subjects of knowledges’ and begins a historical 
inquiry into modern techniques of power and domination. With this shift from 
archaeological investigations into genealogical inquiry, concepts like 
‘episteme,’ ‘enunciation’ and ‘discursive formation’ were replaced by 
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‘discipline,’ ‘technology,’ ‘strategy’ and ‘biopower.’ In an interview in 1976, 
Foucault has this to say about these transformations in his thought:  
 
I wrote [The Order of Things] at a moment of transition. Until then, it 
seems to me that I accepted the traditional conception of power, power 
as an essentially legal mechanism, what the law says, that which 
forbids, that which says no, with a whole string of negative effects: 
exclusion, rejection, barriers, denial, dissimulation, etc. Now I find that 
conception inadequate . . . this occurred to me in the course of a 
concrete experience I had around 1971–72, regarding prisons. Prisons 
convinced me that power should not be considered in terms of law but 
in terms of technology, in terms of tactics and strategy, and it was this 
substitution of a technical and strategic grid for a legal and negative 
grid that I tried to set up in Discipline and Punish, and then use in 
History of Sexuality.78 
 
The concrete experience Foucault refers to here is mainly the prison industrial 
complex in the United States and revolutionary struggles of black liberationist 
movements.79 In an essay that examined the influence of the Black Panthers’ 
mode of struggle and political critique on Foucault’s thought, Brady Heiner 
presents strong textual evidence to support his claim that Foucault’s ‘encounter 
with American-style racism and class struggle, and his engagement with the 
political philosophies and documented struggles of the Black Panther Party’ that 
motivated the shift.80 In a 1971 interview published as ‘Revolutionary Action: 
‘Until Now,’’ Foucault makes explicit reference to the trial of Soledad Brothers 
where George Jackson, the Black Panther Party Field Marshall and two others 
were tried.81 He defines revolutionary action as ‘the simultaneous agitation of 
consciousness and institutions.’82 This involves attacking ‘the relationships of 
power through the notions and institutions that function as their instruments, 
armature, and armour.’83 Whereas schools, prisons, asylums, factories, and 
courts limit and constrain possible sites of struggle, notions like reason, truth, 
progress, morality, and even justice, which are brought together under the title 
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of humanism, serve to ‘dispel the shock of occurrences, to dissolve the event.’84 
Power succeeds only to the extent that it conceals itself. Modern power 
operates by inscribing itself in these discourses. It manifests itself as 
knowledge, and circulates through these institutions. 
 
Unlike the knowledge of the ruling class interested in the categories and 
typologies of humanism, the histories and narratives of the repressed and the 
excluded are preoccupied with power and struggle.85 The insurrection of 
subjugated knowledges cut-off the link between power and knowledge and 
unravels humanist meta-narratives as a mask of power.86 This unmasking has the 
effect of de-subjectification of the subject and destabilization of the categories 
and divisions that masquerade as natural and inevitable to impose limit on the 
subject’s mode of being, acting, and becoming. If power thrives on masking 
itself from being recognized by the subject, as Foucault claims, its unmasking 
incites action, creates conditions of possibility for action.87 This disclosure of 
what was previously accepted as natural and inevitable, exposing the 
contingency underneath the coherence and rationality of the present, 
constitutes the epicentre of Foucault’s notion of resistance in this period. 
Though Foucault refrained from placing limit on the forms resistance must take, 
endorsing various practices that range from the affirmation of difference to 
various forms of revolutionary action, the unmasking of the present as a 
contingent constellation of culture and history (what he later calls power-
knowledge regime) and unravelling of its constitutive and regulative 
mechanisms constitute the core of his idea of resistance. 
 
Defining itself in opposition to essentialist juridico-philosophic discourses, 
genealogy unravels the radical contingency underneath the coherence of the 
present.88 By assigning historical meaning to law’s central legitimating 
discourses such as equality, liberty, the rule of law, legality, and justice, 
genealogy exposes the ‘violent and unfinished’ nature of rules: ‘humanity 
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installs each of its violence[s] in a system of rules and thus proceeds from 
domination to domination.’89 Foucault conceived genealogy as an intellectual 
work and a methodological toolkit that reveals the lines of power/knowledge 
that traverses relationships of all kinds within the body-politic. Genealogical 
critique, as Foucault conceived it, must begin from a micro-analytics of power 
relations. By exhuming disqualified knowledges of struggle and recovering the 
voice of those deprived of logos, by unearthing the force-relations inscribed in 
egalitarian norms of equality and justice; the genealogist ‘aims to entertain the 
claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledge 
against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter . . . them in 
the name of some true knowledge.’90 The primary task of the genealogist, this 
new intellectual, is criticism of a particular kind: 
 
I dream of the intellectual destroyer of evidence and universalities, the 
one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present, locates and 
marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of power, who 
incessantly displaces himself, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading 
nor what he’ll think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the 
present.91  
 
Foucault provides this seemingly elusive notion of critique, at least for people 
who endure daily violence and indignation, because of his view that there are 
no easy solutions for the givens of the present such as prison, madness, 
psychiatry, and medical power since they don’t exist as a problem in the first 
place. In ‘Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,’ Foucault offers the notion 
of problematization as a point of departure for critique: ‘[t]his development of 
a given into a question, this transformation of a group of obstacles and 
difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce 
a response.’92 This intellectual, the genealogist, ‘would like to produce some 
effects of truth which might be used for a possible battle, to be waged by those 
who wish to wage it, in forms yet to be found and in organizations yet to be 
defined.’93 Since power is always already there, since juridical power is always 
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already there within the all-encompassing field of power, a genealogical 
problematization of law’s constitutive and regulative conditions, its central 
notions and organizing concepts, exhumes voices and knowledges that juridical 
knowledge subjugates, disqualifies, and excludes. As he writes, ‘the purpose of 
history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity but to 
commit itself to its dissipation.’94 Through excavation of ‘the submerged 
problem that is all across the surface,’ genealogy induces unsettling nausea.95 
 
In his later work, Foucault turns to the notion of self-creation, not just as 
affirmation of difference but as a refusal of what one is.  In ‘The Subject and 
Power,’ he writes, ‘[M]ay be the target nowadays is not to discover what we are 
but to refuse what we are.’96 By cutting the hinge that ties the subject to 
sovereignty and the state, Foucault here envisages the emergence of new forms 
of subjectivities.97 Despite his formulation of power as all-encompassing, 
investing all positions including the position of the critique, his later work may 
provide a basis for thinking about a certain ethic of resistance that is not 
reducible to power and strategy.98  
 
There are, of course, well known objections to Foucault’s approach: Foucault’s 
crypto-normativity and account of power annihilates agency, cripples political 
action, and leads to paralysis. There are two distinct objections. The first turns 
on Foucault’s skepticism towards normative concepts. Jürgen Habermas and 
Nancy Fraser are perhaps among the most prominent. Habermas criticizes 
Foucault’s suspicious attitude towards normative ideals as ‘presentistic, 
relativistic and crypto-normativism.’99 Habermas claims that there is always 
already a normative drive behind every project: ‘This grounding of a second- 
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order value-freeness is already by no means value-free.’100 Acknowledging that 
Foucault indeed exalts resistance, Fraser asks why Foucault’s subject must 
resist if he cannot articulate a normative ideal and ambition in the name of 
which we seek to change the present.101 She asks, ‘why is struggle preferable to 
submission? Why ought domination to be resisted?’ The second critique relate to 
his account of power and resistance and his characterization of the subject as 
the effect of a power-knowledge dispositif. This is the concern expressed by 
Thomas McCarthy who saw the effect of Foucault’s power-knowledge regimes 
and his ‘docile bodies’ as paralyzing par excellence.102 McCarthy asks, if we 
treat individuals as incapable of making differential and differentiated 
responses to situations ‘simply as acting in compliance with pre-established and 
publicly sanctioned patterns,’ how can we ‘gain an adequate understanding of 
most varieties of social interaction.’103  
 
Contra these objections, I claim that the dynamism with which Foucault 
elaborates resistance opens law to problematization, critique, and struggle. If 
resistance today inhabits law’s outside, it is because of the rationalization and 
formalization of law’s discourses and humanist notions and categories discussed 
above. If the very notion of the right to resistance as oppositional form of 
politics, (as opposed to the right to armed resistance by people under foreign or 
colonial occupation as recognized by international law), appears difficult and 
counter-intuitive, it is because of law’s truth-effects. If there is something 
problematic about the conjunction ‘and’ in the notion of ‘law and resistance,’ it 
is because, as Foucault says, this problem is not already there, at least not as a 
problem yet.104 
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5.5.3. Toward a Performative Conception of Resistance 
I suggest that we conceptualize resistance as a performative action rather than 
a normative action that expresses something outside itself. Rather than being 
strictly ‘representative or expressive action,’ an action that expresses 
something essential about the subject (McCarthy), the practices he resists 
(Habermas), or why he resists (Fraser), resistance is a performative action that 
calls into presence the very reality it speaks about. Performative acts of 
resistance do not express or represent any normative notion the subject refers 
to in his performance of resistance. Unlike the normative, performative acts are 
non-referential. They bring into being the very ideal or normative principle they 
ostensibly refer to. Although the act of resistance, per se, does not express 
anything essential about the practices being resisted, or the ends pursued, the 
subject of resistance speaks in the name of normative ideals such as justice, 
dignity, and equality. As White writes, ‘Every speech act is a way of being and 
acting in the world that makes a claim for its own rightness, which we ask 
others to respect.’105 A claim to truth is always a claim for power, a claim that 
seeks to transcend the power networks that determine what counts as true.  
 
In fact, Foucault’s account of subjectivity in conjunction with his notion of 
strategy and resistance seems to gesture toward a conception of resistance as 
performative. Although Foucault rejects acting in the name of normative ideals, 
he is not against the strategic use of normative ideals. Defending strategic 
appropriations of normative concepts, Foucault wrote: ‘when the prisoners 
began to speak, they possessed an individual theory of prisons, the penal 
system, and justice. It is this form of discourse which ultimately matters, a 
discourse against power, the counter-discourse.’106 Despite his unease with 
normative ideals, his celebration of the deployment of justice as a counter-
discourse suggests something performative in Foucault’s conceptions of 
resistance. When justice becomes a counter-discourse to ground and mobilize 
resistance, it becomes a counter-power, resistance itself. But this invocation of 
a justice beyond the instituted model, what Derrida calls ‘the justice to come,’ 
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is not normatively loaded. It is a performative exercise that seeks to materialize 
the justice it speaks about.  
 
In Foucault’s notion of aesthetics of self-creation—we will find a facet of 
performativity that is ‘identity-creating’ or ‘world-disclosing.’107 In a 1984 
interview cited earlier, Foucault speaks of the ‘active fashion’ by which ‘the 
individual invents himself.’108 This self-creation, the practices of the self, he 
argued, is a permanent becoming. Drawing on Foucault, Butler argues, ‘the 
subject who is produced through subjection is not produced at an instant in its 
totality.’109 The processes by which the subject of resistance breaks from the 
normative structures that limit and regulate his choices are performative. Bell 
for example argued that ‘subjectivity, as Foucault comes to regard it through 
the texts studied in The Use of Pleasure, breaks off from the lines of force 
which brought it into being and establishes its relation to self.’110 One can find 
several textual evidences suggestive of a certain performative rational in 
Foucault’s approach to questions of law and resistance. On the occasion of the 
launching of the International Committee against Piracy, for example, Foucault 
spoke of the existence of the right to international citizenship, which 
establishes rights and duties ‘that obliges one to speak out against every abuse 
of power.’111 Of course, there is no such right either in national or international 
law in the juridical sense of the term. Like Hannah Arendt who wrote about ‘the 
right to have rights’ to generate, performatively, the rights she was writing 
about,112 Foucault is performatively creating the very right he was speaking 
about. Hence, Foucault’s notion of self-creation as resistance can be read as a 
performative resistance.  
But the reference to normative ideals is often a strategic move aimed at 
appropriating the excesses and gaps between law’s normative claims and its 
performative orderings. Indeed, without appeal to the normative, without the 
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strategic appropriation of the very notions, categories, and discourses of 
juridical power, resistance cannot enter law’s space. The man before the law 
cannot access its already inaccessible gate. Without a counter-discourse that 
supports resistant knowledges of struggle, a discourse within which to 
synchronize their politics with the legal form, resistance cannot take off the 
ground in law. The possibility of historicization or re-politicization resides in the 
disjuncture between the actuality of law and the normative notions of justice, 
equality, and dignity to which law appeals. They can be reconfigured and used 
as a counter-discourse, from an opposing direction, and for an altogether 
different purpose. If there is nothing eternal and determinist about legal 
discourses that produce hegemonic norms to sustain relations of domination, As 
Curkpatrick suggests, a performative re-articulation of counter-discourse can 
thwart the complex assemblages of normative forces. However, without a 
normative account of the present and normative ideals so recognized by the 
system, the subject cannot access the fortified and heavily guarded terrain of 
law let alone open up space for contestations. The mode of thought that 
animates the reversal in the temporal gap between signification and ‘the 
differential and differentiated’ uses to which the signifying form can be put is 
performative par excellence.113 I claim that this understanding of resistance to 
practices of subjectification can provide a framework for thinking about 
resistance to the ways by which human beings have become the subject and 
objects of law. 
 
5.6. Performative Strategic Thinking in Law: Carving out Space 
within Space 
If the emphasis is on strategy, it is precisely because the innovative synergies of 
political trials reside in the economy of the strategy, i.e., in the disruptive and 
transformative potential of the strategy of intervention. It is at the strategic 
level that the performative mediates the unity between the activist’s discourse, 
his action and his immanent motives. The rigor of legal process, the canon of 
interpretation or the rituals of the courtroom notwithstanding, the core issues 
in political trials—responsibility, justice, morality, legitimacy, representation, 
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loyalty, identity, nationalism, etc—rests upon innovative strategies of 
intervention that draw their critical pedagogic impetus from lived experiences 
of the excluded and the marginalized.  
 
Tapping law’s responsive spaces, the performative subject exploits law’s 
‘transformative opportunities’ to redeem its promise for justice and equality. 
But what exactly are these responsive and reflexive spaces and what does their 
resignification consists in? What does it mean to engage law in ‘political-
strategic’ terms? What types of resistance register as properly resistant in law 
to generate the kind of power effects Foucault suggests? Through a 
consideration of the works of Emilios Christodoulidis, what follows will identify 
a conceptual-strategic apparatus crucial for understanding performative 
resistance in the courtroom.  
 
In ‘Law and Reflexive Politics,’ Christodoulidis suggests a conception of ‘the 
reflexive’ as that which is the anti-thesis of ‘the ‘exclusionary’’ and ‘reflexive 
politics’ as a redemptive enterprise.114  He defines reflexive politics as that 
which ‘keeps the question of its revisability always open and where the political 
constellation of meanings is always disruptable.’115 Recognizing the ‘limited’ 
reflexivity on which law’s gate-keeping discourses secure their legitimacy and 
resilience, ‘Law and Reflexive Politics’ attempts to redeem law’s exclusionary 
premises. While this particular work can be read as an attempt to clarify and 
reveal the politics of exclusion central to the dominant mode of democratic will 
formation, the author uses this conceptual framework to articulate specific 
legal strategies attentive to key sites and moments in his later works. It is due 
to this specificity that straddles the ‘level and meta-level,’ a framework that 
strategically redirects discursive dynamisms to points of contradictions, 
incongruities, uncertainties, fissures and cracks that I find Christodoulidis’s 
work an informative genre of critique. 
 
Frustrated with these gate-keeping technologies of foreclosures, closures and 
co-option, Christodoulidis warns against abandoning law as a site of critique and 
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resistance.116  In ‘Strategies of Rupture,’ he identifies the ways in which the 
system operates to contain its externalities within the system to guarantee its 
continued and uninterrupted vitality. He identifies two broad schematics 
‘pertinent to law’s functions’ and potential targets for critical interventions: 
‘law’s powers of homology and law’s mechanisms of deliberate deadlock.’117 By 
homology, he refers to law’s paradigmatic mode of stabilizing expectations 
through ‘controlled innovation’ and ‘the use of normativity peculiar to it.’118 By 
‘deliberate deadlock,’ he seeks to capture a plethora of instances in which the 
law reduces or neutralizes the substance of promises central to its legitimacy 
and therefore displaces ‘opportunities of redress.’119 After identifying these 
exclusionary categories that operate in tandem with the system’s logic of 
performative self-reference, which also explains the remarkable resilience and 
stability of the circuit, Christodoulidis turns to examining innovative strategies 
of intervention attentive to ‘contradictions,’ ‘heterogeneity,’ and 
‘incongruence’ that permeates ‘the legal landscape.’120   
 
To tap into the system’s own ‘transformative opportunities,’ strategic thinking 
should be attentive to and vigilant about ‘meta-level-dilemmas’ and must take 
account of the constitutional framework that ‘fore-structures the field of 
possible action.’121  ‘Strategic thinking at the meta-level,’ he argues, ‘re-orients 
itself to carving out a space for the possibility of acting—a meta-level struggle—
against the registers of democratic Capitalism.’122 Christodoulidis calls these 
modalities of critique immanent.  He writes: ‘Immanent critique aims to 
generate within these institutional frameworks contradictions that are 
inevitable (they can neither be displaced nor ignored), compelling (they 
necessitate action) and transformative in that (unlike internal critique) the 
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overcoming of the contradiction does not restore, but transcends, the 
‘disturbed’ framework within which it arose.’123  
 
With ‘Law and Reflexive Politics’ as his overarching framework, Christodoulidis’s 
work is an attempt to strategically reposition law’s reflexive and responsive 
impulse to the margin of discourse and politics. Situating resistance at 
irresistible sites, exploiting discontinuities and contradictions either repressed 
or managed by the system, vigilant to normative prescriptions and concrete 
institutional architectures, attentive to rights discourse and ‘institutional 
imagination,’ attentive too, to the local and global constitutional frameworks, 
Christodoulidis’s project gives new significance to the totality of legal strategies 
and inspires strategic engagement with the law to ameliorate, if not redress,  
present injustices that are urgent and cannot wait.  
 
In response to Roberto M. Unger’s thesis of ‘law as politics’ and his optimistic 
account of law’s ‘transformative opportunities,’ Christodoulidis reminds us of 
the rationality that foregrounds the system’s openness and how it might be 
harnessed for transforming consciousness. There, he writes, ‘The system’s 
cognitive openness, in fact the cognitive openness that can be nothing else 
except systemic, is premised on the system’s closure, its ability to reduce the 
complexity it is faced with.’124 In the binary logic that governs the conduct of 
the criminal trial and the system’s expectation of all claims and utterances to 
confirm to its grid of intelligibility, closure is the rule and openness the 
exception to the rule.  
 
In ‘Against Substitution,’ through James Tully, he explains how political action 
rises to the meta-level: ‘through militant attention to the points of tension upon 
which the management of consensus depends; through the logic of rupture; 
through acting to create the possibility of acting in a way that was 
foreclosed.’125 In ‘Strategies of Rupture,’ a work calibrated to elaborating the 
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specific operation of these strategies, he begins by drawing attention to rights 
discourse and the institutional architecture neglected by mainstream critique. 
Whatever normative closure characterize the discourse of rights, Christodoulidis 
argues, the fundamental indeterminacy of the rights discourse provides us with 
an opportunity for a political-strategic intervention aimed at creating space for 
acts of resistance that are ‘neither co-optable’ nor ‘institutionally relevant.’126 
Through a discussion of Peter Fitzpatrick’s claim that ‘sovereignty must be 
intrinsically receptive to plurality . . . [that] law, to be law, cannot be 
contained in its determinate essence,’ Christodoulidis paints a picture of rights 
discourse that is amenable to militant intervention. A right, he writes, 
 
[c]annot be contained or exhausted in any one determinate content . . . any 
one definitive interpretation or conclusive determinatio. Instead it renews 
itself as responsive to our humanity . . . Law creates determinate effects, 
but those determinations forever leave a remainder, which as excess invokes 
further responses from the law.127 
 
If this provides a glimpse of the transformative potential evident in law, what 
modality of resistance resists without drawing on the dominant ideology to 
transcend institutional cooption? Christodoulidis’ question, ‘what registers as 
resistant, neither reducible to nor co-optable by the order it seeks to resist?’128 
is a question, that, not only seeks to illuminate practices of subjection 
sustained through techniques of closure and cooption, but also explicates a 
mode of critique that intervenes to retrieve the political, to revitalize, even 
reinvent, the political universe: ‘what can break incongruently, irreducibly so, 
with the order of capital or, more precisely, with capitalism’s economy of 
representation?’129 In a passage suggestive of an answer to this question and 
pertinent to the politics of the political trial, he puts forth a view of strategic 
intervention that I take as a departure for a political-strategic thinking that 
opens up new spaces and holds on to already opened spaces, tricks sovereignty 
into its turf, launches an assault against it, to disrupt its rituals and 
ceremonials, destroy its dazzling symbols and prestige, expose exclusionary and 
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hegemonic norms, subvert it, transform it at a site where the system’s cognitive 
expectation of surprise against its normative structure is at its lowest: 
 
Against a 'communicative' or 'deliberative' distribution of speaking positions, 
the 'strategic,’ imports a reflexivity that does not necessarily fall within, but 
may situate itself incongruently to the spaces, interstices and speaking 
positions that the system makes available; incongruently, thus also, to the 
channels of change that ... the system offers as productive to the order of 
capital.130 
 
The strategic may not be the central animating factor behind the personal 
moral conviction to resist but profoundly informs and instigates the 
transformation of the personal into a collective political struggle. Although how 
one situates oneself in this space that ‘the system makes available’ remains a 
political-strategic decision contingent upon local ‘situations,’ legal proceedings 
contain a ‘reflexivity that does not necessarily fall within’ the system’s filters.131 
In its insistence on revealing, exposing, disrupting, and problematizing 
frameworks of subjection, performative resistance operates at the margin, 
situating itself at the interstices of legality and illegality, incongruently, and 
poetically, through humour, irony, wits, jokes, and music to evoke its power-
effect. Contesting and using the truth of the law and of rights, the figure of 
resistance calls into presence a new order of exchange between sovereignty and 
those it excludes.  It offers a different political ontology of the subject, 
sovereignty, and the political. 
 
5.7. The Transformative Potential of Performative Resistance in Law 
What transformative or emancipatory promise can the performative bring to 
bear on resistance to juridical discourses? If sovereignty and the subject 
constitute the two most important juridico-political formations central to the 
openness and closure of the political, the performative deconstructs their 
political ontology; creating conditions of possibility for the ‘politics of 
becoming.’ By revealing the contingency and complexity underneath the 
coherence of both sovereignty and the subject, it opens these formations to 
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what Butler and Athena Athanasiou call ‘unprefigurable future significations.’132 
In other words, understanding these formations as performative, as a historical 
articulation of contingent power-knowledge constellation, forces us to 
acknowledge and recognize the ‘becoming’ central to these formations, leaving 
the future open, unpredictable, and unclosable. 
 
Performative resistance emphasizes not the prohibitive and negative aspects of 
sovereignty and subjectivity but the productive, disciplinary, and normalizing 
effects of power on these formations. If law is a manifestation of power, and it 
certainly is, performative resistance eludes this power because it rejects the 
normativity of its central concepts and organizing principles. If juridical power 
functions only to the extent that it conceals itself, as Foucault says; if the 
technology of concealing survives only to the extent that this power masks itself 
as something else—as knowledge, reason, national security, public safety, etc—
and circulated by supposedly neutral institutions such as courts and prisons; 
performative resistance resists by refiguring the discourse that articulates 
power and knowledge. It breaks the discursive hinge that ties this power to 
institutions.  
 
The understanding and recognition of these formations as performative and 
contingently constituted allows us to unsettle taken-for-granted necessities 
about sovereignty and its power over life and death. It helps us see the 
heterogeneity and complexity underlying its coherent unity, and finally import 
historical inquiry into the orbit of law and legality.’ If the performative 
succeeds in explicating the contingent historical constitution of the present, if it 
gives us a diagnostic device for re-articulating the political ontology of 
sovereignty, the political, and the subject; then, we can begin to question the 
notions, domains, central concepts, and analytic frameworks by which law 
disables contestations and closes opportunities of change and becoming. By 
desecrating these formations from determinist rationalities by which law 
presents performative sovereignty and subjectivity as normative, fixed and 
static, the performative reconfigures these formations—as historical, 
contingent, and non-referential and opens up lines of flights. By situating 
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critical historicity at points of tension, cracks, and fissures, performative 
resistance creates a condition for disjuncture between signification and 
context. Through practices of transgression, disruption, excess, and self-
creation, performative resistance questions the eventalizing force of sovereign 
enunciations and its signifying practices.   
 
Let me recapitulate my central arguments so far: In chapter two, I identified 
the forms of rationality and modes of reasoning by which law eliminated 
resistance and established a normative ontology of sovereignty and the subject. 
By identifying three central moments – foundation, and subject formation – as 
performative par excellence, chapter three advanced an understanding of law 
as a performative enterprise. Through a performative deconstruction of 
sovereignty and subjectivity, I have tried to show how these two formations 
came to have the kind of normative reality they now have. Arguing that a 
normative conception of law, sovereignty, and the subject imposes a closure by 
limiting the becoming horizons of subjectivity and sovereignty, I suggested a 
performative epistemology of law that recognizes and acknowledges the 
constitutive and regulative conditions of these formations. The recognition of 
sovereignty and the subject as processes of becoming introduces a contingency 
that enables a disjuncture between the original signification and the context, 
disrupting the repetition of an iterable code, and therefore rupturing its 
exclusionary and oppressive aims. In chapter four, I identified the political trial 
as one specific performative moment that exposes law’s empty claims to 
normativity, neutrality, objectivity, and justice. I argued that as a surface 
manifestation of a submerged crisis of sovereignty, the political trial offers an 
occasion to go beyond the narrow question of guilt and innocence to question 
the very logic that sustains these and other categories.  
 
Most importantly, since the possibilities for communication and understanding 
between sovereignty and the subject are limited by the instituted idiom of 
intelligibility, i.e., by the logic and rationality that organizes and structures 
communications between the two, the possibility of communication depends on 
the performative disruption of that limit. The subject’s refusal to obey the 
limits imposed by these oppressive structures compels the system to recognize 
and acknowledge its exclusionary character. Through transgressive disruption of 
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law’s gate-keeping discourses and egalitarian principles, performative 
resistance opens up possibilities of communication and understanding between 
the subject and the sovereign. Communication and understanding are the key 
ingredients of political life. However, if the terms of convincing a political 
adversary about the validity of one’s claim are limited by the instituted 
paradigms of communication, then, the possibility of communication and 
understanding depends on the disruption of that paradigm and the performative 
reinvention of a new.133 Our ability to break from the limits imposed on visibility 
and voice by power-knowledge turns on our ability to renew and imagine beyond 
the present, to perceive and believe in a possibility of a different kind of world. 
Performativity offers a way to conceptualize and perform that world.  
 
5.7.1. The Performative-Genealogical Paradigm in Action 
Through a consideration of a particular scene from Abbie Hoffman’s testimony 
in the Chicago Conspiracy trial, I want to account for the political promises of 
performativity.   By identifying the performative logic undergirding Hoffman’s 
interventions, I want to explicate the practical relevance of performative 
strategies for disruption and transformation. A transformative intervention 
informed by performative strategies, to use Christodoulidis’s formulation, 
‘imports a specific reflexivity that does not necessarily fall within, but may 
situate itself incongruently to the spaces, interstices and speaking positions that 
the system makes available.’134 While Abbie Hoffman spoke through several 
genres of speech act to get his message out, here I am interested in one 
innovative scene that not only brilliantly activates politics at a site where 
politics is juridically deactivated, but also engenders new ways of thinking, 
acting, and being in the world.  
 
Here is the exchange: 
  
The Counsel:        Will you please identify yourself for the record?  
The Witness:        My name is Abbie.  I am an orphan of America.  
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The Prosecution:  Your Honor, may the record show it is the defendant 
Hoffman who has taken the stand?  
The Court:            Oh, yes.  It may so indicate. . . .  
The Counsel:         Where do you reside?  
The Witness:          I live in Woodstock Nation.  
The Counsel:        Will you tell the Court and jury where it is?  
The Witness:        Yes.  It is a nation of alienated young people.  We carry it 
around with us as a state of mind in the same way as the Sioux 
Indians carried the Sioux nation around with them.  It is a 
nation dedicated to cooperation versus competition, to the 
idea that people should have better means of exchange than 
property or money, that there should be some other  basis for 
human interaction.  It is a nation dedicated to--  
The Court:            Just where it is, that is all.  
The Witness:         It is in my mind and in the minds of my brothers and 
sisters.  It does not consist of property or material but, rather, 
of ideas and certain values.  We believe in a society--  
The Court:           No, we want the place of residence, if he has one, place of 
doing business, if you have a business.  Nothing about 
philosophy or India, Sir.  Just where you live, if you have a 
place to live.  Now you said Woodstock.  In what state is 
Woodstock?  
The Witness:         It is in the state of mind, in the mind of me and my brothers 
and sisters.  It is a conspiracy.  Presently, the nation is held 
captive, in the penitentiaries of the institutions of a decaying 
system.  
   . . .  
The Counsel:        Can you tell the Court and jury what is your present 
occupation?  
The Witness:        I am a cultural revolutionary. Well, I am really a defendant--
full-time.  
The Counsel:       What do you mean by the phrase ‘cultural revolutionary?’  
The Witness:     Well, I suppose it is a person who tries to shape and participate 
in the values, and the mores, the customs and the style of 
living of new people who eventually become inhabitants of a 
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new nation and a new society through art and poetry, theater, 
and music. 
 
An innovative strategy here appropriates the system’s openness at the earliest 
‘speaking position’ available. Ordinary questions generate extraordinary 
answers aimed at putting one of America’s turbulent decades on trial. It is a 
political strategic intervention that situates the innovative and agonistic 
qualities of the performative at the point where the trial is most reflexive. 
Although the system expects the legal subject to act responsibly, i.e., 
respecting authority and viewing it as its mirror-image, the defendant breaks 
with sovereign enunciation, at his peril, and activates politics. The witness 
begins his defense in a subversive style. In identifying himself as ‘an orphan of 
America,’ resident of ‘Woodstock Nation,’ and a ‘cultural revolutionary,’ the 
defense strategy is at once oriented towards ‘carving out space for acting’ and 
to bringing back internalized norms that make our identities self-evident into 
the realm of contestation. His defiant response to standard questions is at once 
an act of disruption and self-recreation.  
 
This strategic engagement with law offers an account of what Jill Dolan 
describes as a ‘utopian performative’ that is ‘world-disclosing’ and ‘identity-
creating.’ In ‘Utopia in Performance,’ Dolan uses the phrase ‘utopian 
performative’ to capture, 
 
[S]mall but profound moments in which performance calls the attention of 
the audience in a way that lifts everyone slightly above the present, into a 
hopeful feeling of what the world might be like if every moment of our lives 
were as emotionally voluminous, generous, aesthetically striking, and 
intersubjectively intense.135  
 
The moment of the political trial is precisely the kind of moment Dolan 
describes as ‘small but profound,’ akin to what constitutional lawyers call 
‘constitutional moments.’ Not all political trials embody such foundational 
stories as to engage the common deliberation of the body politic. But those like 
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the Chicago Seven Conspiracy Trial are fulcrums for judgment-on them depends 
societies’ understanding of its values, its identity and its sense of justice. As a 
‘utopian performative,’ Hoffman rearticulates the dilemmas of responsibility, 
representation, recognition, exclusion, morality, and legitimacy facing the 
American public.  
 
In imagining himself as a resident of what he named the ‘Woodstock Nation,’ a 
utopian nation that does not have a concrete political existence yet, one that 
exists in ‘the state of mind,’ the witness is disclosing a different world governed 
by a new epistemic standard. He says: ‘a new nation . . . dedicated to 
cooperation versus competition, to the idea that people should have better 
means of exchange than property or money, that there should be some other 
basis for human interaction.’136 While this trial comes at a pivotal moment in 
American history, the performance of seven middle-class-white Americans 
created an intense moment of intersubjective communication between the 
white middle class and the African Americans and the Indians. In their 
concession to the demands of Bobby Seale (the only black defendant in the 
group of eight alleged conspirators), in their denunciation of the system, they 
transformed the trial into a ‘moment of enchantment’ that resulted in a 
‘sudden insight into the shared process of being in the world.’ 
 
It is identity-creating too. In identifying himself as a ‘Cultural Revolutionary,’ 
the witness is bringing into being a new citizen, a new identity, a new political 
subjectivity that is defiant and resistant to the apparatus of subjection and 
seeks to transform it. He defines a ‘cultural revolutionary as ‘a person who tries 
to shape and participate in the values, and the mores, the customs and the style 
of living of new people who eventually become inhabitants of a new nation and 
a new society through art and poetry, theater, and music.’137 Apart from 
reconstituting the defendant as a subject capable of resistance to disciplinary 
technologies that constitute his identity, his performative response extends the 
universe of contestation beyond self-recreation and returns the taken fore- 
granted norms of the ideal liberal subject to the realm of contestation. It is, to 
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use Fredrick Jameson’s formulation, a utopian that marks a ‘radical disjuncture 
with the present.’138 
 
Condemning the usurpation of the power of the constituent and naming a 
different kind of society and an alternative way of being and acting in the 
world, the defendant institutes a disruption that defies containment by the 
system. It is utopian, disruptive and insists on the transformative opportunity of 
the moment to call into being a new reality and a new identity he calls ‘new 
people’ or ‘new society,’ a new world that he names ‘new nation’ and 
articulate a new epistemic standard that shapes their vision of transformation: 
‘art and poetry, theatre, and music.’ Regardless of its utopian form, Hoffman’s 
disruptive strategy demonstrates that ‘we can still act’ though these actions are 
always contingent. The performative is often utopian and utopian is more often 
than not contingent. As Jameson argues, ‘It [utopia] is the break that secures 
the radical difference of the new utopian society [which] simultaneously makes 
it impossible to imagine.’139 Whether or not this mode of performative resistance 
‘can break incongruently . . . with the order of capital or . . . with capitalism’s 
economy of representation,’140 his intervention resists his construction as passive 
and obedient and offers a different way of naming and perceiving the world.  
 
If the teleology behind this mode of resistance is one that seeks to bring into 
the public arena those self-evident truths ‘that cannot be refuted because it 
was hardened into unalterable form in the long baking process of history’141 with 
the view to performatively reinscribing and accentuating their constructedness 
rather than their self-evidence, its success, i.e., the consciousness 
transformation and identity creating effect of his resistance can only be 
achieved by an acting subject after action not before action. In ‘The Subject 
and Power,’ Foucault argues that ‘power exists only when it is put into 
action.’142 His disruptive strategy not only secures space for acting but also 
destabilizes the norms and identities that structure the dialogue within the 
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courtroom. Through such strategic and innovative intervention at this early 
stage in the trial, the defense hints at his utopian politics that seeks to 
strategically bring what is rendered invisible and unimaginable into the sphere 
of politics. In the ‘Archaeologies of the Future,’ Jameson brilliantly 
encapsulates the logic at work in this disruptive-utopian paradigm: ‘Disruption is 
then the name of the new discursive strategy, and Utopia is the form which such 
disruption necessarily takes.’143   
 
5.8. Conclusion 
Whatever transformative or liberating potential one ascribes to this mode of 
participation in law, no matter what the critical potentials of its pedagogy, 
these interventions clearly represent a chasm in the integrity of the institution. 
They are strategic and their utopian mode of critique breaks with the logic of 
the system. The goal of the intervention is not to annihilate power or dispel the 
end of the power structure that is the object of its critique; it aims to create 
the conditions of possibility for intervention and critique. Performative 
resistance is disruptive. As performative strategic participation in law, these 
disruptive interventions deploy disruption as ‘a discursive strategy’ to re-
politicize social conflicts and transform embodied experiences of injustice and 
indignation into a weapon that nourishes their anger and determination to 
resist. Their conflict is not just with the law but also the discursive domains and 
power-knowledge regimes within which their voice is usurped and their agency 
annihilated.  
 
Breaking with the system’s logic of representation and redress, their disruptive 
confrontation with the system oscillates from an internal critique to immanent 
critique and utopian resistance (calling for ‘a radical disjuncture with the 
present’). Exposing the limits of the communicative paradigm and marking its 
‘blind spots,’ such interventions return the system’s normative structures, its 
discourses and operational logic, the norms it consistently upholds and the 
exceptions it allows into the realm of confrontation. In their own ways, these 
strategies generate dilemmas that force the system to acknowledge their 
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claims. In rejecting the communicative paradigm, the performative paradigm 
does not propose an alternative paradigm. It is an agonistic struggle that seeks 
to capture which does not present itself as an object of deliberation within the 
instituted paradigm. 
 
As discussed earlier, if the subject is the effect of power that wields a limited 
free will and therefore agency, it is difficult to see how the agent, at least 
according to this Foucauldian-Butlerian logic that situates the subject in an 
ambivalent relationship to power, effectively subverts the system by ‘using the 
resources of the system’ let alone dispel the end of the structure. Instead, the 
point being made is this: insofar as one can engage in the resistance of the very 
practices that constitute us, this is necessarily a micro-politics of resistance 
whose aim is not to identify a blueprint for the notion of the moral life and how 
to achieve it, it is a struggle against what is, against the closures and 
foreclosures, the limits on the becoming potential of the human subject. Its aim 
is to contest the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present that 
exclude, dispossess, dispose, murder, exterminate etc. Struggles within the law 
do not aim at obliterating the structures of domination once. They aim to 
surprise the system, crush its symbols, disrupt its prestige, and leave 
ineffaceable signs, memorable repertoires of resistance that inhere in memory, 
one which the system cannot integrate or from which it cannot recuperate. It is 
an attack against the notions and systems of thought that legitimize and 
consolidate the order. It is about registering irreparable ruptures that will 
eventually erupt into what Althusser calls ‘ruptural unity.’144  
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Chapter Six 
6. ‘Black man in the white man’s court’: Nelson 
Mandela’s Performative- Genealogical Interventions  
 
6.1.  Introduction: Apartheid on Trial 
 
                         I want to tell you so to your face so that it carries more weight. 
 —Pascal, Pensees  
 
What are these trials about, eh? Who is it they are trying?’ one of them asked. 
‘The whole of South Africa is on trial,’ replied Professor Matthews, looking up 
darkly from his group. ‘You’re on trial, we’re all on trial. It’s ideas that are 
being tried here, not people.1         
    
 —Anthony Sampson, The Treason Cage 
 
Anthony Sampson’s account of the above encounter is emblematic of both the 
substance and the tone of conversations taking shape on the streets of South 
Africa as the government stages a phenomenal spectacle in the courtroom. 
Describing the politics of repression at the heart of the treason indictment, 
counsel for defense captured the essence of the confrontation in terms of 
competing spectacles—a confrontation between spectacles of repression and 
resistance.2 It was a cultural representation of a battle of ideas between those 
who ‘seek equal opportunity for, and freedom of thought and expression by, all 
persons of all races and creeds’ on the one hand, and ‘those which deny to all 
but a few the riches of life, both material and spiritual, which the accused aver 
should be common to all.’3 The first of the many high profile political trials, the 
spectacle backfired and generated what Sampson described as ‘the oddest 
paradox’: ‘in the very court where they were being tried for treason, the 
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Congress leaders were able to hold their biggest unbanned meetings for four 
years.’4 In his memoire, Long Walk to Freedom, Mandela describes the trial’s 
boomerang effect: ‘Our communal cell became a kind of convention for far-
flung freedom fighters. Many of us had been living under severe restrictions, 
making it illegal for us to meet and talk. Now, our enemy had gathered us all 
together under one roof for what became the largest and longest unbanned 
meeting of the Congress Alliance in years.’5  
 
Apartheid’s spectacles of oppression were overtaken by liberatory counter-
spectacles. What is orchestrated to produce and generate images and concepts 
productive to the racist regime was redirected and used by the oppressed as a 
platform for visibility and hearing: to give account of themselves in their own 
terms, with their own discourse and dialect.6 As he later noted, ‘By representing 
myself I would enhance the symbolism of my role’: ‘I would use my trial as a 
showcase for the ANC’s moral opposition to racism.’7 Instead of defending 
themselves against the charges, they laid a charge against the system, accusing 
it of racism, violence, injustice, immorality, and illegality, and illegitimacy; 
transforming themselves into ‘the subjects of history rather than . . . 
impersonal objects of official historical records,’ as Rancière would say.8 An 
event staged with the one and only purpose of squashing resistance to the 
usurpation of the very conditions of intelligibility as speaking beings, generated 
the opposite result: it created a defiant subject that exposed subjection at sites 
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never seen before, that apprehended and named Apartheid’s schematic of 
subjection and injustice.   
 
This chapter will examine the significance of Mandela’s courtroom performances 
of resistance in illuminating our understanding of the constitutive and regulative 
conditions that sustained Apartheid. Much of the emphasis will be on the 
conditions of possibility his interventions made possible. By identifying a few 
scenes from the Incitement trial (1962), and genealogically analyzing their 
disruptive and transformative potential, moments, I will offer a historicist 
reading of Mandela’s relations to the law, focusing on the objections he raises 
and the moves he makes between different registers. 
 
6.2. Performative-Genealogies in the Old Synagogue Court  
 
We would not defend ourselves in a legal sense so much as in a moral sense. We 
saw the trial as a continuation of the struggle by other means.  
 
Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 360 
 
In ‘Just Stories,’ Milner S. Ball conceives ‘narrative’ as a medium through which 
a political community is continuously and permanently constituted and 
reconstituted.9 He argues, ‘Narrative is the primary medium for talking together 
about who we are—and would be—as people, and this is the talk in which 
conversation about justice chiefly subsists.’10 It is in the telling and retelling of 
stories of people, in the continuities and ruptures, in the homogeneities and 
heterogeneities, and the disjuncture between the coherence and contingency of 
the past that the raw material for contestation, re-creation and renewal 
resides.11 As Melvyn Hill tells us, ‘Stories tell us how each one finds or loses his 
just place in relation to others in the world.’12 In particular, some stories of law 
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‘embody such paradigmatic’ dilemmas as to ‘engage our common deliberation 
as a public.’13 They confront the body politic with fundamental questions of 
responsibility, representation, recognition, equality, and justice. These are 
stories ‘in which the community defines itself, not once and for all, but over 
and over, and in the process it educates itself about its own character and the 
nature of the world.’14 Mandela’s trials constitute those singular national 
occasions in which a resistant subject confronted South Africans with 
foundational questions—what kind of society they are and what kind of political 
community they want to have for the future. In recounting the story of 
exclusion and misrecognition of black identity and personhood, the defendant 
transformed the legal moment into what may be called a counter-constitutional 
moment that sought to redeem the logos of those excluded by the original act 
of founding.15 ‘Recounting differently,’ the defendant composes a genealogical 
account not only of South African justice but also South Africa the nation.16 In 
recounting stories of origin differently, i.e., in reconfiguring and retelling South 
Africa’s violence of law-making and law-preserving, Mandela brings politico-
historical inquiry into the orbit of law and legality.  
 
In displacing the gathering effect of the ‘we,’ he offers a genealogical and 
performative reading of the founding moment generally and the law 
specifically: he uses the moment of the trial to show the gap between law and 
mere law. In ‘recounting differently,’ as Ricoeur observes, ‘the inexhaustible 
richness of the event’ of founding, he situates himself genealogically and 
performatively, to the spaces, interstices, and speaking positions offered by the 
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system, to expose the intense political and legal crisis haunting Apartheid.17 
Mandela’s critique both uses and mocks the law, he upholds and defeats the 
law. In this double movement, he stages a genealogical and performative 
problematization that displaces and reinvents law. Without abandoning 
enlightenment values of equality, freedom and liberty, Mandela’s critique of 
Apartheid law and ‘justice’ takes a genealogical turn; launching a stinging 
demythologization of the mythical foundation of law and justice and the 
desacralization of sacred knowledge.  
 
But what do genealogies do in the context of the political trial? First of all, 
genealogies are diagnostic tools: as a historical inquiry into the conditions of the 
present, genealogy reveals the coherence underlying sovereignty, the subject, 
institutions, discourses, and identities as contingent and contested.18 As a 
diagnostic or analytic tool into the conditions of the present, genealogy 
excavates submerged juridico-political crisis into an arena of visibility and 
shows the relationship between the practices of the present and the submerged 
crisis of the past.19 The political trial is simply a surface manifestation of that 
submerged crisis, a crisis of sovereignty that makes an appearance on the 
normative structures of the system ones in a while. By tracing the conflict that 
rages beneath law’s normative mainstays to the submerged crisis of the past, 
genealogy historicizes the juridical realm and exposes the contingency that lies 
beneath the coherence of the normative order. It brings that submerged 
problem into view ‘so as to do something with them.’20 Mandela conceived the 
trial not as ‘a taste of the law’ or as a site of ‘truth-telling,’ but, in his own 
words, ‘as a continuation of the struggle by other means.’21 In all the three 
trials- from the treason trial to the incitement trial and the Rivonia trial, 
Mandela brings historical inquiry into the orbit of law and legality, with the view 
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to doing something with it, with the view to unlocking, if you like, juridically 
closed meanings.  
 
Situating himself within, Mandela reconfigures the reflexive and polyvalent 
material and spatial coordinates of legal principles and the rights discourse to 
appropriate the tension that traverse the legal order. As Foucault writes in 
‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,’ ‘the nature of these rules allows violence to be 
inflicted on violence and the resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently 
strong to dominate those in power.’22 In a passage that encapsulates the kind of 
strategic move adopted by Mandela, Foucault writes: 
 
The success of history belongs to those who are capable of seizing these rules 
to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves as to pervert 
them, invert their meaning and redirect them against those who had initially 
imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it 
function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.23 
 
Mandela’s reconfiguration of South Africa’s story of ‘origin,’ his recounting of 
the story and history of its laws, his re-signification of the very meanings of 
juridical concepts and ideals—legality, criminality, equality, the rule of law, 
violence, communism, democracy, etc —inverting their ‘meaning and 
redirecting it against the very order that originally imported and imposed it’—is 
an impeccable evidence of a genealogical logic at work in his defense.24 Indeed, 
Mandela’s deployment of Apartheid’s own rules against those who owns them, 
re-functioning them so as to expose the violent and ‘surreptitious appropriation 
of a system of rules’ is a successful use of what Foucault calls effective 
history.25 In making spectacle out of Apartheid’s legal absurdity and the false 
legalism of his trials, he invokes and protests rights, a disruptive exercise that 
Foucault calls the ‘simultaneous declaration of war and of rights.’26  
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Consistent with Foucault’s counter-historical discourse, Mandela conceives the 
struggles and confrontations within Apartheid laws, institutions, and the social 
sphere in terms of a race-war that divides the South African body politic along a 
racial line.27 More over, just as Foucault’s genealogical analysis of power28 draws 
on a reformulation of Carl Von Clausewitz’s classic aphorism—’war is a mere 
continuation of policy by other means . . . carrying out of the same by other 
means’—Mandela’s liberationist repertoire of resistance conceived the theatre 
of the state as spectacles of oppression aimed at repressing and eliminating 
resistance to the order. In the Rivonia trial, Mandela goes further, making 
explicit reference to ‘the classic work of Clausewitz,’ as one of the intellectual 
thoughts that shaped his thoughts.29 He said: ‘The Court will see that I 
attempted to examine all types of authority on the subject—from the East and 
from the West, going back to the classic work of Clausewitz, and covering such 
a variety as Mao Tse Tung and Che Guevara.’30 After three decades of thinking 
and reflection in his cell, Mandela gestures at the genealogical logic at work in 
his encounter with Apartheid courts: ‘We would not defend ourselves in a legal 
sense so much as in a moral sense. We saw the trial as a continuation of the 
struggle by other means.’31 
 
I further argue that Mandela’s strategy of resistance is clearly performative. By 
exposing the hidden violence that marks the moment of origin, by revealing the 
performative coup de force that unsettles the law from within, he counters the 
original performative with a new performative, a fiction with a fiction, to 
create an occasion for interruption. By referring to a higher law, what Derrida 
calls ‘the law of laws,’ the law to come, that law which is responsive to the 
ethic of justice and responsibility, he performatively brings into being a new 
standard of justice that always interrupts the law and opens it up to ‘the 
incalculable singular demand of justice beyond circumscription by the law.’32 
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Since his intervention is aimed creating conditions of possibility for change and 
transformation, his genealogies are not merely diagnostic. They are 
reconstructive and transformative. It is here, where genealogy engages in 
reconstruction and transformation that it takes a performative turn.  
Although appeal to humanist ideals of reason, freedom, liberation, truth and 
democracy are pervasive in his defenses and elsewhere in his writings, 
Mandela’s mode of critique and struggle are both performative and 
genealogical.33 In both the Incitement and the Rivonia trial, we see forms of 
critique and political struggle that are genealogical and performative. Without 
abandoning enlightenment values of rights and political liberty, Mandela’s 
scrupulous excavation the submerged past of the law and its surface 
manifestation takes a genealogical and performative approach to the juridical 
domain. In ‘The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe,’ Derrida wrote, 
‘If the Enlightenment has given us human rights, political liberties and 
responsibilities, it would surely be out of the question to want to do away with 
the Enlightenment project. But it may also be necessary not simply to affirm but 
to question the values it has given us . . . The imperative remains . . . they have 
given us our language; our language of responsibility.’34  
While Foucault rejects the idea of resistance in the name of a new law and a 
moral code, and somehow exaggerates the effectiveness of disciplinary 
normalizations, he nevertheless exalts the strategic appropriation of the 
organizing concepts and normalizing procedures of law as a counter-discourse. 
As Timothy Mitchell put it, ‘disciplines can breakdown, counteract one another, 
or overreach. They offer spaces for manoeuvre and resistance, and can be 
turned to counter-hegemonic purposes.’35 In using and critiquing these values, 
Mandela is doing exactly this- using the spaces offered by disciplines ‘for 
manoeuvre and resistance’ to re-politicize the juridical realm and create 
conditions of possibility for intervention and critique. Through a productive 
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coupling of performative genealogies with enlightenment values, he slips under 
Apartheid’s normative mainstays to expose the violence it neutralizes and 
renders inaccessible while critiquing the terms of its rationality. 
6.3. Jurisdictional Objections:  Opening up Space within Space 
In ‘The Human Condition,’ Hannah Arendt writes, ‘Wherever the relevance of 
speech is at stake, matters become political by definition, for speech is what 
makes man a political being.’36 Whereas one can still communicate without 
speech, Arendt maintains, ‘No other human performance requires speech to the 
same extent as action.’37 For Arendt, therefore, political action proper requires 
a form of speech that reveals the appearance of the acting subject ‘in the 
human world.’ However, political action is not solely restricted to the domain of 
speech. In her book, ‘Just Silences,’ Marianna Constable observes that ‘[silence 
is not always an absence of voice.’ 38 It can be heard as voice of consent or 
dissent. Identifying a paradox often appropriated by regimes in silencing 
competing voices from being heard as voices, she writes, ‘the empowerment 
that is to come with voice is a power that cannot be conjured without first 
being asserted; but the voice that asserts or demands power must in some sense 
be already empowered.’39 This is precisely the paradox that animates the 
setting into motion of the judicial machine with the view to achieving 
repression.40 The courts offer political defendants the very stuff they intend to 
deny them: hearing and visibility.  
In political trials, ‘jurisdiction’ matters precisely because of the opportunity it 
offers for contestation.41 The debate over whether the court is a competent 
court of jurisdiction to examine the matter and determine its merit, or whether 
the matter is justiciable in the first place etc, provides the resistant subject 
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with the opportunity to slip into the normative structure of the order – 
unravelling the dirty linen underneath its symbols of legitimation. If the 
Incitement trial was aimed at eliminating resistant voices from being heard, in 
reality, they did exactly the opposite: instead of silencing Mandela and others, 
instead of suffocating black liberationist narratives and discourses, the trial 
offered them a space for hearing and visibility, allowing them to filter stories of 
injustice and indignation into the court of world opinion.42 In his essay, ‘Silence 
in the Courtroom,’ Andrew Green writes this about the trial of Socrates: 
‘Although the trial represented an attempt to silence the critic . . . the speech 
survived for the next two and a half millennia—a solid refutation of the Athenian 
government’s ability to quiet a voice of dissent.’43 In this trial, a subject whose 
voice is usurped and whose discourse marginalized given an opportunity to re-
create himself as resistant and to negotiate his relation with the law. It allowed 
him to both resist and claim authority. Of course, the court would eventually 
silence foes of the state through incarceration or other measures, but the 
‘hearing’ proper provides precisely that—a hearing and visibility through which 
they can offer an account of themselves, in their codes and dialects, through 
their discourse.44  
Insofar as the political appropriation of the speaking position offered by the 
system depends on the defendant’s ability to craft a strategy capable of 
opening up space for re-politicization, Mandela begins his politicization by 
establishing rapport with the court. He assures the judge of his highest respect 
for them and the law.  In carving out space for action, a political space within 
the legal space, he mounts a generative objection that is at once legal and 
political and carves out space that the system cannot close off without 
significant risks to its own legitimacy. From the outset, he reminds the judge 
that the ‘case is a trial of the aspirations of the African people’ – one that is 
neither reducible to nor comprehensible within the confines of the trial’s 
‘communicative offers.’ By respectfully submitting himself to the law, warning 
but not accusing, he defines what the trial is—’the trial of the ‘aspirations of 
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the African people’—and delineates its domain of emphasis: ‘on important 
questions that go beyond the scope of this present trial.’45 Here we have a 
preliminary political injunction- the subject of the trial is not the tragic hero, 
Nelson Mandela, who at once claims and resists authority, but South Africa as a 
whole. It is the crisis of South African sovereignty, the moral degeneration of its 
institutions of justice that is on trial. By inviting them out of the restraining 
domain of the juridical into the political, he deploys the ‘communicative offer’ 
of the trial to communicate his experiences, and how Africans in South Africa 
lost their ‘just place in relation’ to Whites.  
Asked by the judge whether he pleads guilty—a standard neutralizing question 
that elevates the judiciary above and beyond politics by ground its function in 
the moral distinction between guilt and innocence, masking law’s preeminent 
role in technologies of domination—Mandela transcends these normalizing 
categories, by raising jurisdictional objection46: ‘Your Worship, before I plead to 
the charge, there are one or two points I would like to raise.’47 By objecting to 
the competence of the court to hear his case, Mandela carves out space for the 
possibility of acting, to enable politics at a site where politics is deactivated, 
and to turn the destabilizing impetus of the political trial against the very 
power that abuses it while seeming to preserve it. Questioning the court’s 
authority to sit in judgment and dispense justice, Mandela asked the judge to 
suspend the invitation for a plea and made a counter-invitation; inviting the 
judge into his turf—to take flight into the submerged crisis of sovereignty and its 
constituent point. Speaking as a lawyer, a man of law who at once upholds and 
contests law, he makes an objection that cannot be ignored: ‘I want to apply for 
Your Worship’s recusal from this case. I challenge the right of this court to hear 
my case on two grounds.’48  
This is how, at the earliest stage of the trial, he refuses to enter a guilty plea, 
to expand the responsive ranges of this space and this moment: 
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Firstly, I challenge it because I fear that I will not be given a fair and 
proper trial. 
Secondly, I consider myself neither legally nor morally bound to obey 
laws made by a parliament in which I have no representation.’ 
The first objection is an internal critique that does not remain internal but 
transcends. Departing from forms of critique that are possible within law’s 
frameworks and analytic categories, he creates the conditions of possibility for 
a critique of law that is neither reducible to nor subsumable within law’s 
categories. It is a critique that deploys the language of Enlightenment—equality, 
fairness, judicial impartiality, and the principle that one cannot be a judge in 
his own case. He says, ‘It is improper and against the elementary principles of 
justice to entrust whites with cases involving the denial by them of basic human 
rights to the African people.’49  
The second objection, however, is a meta-level objection that is both 
genealogical and performative. It is not a mere denunciation of the inaugural 
violence of exclusion, it is also a performative claim that seeks, to use Derrida’s 
formulation, to ‘justify, to legitimate or transform the relations to law, and so 
to present itself as having a right to law.’50 It is an institutive act of intervention 
that seeks to legitimate itself as law while trying to displace state law. As 
Christodoulidis argues, these are meta-level considerations necessary to open up 
space for an ‘act of resistance [that] registers without being absorbed, 
integrated or co-opted’ by the system and the discourse it resists.51 It is an 
objection that elevates itself beyond the legal-illegal distinctions into the meta-
level critique of the just law and the unjust law, the moral law and the immoral 
law to ‘resist injustices of assimilation and recognition’52. As James Tully argues, 
only at the meta-level can ‘politics resist and redress the multiple forms of its 
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co-option.’53 By elevating the contestation from level to meta-level, i.e., from 
the legal-illegal to the just-unjust, moral-immoral, Mandela appropriates the 
interruptive force of justice and morality to import what Christodoulidis calls a 
‘reflexivity that cannot be captured, and certainly is not exhausted, in any 
notion of the political constitution’ to redeem the speaking position of ‘the 
entire nation.’54  
Conceiving his trial as a surface manifestation of a long submerged and much 
deeper crisis of sovereignty, he excavates the strange singularities that 
undergird law’s universality, and unravels the incoherence of the order. He 
identifies gaps, tensions, ‘linkages, assemblages, and networks’ that show how 
the coherence of law and the judicial order is contingently articulated.55 To 
create a line of flight for forms of critique that go beyond the crisis that 
manifests itself as the surface effect of a much deeper problem, he begins from 
forms of critique that are possible within. But to transcend ‘the multiple forms 
of its cooption,’ as Tully says, to resist the confines of the deliberative offer, he 
instigates a crisis that cuts the ties between the subject and the legal order and 
obliterates their reciprocal obligations.  
6.4. From Epistemic Injustice to the Ethic of Coexistence 
As a black defendant before Apartheid law, Mandela enters the deliberative 
framework of the trial with a speech impediment. In spite of procedural and 
substantive safeguards enshrined in Apartheid juridical codes, Africans in South 
Africa, like the plebeians of the antiquity, are subject to injustices of 
misrecognition. The founding violence that institutes an exclusionary grid of 
intelligibility subjects the excluded to epistemic and hermeneutic 
marginalization that cannot be redressed in law. The political philosophy of 
white supremacy and racist discourses that have become normative and 
quotidian effectively socialized and racialized institutions of law and justice. 
Within that racialized and socialized institutional paradigm, the black body 
represents a problem and a danger. For Mandela, the concern here is what 
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Fanon refers as the dangerousness of being identified with a danger.56 It is not 
the law as such that is a problem, but the disrespected black being that is 
before the law which creates a problem for law. It is Mandela’s explication of 
what W. E. B. Du Bois calls ‘existence as a member of a racial group deemed 
problem people’57 and the epistemological permutations of this dynamics that is 
the focus of this section.  
 
Mandela’s first objection—’I fear that I will not be given a fair and proper 
trial’—is not merely an internal critique suggestive of biases and prejudices, it is 
not even a concern with the politicization of the administration of justice. It is 
an objection to the impossibility of justice under Apartheid, a claim expressive 
of the Fanonian ‘anti-black racial gaze’58 that, to use Foucault’s expression, 
‘attached itself to the body,’ inscribed ‘in the nervous system, in temperament, 
in the digestive apparatus’ of the Whiteman and the white court to which 
Mandela submits himself. Here is Mandela’s trenchant articulation of that 
conundrum: 
 
Broadly speaking, Africans and whites in this country have no common 
standard of fairness, morality, and ethics, and it would be very difficult 
to determine on my part what standard of fairness and justice Your 
Worship has in mind. In their relationship with us, South African whites 
regard it as fair and just to pursue policies which have outraged the 
conscience of mankind and of honest and upright men throughout the 
civilized world. They suppress our aspirations, bar our way to freedom, 
and deny us opportunities to promote our moral and material progress, 
to secure ourselves from fear and want. All the good things of life are 
reserved for the white folk and we blacks are expected to be content to 
nourish our bodies with such pieces of food as drop from the tables of 
men with white skins. This is the white man's standard of justice and 
fairness. Herein lies his conceptions of ethics. Whatever he himself may 
say in his defense, the white man's moral standards in this country must 
be judged by the extent to which he has condemned the vast majority 
of its inhabitants to serfdom and inferiority.59  
 
In this diagnosis of the political rationality and the moral and ethical standards 
of the white community, Mandela is accounting for a mode of knowing and 
acting that excludes the very possibility of communication and understanding 
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between ‘whites’ and blacks in South Africa. This is a conundrum that Miranda 
Fricker, writing almost half a century after Mandela’s speech, identified as 
‘epistemic injustice.’60 According to Fricker, epistemic injustice takes place 
‘when a speaker receives the wrong degree of credibility from his hearer owing 
to a certain sort of unintended prejudice on the hearer’s part.’61 In offering a 
theoretical exposition of this problematic, Fricker refers to this domain as a 
domain of ‘rationality and the ethics of what must surely be our most basic and 
ubiquitous epistemic practice—the practice of gaining knowledge by being 
told.’62  
 
As an object of epistemic injustice excluded from participating in the 
production of truth bearing discourses, Mandela’s genres of discourses, dialects, 
truths are a priori excluded. As an agent that harbors what Fanon calls the look 
of a black male body, Mandela’s image generates a prejudice that exposes his 
claim to what Nancy Fraser calls ‘injustice misrecognition.’63 This 
problematization of the cognitive and affective substrate of Apartheid’s 
normative structures is both redemptive and resistant: redemptive because, by 
demanding the right to have equal access to knowledge production, Mandela 
claims epistemic agency. It is resistant because his intervention contests and 
resists the hermeneutic marginalization of blacks and recreates a rationality 
that resists in epistemic terms, as epistemic resistance.  
Here, Mandela offers a destabilizing critique of epistemic domains that a priori 
excludes the possibility of justice for a ‘black man in white man’s court.’ Put in 
the Foucauldian paradigm, it is an intervention that subverts Apartheid’s 
moral/juridical codes, dislocates its ‘orders of knowledge,’ and decenters the 
domains and objects in which the system’s true and false are inscribed.64 When 
he claims that the whites ‘regard it as fair and just to pursue policies which 
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have outraged the conscience of mankind . . . They suppress our aspirations, bar 
our way to freedom, and deny us opportunities to promote our moral and 
material progress, to secure ourselves from fear and want’65, he is drawing a 
direct line between the submerged crisis of sovereignty to its surface 
manifestations- his trial. Using this moment as an opportunity, he is 
problematizing the instituted forms of law and justice to generate and present 
an alternative narrative of his period so that such discourses and practices can 
no longer go without saying.  
As a subject whose identity ‘can deprive [him] of the very resources [he] needs 
in order to attain the virtue[s]’ necessary to ‘preempt or [overcome] such 
injustice,’ Mandela deploys his knowledge of the law to navigate through law’s 
gate-keeping discourses. Even then, he largely ‘remain hostage to the broader 
social structures in which [his] testimonial’ is heard.66 Recognizing the prejudice 
that is inscribed in the nervous system of his hearers and the consequent 
impossibility of justice in the court of a white man, Mandela declares that his 
point is neither the representation of the ‘unrepresentable’ nor the promise of 
the impossible. The decisive point, Mandela argues, is not one that is reducible 
to the question of whether this conflict can be represented in law and can be 
heard fairly and impartially. ‘The court might reply to this part of my argument 
by assuring me that it will try my case fairly and without fear or favour,’ he 
argued, but ‘such a reply would completely miss the point of my argument.’67 
His central contention turns not so much on the juridical question of fair hearing 
but rather on meta-ethical questions of hearing itself. He is interested in 
apprehending and finally naming a domain that organizes and structures 
Apartheid’s unequal distribution of voice to speaking bodies. His is a concern 
with the ethic of reception; the conditions that need to be there for a hearing 
of any kind to lead to understanding. It is a concern with the responsibility of 
hearing the ‘Other,’ a plea for testimonial sensibility.68  
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This, then, is a kind of critique aimed at generating contradictions capable of 
captivating the imagination of white South Africans and the world ambivalent in 
the face of a moral crisis in which the law is deployed to safeguard illegality-
preventing the majority from changing an illegal situation by a legal means. By 
disentangling ‘white man’s standard of justice’ from the colourless, incalculable 
and singular demands of justice, by exposing the socialized nature of white 
justice, calling into question the ‘ethicity or the morality of [their] ethics’ as 
Derrida would say, his intervention displaces the existing form of epistemic 
sensibility and compels the system to face up to the surprising emergence of 
this ‘new subject in history’ who contests and interrupts the continuity of 
practices and ‘discourses that up until then had seemed to go without saying.’69 
By digging deep into the epistemic and ontological nature of violence and 
injustice in South Africa, he sought to clarify the ethical and moral decadence 
underlying a system in which 3 million whites invoke the ‘we’ to justify their 
usurpation of the speaking position of 13 million people and use the court 
system to preserve and conserve that original violence.70  
 
6.5. White Justice: ‘Black man in a White man’s Court’ 
Exploring the Nationalist Party’s ‘sanitizing rhetoric,’ Stephen Curkpatrick 
explores how the Party formulated a discourse that conceals the race element 
from its racist project and sought to rationalize ‘apartheid’ in terms of 
‘separate development,’ ‘multiracial’ in terms of ‘multinational,’ justifying the 
‘Bantustan policy’ in terms of ‘plural democracy,’ ‘self-governing territories,’ 
and ‘democratic-federalism.’71 In coupling this self-serving rhetoric with existing 
power-knowledge constellation, it defends the ‘homelands’ policy as equivalent 
to ‘European ethnic nationalities and statehood.’72 Curkpatrick goes on to state 
that in the struggle for the preservation of white supremacy, ‘Each period 
represents a shift in rhetoric for international appeasement, but no change in 
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the fundamental characteristics of apartheid.’73 Despite these efforts by the 
system to deploy the full range of resources—its stifling and dazzling ‘prestige of 
power’ that lures peoples into its lies and deceptions, Mandela’s intervention 
effectively infiltrated the system’s apparatus of truth generation and knowledge 
production to bring into view Apartheid’s oppressive underside. He argues that 
without a critical excavation of the racist subtext that animates the setting into 
motion of the justice system, the rhetoric of ‘equality before the law’ is 
‘meaningless and misleading.’74  
 
In one of his most disruptive self-assertions, Mandela asks: ‘what is this rigid 
color-bar in the administration of justice? Why is it that in this courtroom I face 
a white magistrate, am confronted by a white prosecutor, and escorted into the 
dock by a white orderly? Can anyone honestly and seriously suggest that in this 
type of atmosphere the scales of justice are evenly balanced?’75 It is a form of 
critique that Christodoulidis identifies as immanent, in that it derives its 
standard from the ‘material actuality’ of life as lived under Apartheid and 
contrasts it to the normative inscriptions of equality and justice.76 It is a critique 
that turns upside down the violent underside of Apartheid normativity, and 
makes manifest the violence produced and conserved by a whole series of 
juridical codes and institutions. By revealing this intolerable judicial farce, his 
intervention aims to register an irreparable rupture between the system’s 
distinctions of guilt and innocence, and good and evil.  
 
Unable to co-opt and integrate within its economy of containment, the system 
concedes to the whiteness of its laws, its institutions, and its justice at a site in 
which such admission is both legally and politically meaningful. The judge says: 
‘There Is Only One Court today and that is the White Man’s Court. There is No 
Other Court. What purpose does it serve you to make an application when there 
is only one court?’77 This is perhaps an instance of what Christodoulidis, drawing 
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on Verges, refers to as rupture. He writes ‘A rupture registers when an act 
appears incongruent to the logic of its representation, and with such intensity 
that it can neither be domesticated nor ignored.’78 When the court of justice 
admits of its whiteness, clearly, this is a response that registers incongruently 
‘to the logic of its representation.’79 Speaking of the strategy of rupture he 
practiced in the trial of Klaus Barbie, Verges writes, ‘[R]upture traverses the 
whole structure of the trial. Facts as well as circumstances of the action pass 
onto a secondary plane; in the forefront suddenly appears the brutal 
contestation with the order of the State.’80 Because of the contradictions that 
pervade the entire structure of the justice system that uses the devices of 
justice to secure racial inequality, the confrontation between the defendant 
and the state discloses the brutality of the system in ‘ways that excludes all 
compromise.’81  
 
If ‘rupture registers in terms of a response it triggers,’ the court’s admission is a 
response that registers as rupture. The judge’s admission that ‘there is only one 
court today and that is the White Man’s court,’ first and foremost, exposes the 
court as something other than a house of justice; and the judge as an agent of 
oppression than a guarantor of justice. It authenticates and reinforces `the 
defendant’s claim that ‘I am a black man in a white man’s court’: a truth 
Apartheid cannot contain, or, to use Christodoulidis’ phrase, cannot ‘seal-
over.’82 In fact, Mandela is certain, as he engages in a series of double 
movements that at once resists and claim authority, upholds and denounces the 
law, that he has already registered a disturbing surprise against the system’s 
normative claims when he returned to the judge’s admission of the color of 
South African justice. Realizing that there is nothing more politically disruptive 
for the system than to recite and reiterate its visible markers of injustice, 
Mandela pushes the judge further into a further admission about the fraudulent 
logic underlying the administration of justice: ‘Your Worship has already raised 
the point that here in this country there is only a white court. What is the point 
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of all this?’ Replying to his own question, he said: ‘the real purpose of this rigid 
color-bar is to ensure that the justice dispensed by courts conform to the policy 
of the country, however much that policy might be in conflict with norms of 
justice accepted in judiciaries throughout the civilized world.’83 
Switching the plane of his critique to a meta-level, Mandela asks the judge: 
‘What sort of justice is this that enables the aggrieved to sit in judgment over 
those against whom they have laid charge?’84 Here, Mandela speaks in the plural 
‘them’-’us’ binary; draws on the ethic of difference to challenge the system to 
justify its oppression of the native people, to account for socialization of the 
justice that tries the aspirations of the natives for liberation. Questioning 
authority at a site where authority is ceremonially elevated from the realm of 
interrogation, Mandela speaks to white South Africans, in English and as a 
lawyer, affirming that resistance to white justice is not merely consistent with 
the European legal tradition; it is indeed its very expression.85 What is the 
essence and ultimate purpose of this ‘white’ justice that ‘enables’ the 
oppressor ‘to sit in judgment’ over the oppressed?  
While seeming to ask an ethico-juridical question—’what sort of justice enables 
them to sit in judgment over those they have laid charges’—Mandela has done 
nothing but to enable politics, to claim the right to politics, and engage the 
collective ‘Other.’ It is a question that transforms the personal moral struggle in 
Mandela into a collective political struggle between the subjugated Black 
majority and the ruling white minority. It is a strategic intervention that seeks 
to capture in one immanent intervention the rupture that navigates across 
Apartheid’s decadent structures. In addressing the question to the ‘other’—the 
oppressor—Mandela is seeking to place the ‘other’ ‘in contradiction to’ its 
professed values and principles.86 By choosing to demand the judge’s recusal 
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from the case, he opens up the space for a defiant intervention that allows him 
to project this fundamental wrong that is antithetical to any conception of 
justice. By emphasizing the rationality and system of meaning upon which truth 
and justice rested in Apartheid South Africa, Mandela exposes the 
fundamentally inhuman logic that frames and structures Apartheid and the 
radical disjuncture between Apartheid and the cardinal virtues of equality, 
dignity and justice. 
In his speech, he is re-creating a new world of possibilities and a new identity 
that resists its identity as passive and obedient. By unearthing the contingency 
of what the judge sees as self-evident—‘What purpose does it serve you to make 
an application when there is only one court, as you know yourself? What court 
do you wish to be tried by?’—Mandela insists that that is perhaps ‘my main point 
of contention.’87 By problematizing the normalizing discourses of law that the 
court sees as self-evident, Mandela’s performative resistance prevents closure, 
creates an opportunity for re-opening, and compels hegemonic discourses to 
enter the realm of visibility.88 We have here a politics of resistance that deploys 
historical knowledge of colonization and subjugation to disrupt gate-keeping 
legal technologies of domination that include as excluded. Indeed, the treason 
trial was a response to the inaugural claims of the ‘Freedom Charter’ that 
effectively renders the state criminal. Appropriating the amplifying potential of 
the courtroom, Mandela infiltrates this patronizing colonial logic, and its mode 
of thought to expose a singular logic that refuses to register and represent the 
unjust death, and grief of the excluded majority. Mandela’s repertoire of 
resistance successfully overruns the state’s spectacles of repression when the 
Judge failed to contain, suppress or integrate those destabilizing critiques that 
established the colour of Apartheid justice. 
 
Whatever the liberatory potential of this admission, regardless of the 
transformative potential attributed to the disclosure of the racist logic that 
animates the operation of the system, this intervention ‘registers without being 
                                         
87
 Mandela, Incitement Trial, Transcript. 
88
 On the revealing potential of performativity, See Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the 
Performative, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 94; Vikki Bell, Culture and Performance, 25-27; Lois 
McNay, Subject, Psyche and Agency: The Work of Judith Butler, in Vikki Bell, Performativity & 
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absorbed, integrated or co-opted into the system against which it stands.’89 The 
question is not so much what happened to Apartheid in the immediate 
aftermath of this trial, but the unquantifiable truth-effects that circulated a 
true discourse about the legitimate aspirations of the native population that 
ultimately led to the demise of Apartheid. The system cannot admit to the 
whiteness of its justice in a black majority country and continue to pretend that 
Apartheid courts are sites of truth and justice.  By admitting its true colour, the 
court can no longer boast of its European heritage. Convinced that this 
fundamental wrong is something much more profound than the failure of the 
judiciary, Mandela re-enacts life as lived in the space of the courtroom to 
consign and institute this story in the archive of the very state he denounces as 
racist and unjust. In his own words: ‘The court cannot expect a respect for the 
process of representation and negotiation to grow amongst the African people, 
when the government shows every day, by its conduct, that it despises such 
processes and frowns upon them and will not indulge in them. Nor will the 
court, I believe, say that, under the circumstances, my people are condemned 
forever to say nothing and to do nothing.’90 Using his speaking position as 
defendant, the strategy allowed him to reveal to South Africans and the 
international community the fundamental inhumanity of Apartheid and 
therefore the utter impossibility of equality, dignity and justice within its 
‘grotesque system of justice.’91 
 
6.6. Between Law and Justice: Law’s Illegality and Immorality 
 
 I consider myself neither morally nor legally obliged to obey laws made by a 
parliament in which I am not represented. 
 
—Nelson Mandela, The Incitement Trial 
In ‘Mandela’s ‘Force of Law,’’ Stephen Curkpatrick draws on Derrida’s ‘Force of 
Law’ and ‘The Laws of Reflection’ to explore the Derridean performative that 
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cuts through Mandela’s speech.92 Curkpatrick says, ‘The law is fundamentally 
illegal at the point of its performative origin. In the mystical foundation of its 
authority, law is legal because of convention.’93 For Derrida, this inaugural 
aporia is not unique to the performative institution of law but the very 
characteristic of law in general. Law is legal because of ‘the mystical 
foundation of authority,’ those ‘legitimate fictions on which [law] founds the 
truth of its authority.’94 For both Montaigne and Derrida, there exists a 
fundamental rift between law and justice: ‘justice as law is no justice.’ Every 
decision entails unique interpretation ‘which no existing, coded rule can or 
ought to guarantee’: every decision ‘must conserve the law and also destroy it 
or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case and re-justify it.’95  
Mandela’s ‘force of law’ resides not only in his incisive articulation of law’s 
divisibility and iterability, but also in his appropriation of its perpetual 
contestability. In this particular scene, Mandela switches the plane at which he 
was operating to a meta-level to deploy justice and morality as interruption—
forces interruptive of the ‘calculable economy’ of ‘law as convention’96 —to 
reinvent a new and radically egalitarian regime of legality responsive to 
justice.97 In order to fully appreciate the attack that reveals the law as a sort of 
coded and institutionalized violence against Africans, allow me to reproduce his 
intervention: 
The second ground of my objection is that I consider myself neither morally 
nor legally obliged to obey laws made by a parliament in which I am not 
represented. That the will of the people is the basis of the authority of 
government is a principle universally acknowledged as sacred throughout 
the civilized world, and constitutes the basic foundations of freedom and 
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justice. It is understandable why citizens, who have the vote as well as the 
right to direct representation in the country's governing bodies, should be 
morally and legally bound by the laws governing the country. It should be 
equally understandable why we, as Africans, should adopt the attitude that 
we are neither morally nor legally bound to obey laws which we have not 
made, nor can we be expected to have confidence in courts which enforce 
such laws.98  
This is one of the common threads that run through both the Incitement and the 
Rivonia trial. As a lawyer aware of the performative illegality of law’s origin, 
and a man with access to an alternative idiom of legality—the radically 
egalitarian African law that the state disqualified through its inaugural 
violence—Mandela presents himself as having the right to law and a claim to 
authority. Integrating Enlightenment rationality into his strategy, he uses the 
discourse of equality, representation, recognition, and justice to make visible 
the gulf that opens up in the movement from ‘European legal tradition, which 
seeks a universal symmetry of equality before the law’ to Apartheid legality 
where the former is betrayed, adulterated and abused by the latter.99  
By deploying such a performative strategy in a new site—the court of law—he 
was trying to ‘reshape and expand the terms of political debate, enabling 
different questions to be asked, enlarging the space of legitimate contestation, 
modifying the relation of the different participants to the truths in the name of 
which’ Apartheid governs. 100 He is both ‘critical’ and ‘genealogical.’ When he 
says that ‘I consider myself neither legally nor morally bound to obey laws made 
by a parliament in which I have no representation,’ or ‘It is improper and 
against the elementary principles of justice to entrust whites with cases 
involving the denial by them of basic human rights to the African people’ or that 
‘The white man makes all the laws, he drags us before his courts and accuses 
us, and he sits in judgment over us,’ he is raising an insoluble political and 
ethical objections that Apartheid can neither integrate nor suppress ‘within its 
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economy of representation.’ In this, Mandela’s performative mode of 
intervention is disruptive and constitutive. It is disruptive because it 
destabilizes Apartheid’s normative basis for claiming obedience to a law that is 
itself illegal and constitutive because this mode of critique calls into being a 
new subject that imagines the world of political universe differently and acts in 
ways that breaks from and displaces what the system recognizes as the 
normative. 
As a ‘man of law,’ a man that makes possible the disruptive force of law, 
Mandela traces the genesis of Apartheid law to its European root to use this 
genealogy against the enemy that distort it while pretending to be true to its 
unsettling force. Mandela does not merely conceive the struggles and 
confrontations that go on within Apartheid laws and institutions in terms of 
what Foucault calls a race-war.101 He also adopts a strategic-historicist critique 
towards law. In reconfiguring and recounting this genealogy, rather differently, 
he makes visible the uncharted terrains of ‘European legal tradition, which 
seeks a universal symmetry of equality before the law, but is unable to tolerate 
such difference as to affect this universality for radical difference.’102  
The performative coup de force that inaugurated a legal order and concealed 
law’s violent gesture of exclusion is here reconfigured and used by a resistant 
subject to recognize his own subjection and subjectification by the order and to 
negotiate and transform his subjecthood.103 As Nancy Fraser says, ‘The speaker 
speaks for the world, which means the speaker speaks to it, on behalf of it, in 
order to make it a ‘world.’’104 When he says that I understand why white South 
Africans obey Apartheid legality and why, following the same logic, Africans 
‘should adopt the attitude that we are neither morally nor legally bound to obey 
laws which we have not made’; he is, particularly, though not exclusively, 
speaking to Africans, for Africans, with the view to bringing into being a new 
subject and a new idiom of legality that radically breaks from and displaces the 
instituted model. In calling upon South Africans to defy and disobey Apartheid, 
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he performatively calls into being a new defiant subjectivity, what Foucault 
calls a ‘new speaking subject,’ who says ‘I’ and ‘we’ as he recounts 
history,’[Mandela always says I and my people] a subject who ‘tell[s] the story 
of his own history’; one that ‘reorganize[s] the past, events, rights, injustices, 
defeats, and victories around himself and his own destiny.’105 In other words, 
this speech act re-invents a ‘subject’ that is nameless, vote-less, and invisible, 
into a defiant subject resistant to the invasive and productive complex of 
subjection.  
 
In unmasking the deceptive logic at the heart of the constituted grid of legality, 
he not only dislodges the legal basis of legality itself but also prescribes his own 
standard of legality that promises to host the voices and aspirations of all South 
Africans regardless of race or colour. While he denounces Apartheid’s 
infelicitous illegality, he uses the law and the speaking position it offers to 
contest and claim authority. So he speaks not only to describe prevailing 
epistemic standards that frame and determine the limit of what is possible and 
achievable, but also to propose an alternative epistemic standard that allows us 
to imagine and perceive a world of politics that breaks off from the instituted 
model. In short, he is speaking to the world, to use Fraser’s words, ‘to create 
another world’—a new South Africa.  
 
By expressing his admiration to the Anglo-American law and African traditional 
law, he contrasts the equity of Apartheid law to these two legal traditions.106 In 
this comparison that traces the genesis of Apartheid law to the Anglo-American 
tradition that he admires, an admiration that is cognizant of law’s spectral 
haunting, Mandela shows his contempt for the law, the law that is the anti-
thesis of justice, simply to declare his utmost respect for the law.107  Here is 
Mandela: 
 
Perhaps the court will say that despite our human rights to protest, 
to object, to make ourselves heard, we should stay within the letter 
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of the law. I would say, Sir, that it is the government, its 
administration of the law, which brings the law into such contempt 
and disrepute that one is no longer concerned in this country to stay 
within the letter of the law. I will illustrate this from my own 
experience. The government has used the process of law to handicap 
me, in my personal life, in my career, and in my political work, in a 
way which is calculated, in my opinion, to bring about contempt for 
the law.108 
 
In identifying the law as a normative instrument Apartheid mobilizes to close all 
avenues of lawful protest, leaving social agents with the only options of 
accepting either ‘a permanent state of inferiority,’ ‘a perpetual subordination’ 
or defying the government and its laws, Mandela taps a contradiction that 
‘inform[s] a crisis that is experienced by social agents in the materiality of their 
life.’109 By using the law to eliminate all forms of dissent and opposition, by 
using the law to prevent him from practicing law in sites where this practice is 
of paramount importance to his people, by using the law to outlaw a man of the 
law, the system shows the utmost contempt for the law.110  
 
Speaking as ‘a man of law’ familiar and the nuts and bolts of legal practice, he 
demonstrates not only that he belongs to a tradition respectful of law, but also 
one committed to the law of laws, the law responsible and answerable for its 
normative correctness. Mandela’s contempt for Apartheid law is ‘the 
symmetrical inverse of [his] respect for the moral law.’111 Taking himself as an 
example, he is reflecting the contempt of the white man for his own laws. More 
importantly, he is making the point that by scorning the law, i.e., by operating 
outside the framework of the law ‘to handicap me, in my personal life, in my 
career, and in my political work,’ the argument goes, what goes on in Apartheid 
courts is not judgment but a certain coalescence of what Walter Benjamin 
identifies as lawmaking and law preserving violence.112 Reflecting on this 
reflection, Derrida notes, ‘those who, one day, made him an outlaw simply did 
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not have the right: they had already placed themselves outside the law.’113 If 
the system holds its own law in contempt, he argues, it cannot expect the 
subjugated to respect the very law the owners hold in great contempt. This 
voice that has become a mirror for the white man ‘to recognize and see their 
own scorn for the law reflected’114, as Derrida insists, does more than reflecting: 
it produces justice.  
 
6.7. Conclusion 
In a nutshell, Mandela’s strategy of resistance aims at infiltrating the system to 
expose its productive and repressive logic and lead toward the reformulation of 
the terms of the social contract on the basis of the principles articulated in the 
‘Freedom Charter.’ Through critical and prophetic statements transformative of 
the moment, Mandela sought to expose the infelicitous performative planted at 
the heart of Apartheid legality and dismantle the fictions of law and justice that 
furnish the legitimacy that sustain an explicitly violent and racist order.  
Whatever framework of analysis one adopts in engaging his words, the appealing 
force of his critique turns on its unique ability to reveal the darker side of the 
law, the violence it produces and conserves, the epistemic injustice it exposes, 
and its profound potential to imagine a world of political action differently. It is 
a generative claim that imagines and discloses a new political universe; that 
utopian universe he calls ‘a democratic and free society in which all persons live 
together in harmony and with equal opportunities.’ After all, one can counter a 
legitimate fiction only with a competing fiction, a spectacle of domination with 
a spectacle of liberation, ‘creating an aporia in the law that is always’ reflexive 
and open to new claims for dignity and justice but this time a fiction of justice 
that seek to supplement its inevitable originary violence with an ethic of care, 
justice and responsibility.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
7. Terrorism, Resistance, and Occupation on Trial: 
Marwan Barghouti in Tel Aviv 
 
7.1. Introduction: The Road to Tel Aviv  
Despite ‘hundreds of meetings, tens of initiatives and seven interim 
agreements,’ the Washington-Tel-Aviv-Ramallah public performances neither 
secured Israel nor liberated Palestinians from colonial occupation.1 From Madrid 
to Oslo; from Sharm El-Sheik to Camp David, from Tel Aviv to Annapolis, the 
‘Peace Process Industry’ is a technology of power used to normalize and pacify a 
violent occupation.2 Instead of restoring balance to a political space evacuated 
of the right relations, the ‘Roadmap for Peace’ came to signify a regime of 
‘legitimate occupation,’ a contradiction that Hardt and Negri call ‘a perverse 
dialectic of Enlightenment.’3 Noam Chomsky for example writes that ‘Any 
discussion of what is called a ‘peace process’—whether the one underway at 
Camp David or any other—should keep in mind the operative meaning of the 
phrase: by definition, the ‘peace process’ is whatever the US government 
happens to be pursuing.’4 Instead of being a deliberative process aimed at 
communication and understanding, what is called ‘The Middle East Peace 
Process’ is a performative exercise intended to erect a permanent state of 
exception and necropolitical relations between the occupied and the occupier. 
Marwan Barghouti’s arrest and trial is a product of this arrangement and bears 
the hallmarks of necropolitical logic.  
 
Let us begin at the Second Intifada- a moment that destabilized the logic that 
structures and regulates the relationship between the occupied and the 
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occupier. This is the moment at which—terrorism and resistance—the two 
discourses that oppose Israel and the Palestinians entered a civilian courtroom. 
Unlike ordinary criminal trials, this trial is not intended to weigh these 
disagreements on the scale of law and justice but rather to use the devices of 
justice and the court for ‘knowledge production and truth generation.’  
 
Following the collapse of the ‘Final Status Settlement’ at Camp David on July of 
2000, cynicism and despair reigned in the then Occupied Territories, what is 
now known as ‘the State of Palestine.’5 Contestation over sacred spaces—
sovereignty over East Jerusalem and Haram-al-Sharaf (The Temple Mount)—two 
issues to which both Prime Minister Ehud Barak6 and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat7 
accorded exceptional significance, constituted the primary, if not the sole, 
reasons for the collapse of the Camp David Summit.8 Israel and the United 
States disseminated what is still the most widely accepted narrative in both 
Israel and the United States: Barak made a generous offer and Palestinians 
rejected it.9 Two months after Camp David came to its inevitable doom, Ariel 
Sharon, then leader of the Opposition, visited the Haram/Temple—the ultimate 
trigger for The Second Intifadah.10  
 
There are two mutually exclusive accounts about the immediate cause of The 
Second Intifada. The Palestinian version holds that ‘Sharon went to the Temple 
Mount on 28 September 2002 with the manifest intention of provoking 
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Palestinians and ending Israeli-Palestinian political negotiations.’11 The then 
Israeli government partly agreed with the Palestinians assessment of Sharon’s 
visit, with the then Likud spokesman, Ofir Akounis, describing the visit as ‘a 
political statement [intended] to show that under the Likud, The Temple Mount 
would remain under Israeli sovereignty.’12 Nevertheless, Israel rejected the view 
that the visit, in and of itself, whatever Sharon’s motivation, constituted a 
justification for the violence. Instead, Israel held the view that ‘Arafat and the 
Palestinians planned and executed a violent uprising because they wanted to 
destroy Israel and win a Palestinian state through violent means.’13 In response 
to Palestinian violence, Israel responded with state-of-the-art military hardware 
in what is called ‘Operation Defensive Shield.’14 The performative politics of 
hope and possibilities represented by the ‘Peace Process,’ turned into screams 
of terror and insanity. 
 
On 15 April 2002, Marwan Barghouti, a high profile Member of the Palestinian 
Parliament and a close aide of Yasir Arafat was arrested and taken to Israel for 
trial.15 On 14 August 2002, he was charged with multiple counts of crimes 
including acts of terrorism, murder and conspiracy to murder and his trial 
opened in the district court in Tel Aviv before a three judge panel on 5 
September 2002. Juxtaposing three representative but different Palestinian 
organizations—Fatah, Tanzim, and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade—and calling them 
‘Terrorist Organizations’ throughout the indictment, the prosecution accuses, 
by extension, the entire Palestinian people of terrorism.16  
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A fundamental assumption informs the way in which the thread running through 
this chapter is organized: both terrorism and resistance are discursive 
formations mobilized by the parties to generate power effects. Performative 
strategies and tactics are deployed to generate and present the materiality of 
their respective discourses. Drawing on key moments of the trial, the chapter 
will emphasize, among other things, the performative generation of the 
materiality of both resistance and terrorism, and questions of image-formation, 
visibility, and hearing in the courtroom. In the final analysis, the debate over 
what counts as resistance and terrorism becomes the performative kernel of 
Barghouti’s trial.  
 
7.2.  The ‘Politics’ in Barghouti’s Political Trial: From Domination to 
Resistance 
Marking the essential point of difference between the political trial proper and 
ordinary criminal trials, Otto Kirchheimer calls attention to what he calls ‘the 
direct involvement of courts’ in purely political struggles.17 What makes the trial 
political is neither its distance from formal legality nor its conformity with 
established rites and ceremonies as the mobilization of the judicial apparatus 
‘to exert influence on the distribution of political power.’18 ‘The regime’s 
attempt to incriminate the public image of its political foes’ with the view to 
facilitating the eventual eviction of its foes from the political scene, he argues, 
constitutes the classic case of political trials.19 This conception of the political 
trial draws on the Schmittian distinction between friend and enemy—the enemy 
that he refers to as a foe—against whom the devices of justice are strategically 
deployed to attain political goals.20 In his own words, ‘The judicial machinery 
and its trial mechanics are set into motion to attain political objectives which 
transcend both the bystander’s curiosity and the governmental custodian’s 
satisfaction in the vindication of the political order.’21 Writing at the height of 
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the Cold War, Kirchheimer conceived the political trial as the purest instance of 
political justice and a troubled juridico-political practice where political 
considerations dictate the elimination of a political adversary. As he put it, ‘In 
the simplest and crudest terms . . . the courts eliminate a political foe of the 
regime according to some prearranged rules.’22 Barghouti’s trial embodies the 
entire marks of the political trial.23 At its core, the trial is a public re-enactment 
of Israel’s notion of Palestinian terrorism and Palestinian’s repertoires of 
resistance.   
 
In a passage that captures the distinctions between political trials and ordinary 
trials, Kirchheimer says:  
 
It is the direct involvement in the struggle for political power [by 
courts], rather than the long range political effect of socio-economic 
power contests, or the derivative political effect of the confirmation or 
destruction of personal power positions, which gives the political trial 
proper its particular colour and intensity and marks its peculiar problem 
areas.24 
 
In Barghouti’s trial, the Israeli prosecution and the entire government was quite 
forthcoming about the trial’s political motive. Consistent with the policy of the 
new Israeli government, Israel wants to delegitimize and evict the Palestinian 
establishment from political scene. According to the New York Times, the 
prosecution made it ‘clear that Israel intends to use the trial to substantiate its 
claim that the entire Palestinian leadership of Yasir Arafat, in which Mr. 
Barghouti played a prominent role, is nothing more than a band of terrorists and 
murderers.’25 Within this formula, Barghouti was a convenient scapegoat that at 
once embodies and symbolizes everything Israel needed to put Arafat and 
Palestinians on trial. In fact, Israel did not make a secret of its spectacle. The 
then Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Meir 
articulated the logic behind Israel’s mega-spectacle: ‘This is an opportunity to 
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tell Israel’s story. We need to tell the story of the Israeli population and what it 
has been through in the last two years.’26  
 
It is this direct involvement of the Israeli judiciary in the political struggle 
between Palestinians and Israel in general and this particular ‘show’ that Israel 
wants to show to the rest of the world, as the Minister claims, that makes 
Barghouti’s trial a political trial in the Kirchheimerian sense of that expression. 
Just like the famous trials of Socrates, Jesus of Nazareth, Galileo, Joan of Arc, 
Suzanne Anthony, or the more contemporary political trials of the Nuremberg, 
the Chicago Seven, Mandela, Milosevic, and many other high profile trials, the 
prosecution had a case against the accused. However, the indictment against 
Barghouti, like the indictments against these historical figures, is primarily 
motivated with a political decision to eliminate Barghouti- Israel’s public 
enemy- from the political map. If we conceive the political trial as a 
continuation of war by legal means, Barghouti’s trial is the penultimate political 
trial. To quote Kirchheimer once again:  
 
The aim of political justice [trial] is to enlarge the area of political 
action by enlisting the services of courts in behalf of political goals. It 
is characterized by the submission to court scrutiny of group and 
individual action. Those instrumental in such submission seek to 
strengthen their own position and weaken those of their political 
foes.27  
 
As a continuation of the struggle by legal means, Barghouti’s trial is aimed at 
enlarging ‘the area of political action by enlisting the services of courts in 
behalf of political goals.’28 Consistent with this strategy, the state taps the 
court’s superior ability of image creation and legitimation to generate a 
knowledge and truth necessary in the preservation and consolidation of existing 
relationship of occupation and inequality. By submitting a prominent Palestinian 
to the scrutiny of its own courts, the prosecution here aims to cement Israeli 
claims of terrorism as he delegitimizes and weakens the Palestinian struggle as 
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acts terrorism. Drawing on the resources of the state, the accused tries to 
expose Israel’s political use of the discourse of terrorism to legitimize and 
validate an immoral and illegal occupation. The courtroom is used as a public 
re-enactment of their respective politics—a battleground for performative 
pedagogies of domination and resistance.  
 
We know from John L. Austin that not all performatives are felicitous.29 In order 
for the trial to be a felicitous performative, it must recite and reiterate its 
accepted conventions. Put differently, in order for the trial to generate and 
transmit knowledge and truths productive to the power-knowledge regime it is 
there to secure and consolidate, it should adhere to the norms, decorum, and 
normative expectations of its participants30 Although Barghouti’s trial is 
significantly different from the Stalinist forms of political show trials, it is far 
from a procedure Theodore Becker describes as ‘judicial’ and ‘judicious’ in his 
account of ‘political trials.’31 Even if we set aside the fundamental constitutive 
wrongs that undercut the legitimacy of the trial, even if we take Israeli juridical 
structures and applicable norms as the basis of our analysis, the trial is neither 
‘judicial’ nor ‘judicious.’ A legal expert commissioned by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union to investigate the legality and fairness of the procedure 
rejected Israel’s guilty verdict concluding that ‘the numerous breaches of 
international law . . . make[s] it impossible to conclude that Mr. Barghouti was 
given a fair trial.’32  
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7.3. Barghouti in Tel Aviv: Between a Terrorist and a Freedom 
Fighter 
The work of decolonization requires that we change the terms of 
recognition. ...The crucial stakes of political  struggle  are  the  
categories  of perception and  the  systems  of  classification  and 
conceptualization-in  other  words,  names  and phrases-that 
construct  the  social  world,  the  real existing world.  In this view, 
we must fight phrases with phrases.  
 
                                                                                   —Lynn Worsham                                                                                                                 
 
Writing on the rhetorical dimension of the trial, Robert Burns argue, ‘The trial is 
spoken; it proceeds through time; it is a sort of drama; it is a rhetorical 
situation.’33 Through reconstruction or deconstruction, the trial re-stages the 
conflict in narrative form. By re-enacting events in the courtroom, the trial 
offers a window, ‘however too close or too remote from the actual event,’ into 
the past for the purpose of shaping the future.34 Just as Eichmann in Jerusalem 
was a public re-enactment of the Holocaust, Barghouti in Tel-Aviv was a 
spectacle aimed at performing Palestinian terrorism, i.e., to create a racialized 
image of Palestinians as dangerous, violent, and ‘enemies of the free world’ 
whom the ‘free world,’ and ‘everyone brought up on the values of freedom and 
democracy’ must recognize as such.35 It is a performative stunt carefully 
designed to generate an image of Palestinian terrorism productive to Israel’s 
central political claim. In fact, the deployment of the court and the machinery 
of justice as a tool of historico-political instruction and ‘consciousness 
transformation’ is one of the constant in the history of Israel.36 
 
In her book, ‘Transformative Justice: Israeli Identity on Trial,’ Leora Bilsky 
analyzes key Israeli trials designed by its instigators to serve a radical political 
agenda: a vehicle for reconstituting and refashioning ‘Israeli collective 
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identity.’37 From the trial of Kastner to Adolf Eichmann’s, from the trial of Kufr 
Qassem to that of Yigal Amir (the assassin of Israeli Prime Minister Yishak 
Rabin), from Marwan Bishara’s to Marwan Barghouti’s trials, Bilsky shows the 
irresistible urge by both the state and political operators to turn the courtroom 
into a vehicle for settling contested and contingent accounts of the past.38 And 
of course, Israel is certainly aware of the effect of the ‘Dreyfus Affairs,’ a trial 
Hannah Arendt called the ‘fore gleam of the 20th century’ and helped ‘rekindle 
the flame of political Zionism.’39 Conceiving these trials in terms of struggles in 
power relations, Bilsky writes, the contestation ‘in the courtroom transforms 
dry and distant history or abstract ideological worldviews into a living story with 
a name, a face, and a body.’40 The trial provides, as Tocqueville argues, ‘a 
bodily form’ ‘to the mere appearance of justice’ even long after the juridical 
record is refuted by an otherwise irrefutable evidence.41  
 
In Israel, courts have been used as sites of contestations over power, history, 
and memory since the birth of the state of Israel.42 Even today, Israeli courts are 
the primary sites of struggle and confrontation between rightwing settlers and 
advocates of Palestinians rights over fundamental questions of politics and 
history.43 In a meeting of ‘senior Jewish legal experts’ convened to discuss ways 
of improving Israel’s public relations effort, retired Israeli Judge Hadassa Ben-
Itto, suggested the use of courts to create reality in the image of the Israeli 
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government.44 ‘We must learn from the Nazi tactics,’ she said, ‘I have reached 
the conclusion that we must use these tactics in courts worldwide, just like the 
Nazis – with all distinctions – used the courts to spread their message.’45 Indeed, 
the Nazis used the courtroom as a tactic. Explaining the didactic purpose behind 
Grynspan’s trial, Goebbels wrote to Hitler, ‘The trial thus offers a possibility to 
prove to the whole world the decisive participation of world-Jewry in the 
outbreak of the present war.’46  
 
Considering all the relevant facts at the time and statements of Israeli 
government officials, it is clear that this is precisely the logic that informed 
Barghouti’s trial in Tel Aviv. By accusing him of terrorism in Tel Aviv, the 
government presents a body of a charismatic Palestinian leader as a material 
form through whom they can access and comprehend what Israel means when it 
describes Palestinian violence as intrinsic. By associating terrorism with 
Palestinians, and by repeating and reiterating it, the trial embeds and cements 
the image that seeks to identify Palestinians with violence (people incapable of 
democratic and free existence) and Israelis with freedom and democracy.47 The 
latter’s violence as violence meted out to protect freedom and democratic 
values from the intrinsically violent culture of Palestinians. In effect, Israel 
wanted to make Barghouti in Tel Aviv a replay of Eichmann in Jerusalem. By 
accusing Barghouti as ‘terrorist,’ Israel is interested in much more than finding 
Barghouti guilty of terrorism: by finding him guilty in accordance with a 
prearranged rule, it is performatively generating the very subject it names. The 
description associates terrorism to Palestinians, an association that conceals its 
mark, and creates a signification spiral that amplifies the threat represented by 
the association.48 The association between terrorism and Palestinians, which is 
now known as ‘Palestinian terrorism,’ forges a problematic proximity between 
the signified (Palestinians) and the signifier (terrorism) whose ‘stereotypical 
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characteristics are already part of socially available knowledge’49. When 
repeated and amplified ‘within the area of signification,’ the association 
eliminates the distinction between Palestinians, an occupied people, and 
terrorism, an altogether different problem.50 This signification creates a 
dangerous parallel by converging virtually separate events and marks out the 
threshold of what is tolerable. Thus, the image of Palestinian terrorism 
projected from the Israeli court as emblematic of a much ‘deeper problem’—the 
‘tip of the iceberg’—links ‘Palestinians’ protest or other acts of resistance to 
the altogether separate problem of ‘terrorism.’51  
 
The acts constitutive of the sign operate to stoke fear, a red scare hysteria that 
institutes a cultural meaning that delineates the relationship between the 
threatened and those who threaten. Most importantly, the process entrenches 
and authenticates a higher threshold that marks out the limit of what is 
tolerable. Through reiteration, the referents used to describe the Palestinians—
violent, murderous, dangerous, terrorist, etc—generate affects that ‘stick to 
bodies, shaping them, generating the material effects that they name’—
terrorism. Writing on ‘the affective politics of fear,’ Sarah Ahmed suggests the 
view that ‘the language of fear involves the intensification of ‘threats,’ which 
works to create a distinction between those who are ‘threatened’ and those 
who threaten. Fear is an effect of this process, rather than its origin . . . 
Through the generation of ‘the threat,’ fear works to align bodies with and 
against others.’52 The economy of fear thus functions as a cement; to generate a 
sense of unity, and cohesion between the victims against those who threaten 
their peace and tranquillity. Every resistant act of Palestinians would be 
interpreted against this framework of signification to escalate their potential, 
therefore justifying Israel’s coercive response.  
 
However, in spite of Israel’s carefully choreographed spectacle, Barghouti in 
Tel-Aviv did not rekindle the memory of Eichmann in Jerusalem. Barghouti 
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symbolizes the irrepressible yearnings of people for freedom – a yearning that 
cannot be repressed or displaced by a colonizer despite its ability to create 
reality on the ground. In contrast to Eichmann in Jerusalem, Barghouti in Tel 
Aviv embodies the aspirations of people for freedom and justice. In countering 
Israel’s ‘affective economy of fear,’ Barghouti speaks of the right to resistance 
beyond Israeli legal tradition to reclaim its radical synergy, and to call into 
presence a resistant Palestinian subjectivity capable of emancipating itself from 
the yoke of Israeli occupation. He argued, ‘I am a freedom fighter, fighting for 
the freedom of my people and peace between the two peoples.’53 What Israel 
refers to as an act of terrorism, Barghouti reinscribes it and names it a lawful 
right to resistance. Barghouti attacks the very principles of law and justice that 
Israel asserts to justify its right as an occupying power to sit in judgement over 
the leader of the occupied. He denounces the forms of rationality and modes of 
thought that undergirds their rhetoric of freedom and democracy. Using the 
limited opportunity he had, he sought to re-function, to use the Brechtian 
terms, the Israeli account of peace and security as a counter discourse and 
therefore as a power to  perform Palestinian repertoire of resistance. He 
dismisses the trial as a show trial: ‘My show trial says more about the sorry state 
of Israeli morality than it does about me.  . . . Like President Arafat, I have 
become a scapegoat—my trial simply a public relations event by a morally 
bankrupt and visionless Israeli leadership.’54 
 
7.4.  The Performative Generation of the Materiality of Terrorism  
We  shall  remain  or  try  to  remain,  at  the  level  of discourse 
itself, ... a task that consists not-of no longer-treating discourses as 
groups of signs ... but as practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak. 
 
               —Michel Foucault 
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The deployment of the courtroom as a pedagogic enterprise draws on an 
understanding of judicial practice as a site of truth and meaning. In ‘Truth and 
Juridical Forms,’ Foucault identifies ‘judicial practices’ as sites of truth and 
signification. He writes: 
 
Judicial practices, the manner in which wrongs and responsibilities are 
settled between men, the mode by which, in the history of the West, 
society conceived and defined the way men could be judged in terms of 
wrongs committed . . . seem to me to be one of the forms by which our 
society defined types of subjectivity, forms of knowledge, and 
consequently, relations between man and truth.’55  
 
It is precisely this recognition of the courtroom as a ‘generative locus’ of 
domains of truth and forms of knowledge that explains Israel’s mobilization of 
its courts as a political weapon.56 By re-enacting instances of terrorism in the 
courtroom, couching it in the seemingly neutralizing language of laws that do 
not signify the idiom of Palestinians, the trial generates forms of truth and 
knowledge productive to the system. As a name and sign that ‘sticks to bodies,’ 
Barghouti’s terrorism trial reconstitutes and transforms Palestinians into 
‘terrorists,’ generating the material effect the indictment names.  
 
Barghouti’s trial is the continuation of the aggressive Israeli policy aimed at 
solidifying the case against Arafat and the PA.57 Ariel Sharon campaigned on the 
promise to remove (exile) Arafat from the West Bank.58 He pursued a policy of 
discrediting Arafat and the entire Fatah establishment. Speaking of Arafat and 
Fatah, an organization internationally recognized as a legitimate representative 
of the Palestinian people, Sharon claimed, ‘A murderous regime that must be 
removed and replaced.’59  
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By performing terrorism before its own courts, Israel wanted to formulate, 
circulate and made to work a reality productive to the Israeli leadership of the 
time. They wanted to create an alternative reality and corresponding concepts 
PM Ariel Sharon who promised to ‘remove and replace’ Arafat and the 
Palestinian Authority.60 Addressing the Knesset, Sharon set the tone for what 
will be the framework for understanding and articulating the Israeli narrative in 
the political, legal and diplomatic fronts:61  
 
And there is one dispatcher: Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser 
Arafat. He is the man who, in a series of agreements, promised to 
abandon the path of terrorism, refrain from committing murder, use 
his forces to prevent it—and betrayed all his promises. . . . In the 
territories under his rule, Arafat has established a regime of terror, 
which nationally and officially trains terrorists and incites, finances, 
arms and sends them to perpetuate murderous operations across 
Israel.62 
 
Israel sought to use the trial to establish the truth of this claim. The indictment 
defines Fatah, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as a terrorist 
organization. It accuses it of engraving ‘armed struggle’ on its flag as a principle 
of liberation.63 This is evident in several statements of the Israeli government. 
An official from the Israeli Ministry of Justice declared that Israel will seek to 
convince the international community by staging a ‘publicized’ trial and that 
‘Barghouti was the central partner in the decisions made by [Fatah] 
organizations that in the last two years carried out a series of attacks against 
Israeli citizens.’64 Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Gideon Meir said: ‘This is an opportunity to tell Israel’s story. We need to tell 
the story of the Israeli population and what it has been through in the last two 
years.’65 A Spokesman for the state of Israel, Daniel Taub, ‘repeatedly insisted’ 
that ‘what is important to us [Israel] is to ensure that the world understands 
what it is to be a democracy fighting terrorism.’66 Another official from Israel 
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Ministry of Justice declared that Israel will seek to convince the international 
community by staging a ‘publicized’ trial and that ‘Barghouti was the central 
partner in the decisions made by [Fatah] organizations that in the last two years 
carried out a series of attacks against Israeli citizens.’67 Through such a public 
relations exercise, Israel wanted to build an enabling international consensus 
which allows Israel to establish a violent snapshot of the Palestinian people, and 
therefore justify occupation as necessary and inevitable.  
 
Terrorism is a performative discourse that brings into being the very subject 
that it names. By accusing a subject as terrorist, i.e., by hurling terrorism to 
individuals and groups seen as a threat to the hegemonic pursuits of the 
political class (both at the local and global level), the accuser transforms the 
subject into a terrorist, excludes him from the category of the human and 
therefore ineligible for the protection of the law. In Israel, the discourse serves 
not only to dehumanize, and exclude Palestinians from the protection of the 
applicable framework of international law but also constructs them as a 
metonym for violence. In the words of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, they are 
‘murderous gangs,’ ‘enemies of all mankind’ who ‘do not distinguish between 
blood and blood, between Jewish victim and any other victim.’68 Having 
excluded them from the category of the human, hailing them as ‘enemies of 
mankind’ and a ‘danger’ to the free world, he calls upon ‘everyone who was 
brought up on the values of freedom and democracy’ to ‘remember that 
leniency toward terrorism is the same as green light to terrorists.’69 In justifying 
Israeli violence as necessary and legitimate, he said: ‘You cannot fight terrorism 
on the one hand, and condemn the victims of terrorism on the other.’70 Because 
Israel is fighting to preserve the same values of freedom and democracy, 
because it is fighting against the same agents of fear and destruction, Israeli 
action must not be held to a different standard. The same logic that justifies 
the ‘Global War on Terror,’ Israel argues, justifies Israeli violence and 
treatment of Palestinians. The mega-spectacle in Tel Aviv courthouse was an 
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integral part of this strategy designed to shape a ‘terrorist’ image of the 
adversary-Palestinians.   
 
Barghouti’s charismatic profile and his relationship with Chairman Arafat make 
him a spectacular scapegoat convenient to generate the kind of ‘psychological 
effect on the public at large.’ Barghouti is the first ‘prominent’ Palestinian 
leader ‘ever been brought to an Israeli Court.’71 As Hilla Dayan writes, 
Barghouti’s trial ‘is the first case of a defendant, charged with terrorist 
offenses, not to be tried by a military tribunal, but at an ordinary civil court.’72 
By trying a prominent political figure that embodies Palestinians aspirations for 
freedom and statehood, the spectacle produces a telling snapshot of the 
leadership—forging a lasting image of Palestinian terror that enjoys endless 
repetition to penetrate and inhere in the memory of its audience.  
 
One of the most politically disarming effects of the trial is its ‘reduction of 
history’ into an either-or binary opposition that fits the official hegemonic 
account of history.73 The narrow nature of the evidence offered, and the means 
by which they were obtained and the story reconstructed matters very little. 
Indeed, the confessions that were obtained to convict Barghouti from already 
convicted Palestinians were recanted in court.74 However, under Israeli law, 
confessions cannot be recanted. Nasser Abu-Hamid, the first prosecution 
witness, remained silent as an act of defiance and refused to testify. In the 
middle of the proceeding, he ‘put his fingers in his ears and refused to listen to 
prosecution questions.’75 Another Palestinian witness tore up confessions 
extracted from him before the testimony when handed to him by the 
prosecution and shouted ‘This is like a football match, not a trial.’76 Bilal 
Barghouti, another Palestinian prisoner, shouted ‘Jerusalem is ours’ and asked 
to leave the court.77 No matter how fraudulent the procedure, the image clings, 
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even ‘long after the substance has evaporated.’78 Despite legitimate concerns 
about the legitimacy, and even the legality of the trial, for all the reasons 
stated so far, ‘the criticism will neither efface nor materially rectify the 
permanency of the image.’79 Let me identify two separate but overlapping 
images Israel’s spectacle is designed to produce and institute. 
 
First, Israel wanted to form and circulate an image of the PA that is synonymous 
with violence and terrorism. Tapping the trial’s vast and superior quality of 
image creation,  Israel re-creates its own alternative reality in the courtroom to 
undermine the moral and political authority of the Palestinian Authority to 
negotiate a final settlement on behalf of the Palestinians—exonerating Israel of 
any obligation to bring the occupation to an end. Sharon argued, ‘Israel wants 
to enter into peace negotiations and will do so as soon as two basic terms for 
the establishment of a genuine peace process are met: The complete cessation 
of terror, violence and incitement.80 While the Prime Minister’s sanitizing 
rhetoric frames Palestinian violence as ‘murderous acts of terrorism,’ denying 
the Palestinians any right of response to Israeli violence of multiple formation, 
the latter’s violence is articulated in terms of the right to self-defense; 
rendering it legal, legitimate, normative, and quotidian. For Israel, Palestinian 
violence is a pathology that needs a cure. Although there is no basis for it in 
international law, Israel justifies its violence as a right it has acquired by virtue 
of its authority as an occupying power. Palestinian resistance, on the other 
hand, is interpreted and officially described as ‘barbaric and murderous.’ In a 
statement addressed to the Israeli military court, another Palestinian leader and 
prisoner, Ahmad Sa'adat, sums up this point rather eloquently:  
  
As for your judicial apparatus…: it is one of the instruments of the 
occupation whose function is to give the cover of legal legitimacy to the 
crimes of the occupation, in addition to consecrating its systems and 
allowing the imposition of these systems on our people through force. 
This judicial apparatus also supports the administration of this 
occupation - which is the worst form of state-organized terrorism - as if 
you were in a permanent state of self-defense. The legitimate 
resistance of our people is seen as if it were terrorism that must be 
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combated and liquidated and judgment is placed upon those that 
practice or support it. And in the face of this contradiction between two 
logics, there would have to be a conviction.81 
 
From the system’s perspective, this is what Christodoulidis calls ‘the objection 
that cannot be heard.’82 Since these claims, however empirically true, are not 
intelligible within the register of the system and therefore illegitimate. By 
judging subjects whose idiom of legality and justice cannot be heard within its 
exclusionary framework, Israel presents the mere act of court appearance itself 
as evidence of the democratic and free character of the state of Israel. In so 
doing, it cements the international standing of its judiciary while it incarcerates 
the most capable and active of the occupied people. Barghouti seeks to break 
out of this epistemic web by appealing to the conscience of Israelis and the 
international community for whose consumption the trial is staged. He told the 
Israelis that he is a peaceful man who wants nothing more than the freedom and 
democracy Israelis want for themselves.  He reassures the international 
community, this time in English: ‘I am a peaceful man. I was trying to do 
everything for peace between the two peoples. I believe the best solution is two 
states for two peoples.’83 
 
Second, there is an international dimension to Israel’s performance of terrorism 
in the courtroom. While Barghouti is tried in the courtroom for acts of 
terrorism—one of the most performative and eventalizing discourse of the 21st 
century—in the court of world opinion, it was conjuring images that go beyond 
the guilt and innocence of the one man standing trial. It was trying to 
dehumanize the Palestinians: ‘He [Arafat] is the enemy of the entire free world. 
Everyone who seeks freedom, everyone who was brought up on the values of 
freedom and democracy must know that Arafat is an obstacle to peace in the 
Middle East. Arafat is a danger to the whole region.’84 By performing Palestinian 
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terrorism in ways that reveals the PLO and its leadership as ‘the enemy of the 
entire free world,’ it presents the occupation as a necessary bulwark against 
Palestinian terrorism and global Jihad. In providing his performative stunt with 
an international context, Sharon compared Palestinian violence with the acts of 
9/11. He said, Rehavam Ze’evi’s (Israeli Minister of Tourism) murder was 
‘Israel’s own Twin Towers.’85 To further cement this nexus between Palestinian 
violence and global terrorism, Sharon says: 
 
Since the horrific attack on September 11th, exactly one year after 
the outbreak of the Palestinian terrorist campaign against Israel, the 
United States has been leading the world in a heroic struggle to 
uproot terrorism. . . . . You must remember that leniency toward 
terrorists is the same as a green light to terrorists, who have already 
proven that they do not distinguish between blood and blood, 
between a Jewish victim and any other victim. You cannot fight 
terrorism on the one hand, and condemn the victims of terrorism on 
the other.86  
 
 
7.5. The Performative Generation of the Materiality of Resistance 
Signs can be misheard or misinterpreted by those to whom they are 
directed. They may also be deployed in new ways and at new sites 
and in ways that break with context, displacing the original meaning 
of a word or norm, denaturalising the concept, changing the way we 
think or act, even endangering new forms of the culturally 
intelligible.87  
 
                      —Karin Zivi 
 
In his famous essay, ‘Necropolitics,’ Achille Mbembe regards Palestine as ‘a late 
modern colonial occupation.’88 He argues that this form of occupation is 
different from early-modern colonial occupation in ‘its combining of the 
disciplinary, the biopolitical, and the necropolitical.’89 He offers the occupation 
of Palestine as ‘the most accomplished form of necropower,’ a word he uses to 
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account for ‘the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons are 
deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the creation of 
death-worlds  . . .  conferring upon them the status of living dead.’90 As a site of 
the ‘regulation of death,’ a necropolitical space is a site of exception, ‘the 
location par excellence where the controls and guarantees of judicial order can 
be suspended—the zone where the violence of the state of exception is deemed 
to operate in the service of ‘civilization.’91 Palestinians arrested by the Israeli 
military have never been dignified with a gesture of a public trial. They were 
either murdered under what Israel calls ‘targeted assassination’ or tried before 
military courts.92 To return to Hilla Dayan once more, Barghouti ‘is the first case 
of a defendant, charged with terrorist offenses, not to be tried by a military 
tribunal, but at an ordinary civil court.’93 The decision to grant Barghouti a 
civilian trial in Tel Aviv is not a departure from the logic of necropolitics; it is 
indeed an integral part of its operation central to its spectacle. To manage 
public opinion, Israel, like other colonial states before it, needed to act in the 
name of reason, freedom, and civilization. This public trial is in part an 
‘exercise of reason in the public sphere’ that is ‘tantamount to the exercise of 
freedom.’94  The state redirects and deploys the ideals of freedom and 
democracy in spheres of ‘unfreedom,’ in a zone of colonial subjugation to 
create new culturally intelligible categories.  
 
Writing for Haaretz, Gideon Levy said, ‘Following dozens of assassinations, the 
Israeli Defense Forces suddenly proved that when it wants to arrest someone 
instead of assassinating him, it knows how to do it quite well.’95 To understand 
the politics at the core of this trial, one does not need to reconstruct the events 
of the trial themselves. Israel’s own sincere declarations furnish definitive 
evidence of the political rationality at work in the trial: ‘This is an opportunity 
to tell Israel’s story. We need to tell the story of the Israeli population and what 
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it has been through in the last two years,’ says Gideon Mier, Israel’s Director 
General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aware of the court’s central function 
in the production, circulation, and internalization of hegemonic norms, 
Barghouti formulated strategies of resistance that resists through resignification 
of the same signs of freedom and justice that Israel deploys. But Barghouti 
deploys discourses of freedom and democracy in ways that breaks from and 
displaces the discourse that allows sovereignty to use ‘freedom,’ and 
‘democracy’ as a ‘normative basis to kill’; disrupting normative hinges that links 
freedom and sovereignty. In this project of emancipating sovereignty from the 
dazzling light of necropower, Barghouti and his co-performers aim at changing 
the way in which the world, including Palestinians and Israelis, think and act. It 
is a strategy of disruption, and self-definition (re-creation).96 They argue that 
the right to resist, to respond to an attack on the human condition, whatever 
sovereignty’s juridical constructions of who may live and die, is an inherent, 
and universal human norm, not only recognized by national and international 
norms, but also resides in the deep conscience of humanity. They protest the 
original meaning of the norm, to reconfigure it, and bring about a new meaning 
of the normative.   
 
If Israeli production of narrative justice is designed to generate and 
authenticate norms that conceal, pacify and normalize occupation, framing 
occupation and terrorism to suit its own performative stunt, Barghouti’s 
strategy of resistance returns these hegemonic norms into the realm of 
contestation, ensuring the resistibility of hegemonic norms the court is called up 
on to rationalize and justify. By identifying Israeli occupation as the melting pot 
of violence, claiming the inherent right of resistance, the defense team tries to 
attach the deeper logic that animates the Israeli spectacle. Appropriating the 
platform made available by the state, they institute Palestinian repertoire of 
resistance on the normative structure of the state.97  
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On the first day of the trial, Barghouti told the judge, ‘There is a mistake here. 
The one who should be sitting here (in the dock) is the government of Israel.’98 
As a subject engaged in the duty to resist the violence of Israeli occupation, he 
has no case to answer, but a legitimate cause of which he is a symbol. 
Challenging the authority of Israeli judges; he accuses them as ‘partners’ of the 
occupation who have vested interest in the dispute: ‘the judges are just like 
pilots who fly planes and drop bombs.’99 As a performative response to Israel’s 
spectacles of legality, Barghouti replied with a counter- spectacle: ‘I have a 
charge sheet with 50 clauses against Israel for the bloodbath of both people!’100 
Accusing his accusers, he dismisses the court rituals as a play of power, and uses 
the opportunity to offer a political testament: 
 
I categorically reject the authority of this criminal court of occupation 
and I will not dignify the ludicrous claims against me by responding to 
them. If my trial were truly a search for truth and justice, it would be 
Sharon and the Israeli army behind bars – it would be the criminals of 
occupation who have perpetrated war crimes against the men, women 
and children of Palestine over decades, who continue to violate UN 
Resolutions and the 4th Geneva Convention with impunity.101 
 
Insofar as the Israeli narrative aims to establish terror as the sign and signifier 
of the Palestinian Authority, using Barghouti as scapegoat, Barghouti’s 
performative resistance does two things: it not only resists Israel’s construction 
of his identity as violent and terrorist but denounces the court process as the 
mechanism through which the state produces what it calls the ‘terrorist’ 
subject. Instead of denying the accusation of violence, Barghouti claims the 
inherent right to a violent means of resistance and contests Israel’s moral and 
legal authority to try him. In a performative act of self-definition- one that 
resists Israeli construction of his identity as a terrorist, he spoke before the 
court is called to order, in a fluent Hebrew he learned in Israeli jails: ‘I am a 
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freedom fighter, fighting for the freedom of my people and peace between the 
two peoples.’102 In this self-definition, the ‘I’ of ‘I am’ is laying claim to the 
truth, in order to redefine not only his way of being but also his mode of 
generating meaning. Although his status as stateless affects the meaning and 
veracity of his statements, his truth, including its mode of recounting, emerges, 
not from Israeli juridical constructions, but, from his experience as an occupied, 
from his relationship to the occupier, and the rest of the world. He claims: ‘I am 
a peaceful man. I was trying to do everything for peace between the two 
peoples. I believe the best solution is two states for two peoples.’103 
 
When Barghouti says, ‘I am a peaceful man,’ denying and denouncing the 
state’s mega-spectacle to construct him as violent and terrorist, he discloses a 
different relationship to juridical truth, and reveals the contingency and 
arbitrariness of power-knowledge regimes that condition juridical forms of 
truth. For Barghouti, the violence enumerated in the indictment misrepresents 
and misrecognizes the underlying conflict. What the indictment names terrorism 
commits an injustice of misrecognition deliberately and systematically designed 
to co-opt and suppress the yearning of the Palestinian people for a free and 
dignified life. By framing the dispute as that of terrorism, rather than 
occupation, the trial commits an injustice of misrecognition. For the 
Palestinians, the occupation, of itself, is violence, in both the ontological and 
epistemic sense of the term. This violence, both hot and cold, continued 
unabated since 1967 in flagrant violation of international law, UN resolutions, 
and the decisions of the International Court of Justice.104 By framing Palestinian 
resistance to illegal and illegitimate occupation as not only national but a global 
security threat, the indictment securitizes, misrepresents, misrecognizes, and 
usurps the occupied of the logos with which they can articulate their grievances 
and give an account of themselves, according to their own experiences, their 
way of being and knowing.   
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Marwan Barghouti is a politician that compels admiration. Fluent in Arabic, 
Hebrew, and English, prisoner garners enormous support and admiration both 
from his people and from his enemies.105 For example, Jimmy Carter described 
Barghouti as a ‘revered prisoner . . . [whose] influence is enormous.’106 Even 
Israeli General Orit Adato referred to him as ‘The Nelson Mandela of the 
Palestinians.’107 With the Palestinian territories, he is a man with a great 
grassroots following and among the few politicians who can cut deals between 
Fatah and Hamas, even from behind Israeli prison. In 2006, he initiated what is 
known as the ‘National Conciliation Document.’108   
 
As a progressive politician who supported peaceful negotiation including the 
Oslo Framework and several subsequent initiatives, Barghouti symbolizes the 
despair and frustration of four decades of occupation; people, who, out of daily 
violence and cynicism, apparently turned into advocates of violence as a 
measure of the last recourse.109 In a statement that captures the political core 
of Barghouti’s response to Israeli accusation of terrorism, an Israeli 
commentator writes during the trial: ‘Look at Barghouti and you will understand 
the entire story. The path he took was the only one we showed the 
Palestinians—a path on which we tripped and pushed them deeper and deeper 
into despair and ultimately to violence.’110 It is not the love of violence, but 
oppression, a violence Western jurisprudence calls ‘occupation’ that forced him 
to take the path of violence. He says, ‘I say to Israeli people that I only want for 
the Palestinians what you Israelis want for yourselves: peace, security and 
above all, freedom.’111 When injustice itself rules, resistance is no longer a 
weapon of choice; it is a necessary condition of existence. 
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As Foucault writes, ‘Where there is power, there is resistance’: power, both at 
the micro and macro-level, produces that which comes to resist it.112 However, 
Foucault also reminds that resistance is ‘never in a position of exteriority’ to 
the power that produces and invests it.113 The particular power-knowledge 
regime by which Israel synchronizes physical violence with concealing and 
legitimizing truth-discourses generates a response specific to its original 
configuration.114 Recognizing the futility of decades of negotiation with an 
occupier that continues to build settlements even as it declares it desire to 
negotiate, Barghouti offers a counter-proposal: ‘we tried seven years of 
Intifadah without negotiations, and then seven years of negotiations without 
Intifadah; perhaps it is time to try both simultaneously.’115 Using his speaking 
position—to the extent upheld by his judges, he sought to demythologize the 
myths formulated, rationalized, and disseminated by Israeli judiciary as mask 
designed to conceal the brutal reality of occupation. He says: ‘Israelis must 
abandon the myth that it is possible to have peace and occupation at the same 
time, that peaceful coexistence is possible between slave and master.’116 
 
For him, to be accused of a violent threat to occupation is a contradiction in 
terms. By creating a sequence between three words, ‘peace, security, 
occupation,’ Barghouti formulates a narrative anchor—’No peace, no security, 
with occupation’—that served as a framework of meaning and interpretation for 
his contestations.117 It is an anchor that repurposed the same hegemonic 
discourse of his enemy, usurped Israel of its monopoly over the vocabulary; 
destabilizing the concepts and categories by which it legitimized occupation. 
Going beyond the jurisprudential, this narrative anchor channels the debate into 
the submerged violence of occupation which the court dismisses as irrelevant to 
the issue on trial. By directing his response to the central political question of 
occupation, he confronted the Israeli authorities and the audience, leading 
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them beyond the absurd question of criminal responsibility to the material 
cause of the tragedy.  
 
Invoking what he calls an ‘inherent moral and legal right to resist’ occupation, 
Barghouti reflects on the status quo and performatively discloses a new law 
beyond Israel’s determinate legality.118 Using the language of peace, freedom, 
resistance and occupation as a justification for his action, invoking a universal 
law beyond this particular tradition, he appeals to the deepest imperatives of a 
truly human ethic. In the courtroom, he does not merely protest his 
construction by Israel as violent and terrorist; he reveals legal and structural 
violence as the surface effects of the violence of occupation. His strategy is to 
create a political opening for a performative reconstitution of self and 
authority; to affirm difference, to refuse the limit and closure imposed by laws 
that proceed by mishearing and misrecognizing the subject it judges. Israel 
presents its culture as democratic and free. Freedom and democracy becomes 
its ‘cultural attributes,’ something that belongs to Israel and one it is defending 
from the violent culture of the Palestinians. To disrupt this discursive process 
through which Israel continues to use its power to generate an image of Israeli 
freedom and Palestinian violence, Barghouti brings up an insoluble incongruity 
that situate Israel in contradiction to its official claims:  
 
We have been suffering under your sinister military occupation for over 
36 years during which you killed us, tortured us, destroyed our homes 
and usurped our land. You made our life an enduring hell. We have an 
inherent moral and legal right to resist your occupation of our country. 
If you were in our shoes, you most certainly would do the same as we 
are doing. You would resist.119 
 
Barghouti protested Israel’s legal, moral and ethical authority to try him. He 
says, ‘I do not recognize the right of Israel to try and sentence a Palestinian.’120 
For Barghouti, to use Israeli criminal law as the appropriate framework within 
which to explore questions of criminal responsibility is a perpetration of a 
fundamental wrong that proceeds from the legitimation of constitutive violence 
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to the legitimation of this specific misrecognition of the conflict.121 He refused 
to recognise Israeli jurisdiction and legal framework since to do so would be to 
grant recognition to the very infrastructure he seeks to escape. In denouncing 
Israel’s law and rejecting its authority to sit in judgment over the people it 
colonizes, Barghouti seems to invoke, like Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther 
King Jr. before him, the classic natural law theorists. With St. Augustine, he 
says, ‘An unjust law is no law.’ Invoking international law as an equitable rule of 
judgment in matter that oppose two people, Barghouti says with Cicero: 
 
[t]rue law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal 
application, unchanging and everlasting ....We cannot be freed from its 
obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves 
for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different 
laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, 
but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and 
all times.122 
 
In the absence of a universal law that embraces human dignity and equality, a 
law that represents and recognizes the grievances and speaking positions of all 
speaking beings, the dispute is a différend. As Jean-François Lyotard says, ‘A 
case of différend between two parties takes place when the ‘regulation’ of the 
conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the 
wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom.’123 To accept Israeli 
law as an equitable rule of judgment is to concede the power of Israel to try 
him and therefore the legality of the very occupation he seeks to resist. 
Although he knows that his objections cannot register in the legal sense of the 
term- he knows that they prevail in the court of world opinion. So for them, the 
battle, to paraphrase Austin again, is to accomplish action through utterance, to 
advance a performative politics of resistance that disrupts juridical norms that 
operate to camouflage the political ontology of occupation. 
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7.6. Barghouti in Tel Aviv and Mandela at Rivonia: Generative 
Historicity  
The political agenda contains the stories which strike home with each 
of us as citizens. If the legal agenda focuses on incidents which can 
be dated and located, the political agenda calls up analogies from 
the depths of our culture that are difficult to delineate. If the legal 
agenda depends on a rational analysis, the political agenda summons 
our empathy. Both sides can invoke the political agenda.  
 
                                                    Ron Christenson, Political Trials, 256 
 
 
As Christenson rightly observes, stories ‘are the ones that shape our thinking 
about the dilemmas of law, influence our sense of justice, and change our 
morality.’124 To summon the empathy of the world, ‘to appeal to the voice of 
conscience, to the immediate and unfailing feeling of justice,’ the parties 
projected stories that strike home with their respective constituencies. Israel 
deliberately mischaracterizes the conflict and aligns it with ‘historical 
constants’ and ‘desirable concepts corresponding to official needs’ to mute the 
audibility of Palestinian demands for homeland and dignity.125 To delegitimize 
their claims, and justify its actions as necessary and proportionate, it raises the 
spectre of the Holocaust and 9/11, creating associations between two different 
conflicts to appropriate the cultural meaning these  signifiers, i.e., Holocaust as 
a signifying historical constant and terrorism as a ‘desirable concept’ and a 
‘sign’ had already accumulated. By aligning its conflict with the people whose 
land and livelihood it occupies with the USA led ‘War on Terrorism’ and 
Barghouti’s trial as a re-enactment of Eichmann, Israel appropriates the self-
evidence and universality of the sign and the Holocaust as historic constant. 
Indeed, Israel explicitly referred to the murder of its Minister of Tourism, 
Rehavam Ze’evi as ‘Israel’s own Twin Towers.’  
 
On the other hand, by identifying his trial with the trial of Nelson Mandela and 
the Algerian freedom fighters tried in French courts, Barghouti raises the 
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spectre of Apartheid and French colonialism. As the focal point of political 
strategy, Barghouti locates his struggle within genealogies of exemplary 
struggles against colonialism and a former freedom fighter whose name is now 
inscribed in ‘architectural structures, and commemorative commodities’ and 
made present forever.126 To problematize the Israeli ‘sign,’ i.e., to disrupt the 
self-evidence, and universality with which this master signifier—‘terrorism’—
generates political values and cultural meaning, he imports a competing ‘master 
signifier’–‘former freedom fighter,’ to disrupt the context in which the master 
signifier generates its material effects. The same freedom fighter denounced as 
a terrorist during his struggle is now being celebrated as a global icon that 
symbolizes the very meaning of freedom and equality.127  By aligning Palestinian 
struggle with the South African struggle and the Algerian War of Independence, 
Barghouti dislodges the context that supplies the master sign with the raw 
material to generate its political effects. The counter-sign, i.e., ‘freedom 
fighter,’ institute a break, what Derrida calls a ‘disjuncture,’ between the sign 
and the context, so that the sign no longer appear self-evident, personal, and 
ahistorical.  
 
There are two processes of internationalization at work in the trial. The first is 
the explicit analogy between the trials of Nelson Mandela and his trial.128 The 
second is evident in his decision to recruit two Jewish defense lawyers as co-
performers in his trial—what he regards as the trial of the aspirations of 
Palestinians. To foreground the performative in the cultural, religious, and 
emotional politics of the conflict, the defence brought onboard two prominent 
Jewish lawyers—Gisele Halimi and Shammai Leibowitz, whose political profile 
dramatizes and generates contradictions that disrupts Israel’s central 
ideological-political claims. Gisele Halimi is a French Jew known for his defense 
of Algerian freedom fighters in French Courts during the Algerian War of 
Independence.129 Shammai Leibowitz, the Grandson of the prominent 
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philosopher, Yeshayahu Leibowitz, is an Israeli citizen and a conscientious 
objector to the occupation. Let me take each of these processes of 
internationalization in turn. First, the Nelson Mandela analogy: 
 
The analogy between Mandela’s encounters with the Apartheid courts and 
Barghouti’s encounter with the court of Israeli occupation is a consequential 
analogy. The defence team recognized that, as Alasdair MacIntyre says, the 
essentially story-telling character of human beings.130 It is in the stories, as 
Christenson reminds us, that societies find the crucible for understanding the 
basic issues of law and politics. Locating his struggle within past struggles, by 
establishing connections and forging relations, Barghouti is trying to raise the 
spectre of Apartheid South Africa and mobilize Mandela’s name—which is more 
than a mere name—as a kind of gesture that effects something within the 
existing power-knowledge regime; power capable of moving people, aligning 
and ‘sticking different bodies together.’ It is an analogy that transposes the 
South African image onto the Palestinian scene and confronts us with 
fundamental ethical questions. It is transformative and generative of ‘affective 
webs’ critical for forging new solidarities and alliances. 
 
To disrupt the Israeli spectacle and solidify the truth of his analogy, Barghouti’s 
lawyers extended an invitation to Nelson Mandela—the man that symbolizes 
South Africa’s ‘Long Walk to Freedom’—to attend Barghouti’s trial. Although 
Mandela declined the invitation citing busy schedule, he is nevertheless said to 
have issued a public statement comparing Barghouti’s trial to his.131 
Notwithstanding his attendance, the mere fact of naming Mandela in the course 
of this trial raised the spectre of Apartheid in the Israeli court, rendering the 
occupation synonymous with Apartheid, rather than the memory of Eichmann 
that Israel sought to enact. Commenting on the generative effects of this logic, 
an Israeli commentator observed, ‘Barghouti obviously would have been 
overjoyed to see Mandela in [the] courthouse, but the main aim of his public 
relations stunt has been advanced—an attempt to burn into the international 
public consciousness that he, like Mandela, is the victim of an oppressive, 
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pernicious regime.’132 His lawyers made sure that Barghouti in Tel Aviv is less 
like Eichmann in Jerusalem and more like Mandela at Rivonia.  
 
Comparing his trial with Mandela’s trial; Barghouti amplifies and magnifies the 
parallel between Israeli occupation and South Africa’s now defunct apartheid. 
By identifying Israeli occupation with Apartheid, and drawing parallels between 
Israel’s deployment of legal technologies of oppression to protect occupation, 
on the one hand, and Apartheid’s deployment of pernicious laws to eliminate 
resistance, on the other, Barghouti exposes the occupation as the melting pot of 
violence and appeals to the conscience of humanity.133 This parallel performs a 
remarkable re-constitution of Barghouti. It is not merely an attention grabbing 
analogy, but an analogy that functions as fulcrum for judgement on basic 
questions of law and justice. It transformed the ‘regular guy from the 
Palestinian street’ into a ‘Palestinian Mandela.’ Like Nelson Mandela, Barghouti 
characterized himself as a peaceful man that resorted to violence out of the 
desire for a dignified and just life for his people. Just as Nelson Mandela 
justified what he called ‘strictly controlled violence’ as a measure of the last 
recourse against a racist order that knows no moral or legal bounds, Barghouti 
argues that recourse to violence is justified by a universal norm enunciated in 
the Universal Declarations of Human Rights. Dismayed by the evocative power of 
this analogy, another commentator noted, ‘Arresting Barghouti may have been 
just, but it is not wise. Now he will become the Palestinian Mandela.’134Almost a 
decade after his incarceration, this narrative still resonates across the 
Palestinian territories and the Arab World. As Avnery writes, ‘Marwan 
Barghouti’s manifesto expresses the near-unanimous feelings of the Palestinians 
. . . Like Nelson Mandela in apartheid South Africa, the man in prison may well 
be more important than the leaders outside.’135 
 
Second, the co-performance of Israeli lawyers: The solidarity of the Jewish 
lawyers with a Palestinian, in defence of Marwan Barghouti before an Israeli 
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court, of itself, is disruptive of Israel’s oppressive spectacle of legality. Crossing 
cultural, national, and ethnic allegiance, their participation in the defence of 
Marwan Barghouti ‘connects the biographical and the personal to the 
pedagogical and the performative.’136  
 
As a mode of critique and political struggle, their co-performance with 
Barghouti destabilizes the context necessary to generate the material effects of 
the signs. Drawing on their biographical record, casting themselves as both 
insiders and outsiders, they enacted the role of an objective observer who, by 
virtue of blood and lineage, cannot be Anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli. Their mere 
appearance in his defense calls into being a different cultural meaning of the 
signs and referents used as exclusionary affective technologies.137 By attempting 
a reversal of established patterns, they sought to suggest a moral-ethical way of 
being and acting; ‘a demand for collective politics, as a politics based not on 
the possibility that we might be reconciled, but on learning to live with the 
impossibility of reconciliation, or learning to live that we live with and besides 
each other, and yet we are not one.’ 138 Their co-performance with Barghouti 
disrupts the narrative that divides Palestinians and Israelis along a binary line 
and exposes this binary structure as unnatural and contingently articulated. 
 
Outraged by this intervention, an audience in the courtroom shouted, ‘I will 
burn all your grandfather’s books’ while another tried a ‘halachic insult’ against 
the kippa-clad Leibowitz.139 Because of the identity of the speaker, his 
utterances cannot be dismissed as ‘anti-Israel,’ ‘anti-Semitic,’ or even ‘hostile 
to Israel’ for to do so would be logically counter-intuitive. Pointing to the 
heterogeneous tissue of Israel’s history, Leibowitz calls for an alternative form 
of relations between the two, noting that, ‘Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir 
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stopped the terror against the British once they had a state and the same thing 
will happen with the Palestinians.’140 
 
By crossing the Jewish-Arab boundary being crystallized, they perform an 
‘ethical solicitation’ that enacts ‘a politics of possibility, a politics that 
mobilizes people’s memories, fantasies, and desires’ for collective politics.141 
Leibowitz and Halimi, both insiders to the Israeli political inside by virtue of 
their ethnicity, protested occupation as a fundamental wrong, reminded Israelis 
of their origin and values, to change how both communities feel about each 
other. As Sara Ahmed reminds us, ‘How we feel about others is what aligns us 
with a collective’ and it is ‘through how others impress upon us that the skin of 
the collective begins to take shape.’142 As citizens of Israel defending a 
Palestinian determined to resist Israeli occupation by force, their solidarity is 
expressive of an ethic of difference that seeks an active way of remaking a 
world of plurality and equality.  
 
In their reference to genealogies of struggles against two of history’s known 
oppressive regimes, the Algerian and the South African experience, the defense 
intends to do more than celebrate the success of these struggles. In celebrating 
the struggle and the self-sacrifice of its leaders, they are reconfiguring the 
‘micro-politics of personal feelings’ to force people to look deep down into their 
conscience. Inviting the international community to be ‘co-performers in a 
drama of social resistance and social critique,’ they seek to forge a new unity 
and solidarity between Palestinians and the rest of the world.143 By grounding 
their comparison in similar and concrete historical analogies vivid in the minds 
of their audience, they engaged in the performance of a liberatory politics- 
what Paulo Freire calls ‘a dialogic way of being in the world’- to mobilize 
memories and history as a weapon of struggle.144  
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7.7. Between Moses in Egypt and Barghouti in Tel Aviv: 
Liberationist Counter-history 
 
You who have faith in the destiny of the human kind, summon up 
your courage, the future will be yours. You will be persecuted and 
tortured, but you will never be defeated. Each great cause requires 
great sacrifices to become triumphant.145 
                 —Felicite de Lamennais 
 
The high watermark of Barghouti’s ‘ethical solicitation’ came when his kippa-
clad human rights attorney, Shamai Leibowitz, registered an unexpected and 
destabilizing surprise against normative expectations of the Israeli social 
ontology. Escalating the confrontation, Leibowitz invokes a prophetic story from 
the Torah to incite a political deliberation irreducible to nationalistic political 
calculations. He said: 
 
Moses escaped to Midian after killing the Egyptian because he knew the 
occupied could not get justice in the occupier’s courtroom. On the 
other hand, Pharaoh did not put him on trial because he understood 
that he did not have the authority to judge the leader of a people 
seeking their freedom.146  
 
This is a mode of political critique and historical analysis that is radical and 
subversive. In order to escape gate-keeping legal technologies constructed to 
protect the system precisely from these forms of sudden surprises; Leibowitz 
compares Marwan Barghouti, the ‘other’ that the state of Israel despises and 
dehumanizes, with Moses, Judaism’s most important prophet and the author of 
the Torah, to enhance the receptivity of their story. The moral of the story does 
not end there. Implicit in this intervention is a moral outrage at the violent and 
oppressive rationality that betrayed this messianic tradition that leads him to 
compare the State of Israel with Pharaoh, a figure ‘described in the Torah and is 
etched in Jewish consciousness as a murderous tyrant.’147 These parallels seek to 
mediate the present sufferings of the Palestinian people with the distant 
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persecution of the Jewish people to conjure an image that operates as ‘an 
ethical solicitation.’148  
 
In her Nobel Lecture titled ‘Precarious Life and the Obligations of Cohabitation,’ 
Butler asks important questions on ‘the ethical obligation’ that ‘compels,’ 
‘concerns,’ and ‘moves’ us to respond to the suffering of the ‘other’ whether in 
proximity or at a distance.149 She asks whether human beings have the ‘capacity 
or inclination to respond ethically to suffering’ by others, and what makes it 
possible.’150 Working through Emmanuel Levinas and Hannah Arendt, arguing 
with them and against them, Butler formulates an ethics of cohabitation that 
accounts for the impinging power of images, i.e., images that ‘impinge upon us’ 
and compel us to enter into a binding ethical relation with the ‘other,’ those 
with whom we share a piece of the earth.151 She argues, ‘in spite of ourselves 
and quite apart from any intentional act, we are nevertheless solicited by 
images of distant suffering in ways that compel our concern and move us to act, 
that is, to voice our objection and register our resistance to such violence 
through concrete political means.’152 By crossing communal, racial, and religious 
divides, Leibowitz, the grandson of Yeshaia Leibowitz, ‘one of the most 
distinguished Israeli philosophers and public intellectuals,’ appropriates not only 
his ‘Jewishness’ but also his lineage from an ‘eminent family’ of ‘distinguished 
Israeli Orthodox public intellectuals,’ to express and enact ‘bonds of solidarity’ 
with Palestinians. Just like Bram Fischer who, having been a member of an elite 
Afrikaner family, sacrificed his privilege fighting against Apartheid, Leibowitz is 
taking a great personal risk in his defense of Barghouti.153 Writing about 
Fischer’s contribution as a member of the defense team at Rivonia, Mandela 
writes: ‘Although he could have been Prime Minister of South Africa,   
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Even his political opponents would agree with us his comrades that Bram 
Fischer could have become prime minister or the chief justice of South 
Africa if he had chosen to follow the narrow path of Afrikaner 
nationalism. He chose instead the long and hard road to freedom not 
only for himself but for all of us. He chose the road that had to pass 
through the jail. He travelled it with courage and dignity. He served as 
an example to many who followed him.154 
 
Insofar as Israel is seeking to conjure an image of Palestinian terrorism, 
concealing its own institutional and systematic violence, Leibowitz is trying to 
paralyze the power of that image from moving people to act in ways that 
further oppresses and denies Palestinians their yearning for a homeland. 
Articulating Barghouti’s position, Leibowitz conjures a counter-image resistant 
to Israeli ‘economy of fear’: ‘When the state of Israel cruelly rules over millions 
of people who live under curfews and closures and makes their lives a living 
hell—it is the natural and moral right of the occupied people, Barghouti argues, 
to fight for their freedom and independence.’155 As Butler rightly points out, 
‘obligations to those who are far away as well as to those who are proximate 
across linguistic and national boundaries are only possible by virtue of visual or 
linguistic translations.’156 Using his Jewish background to interpret the Torah, 
comparing those distant injustices against the Jewish people with the injustice 
presently perpetrated by the state that identifies itself as ‘Jewish’ against the 
Palestinians, Leibowitz is formulating what Butler calls an ‘ethical quandary’ 
that operates as a site of  ‘ethical solicitation.’157 Butler’s approach positions 
ethics as an active site of reinventing the world, a space from which to effect 
modes of intervention empathetic to images of Palestinian suffering. It is a 
formulation that reinvigorates the sensibility of the subject, reinforces its 
receptivity. Within this framework, the image Leibowitz conjures, to use 
Butler’s formulation, ‘compels our concerns, and moves us to act, that is, to 
voice our objection and register our resistance’ to Israeli violence.158  
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The conflict on trial threatens to denaturalize as to transcend the narrow 
confines of the jurisprudential—opening up deeper foundational questions about 
the values and principles of the community exercising the right to judge a 
person, who, like Moses before him, is fighting to liberate his people. Invoking 
the Torah as the grounds from which he speaks as a Jew that embodies the 
principles, and community norms considered ethically binding among Israelis, 
Leibowitz’s enactment reclaims values central to that tradition. By comparing 
Barghouti’s leadership of the Palestinians to Moses’s leadership of the Jewish 
people from Egyptian oppression, Leibowitz is posing subtle ethico-political 
questions to those, who, while seeming to uphold and preserve these values, 
are in fact betraying and abusing it.  By framing his response as an ethical 
demand that derives from the Judaeo-Christian tradition, Leibowitz’s likening of 
Barghouti with Moses, and the Israeli government with Pharaoh destabilizes the 
signifying logic that operates to render the government’s perspective on the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict normative and universal. Because of the insufficiency 
of the juridical to transcend the play of power and represent, recognize, and 
articulate the claims of those who have been usurped of the means of 
articulation, the communication took a theological turn into a Judaeo-Christian 
tradition, to reclaim not only the ethical duty to respond but also the right to 
resistance as such.  
 
Whatever the factual merit of this comparison, the intervention enraged several 
members of the audience and destabilized the normative appeal of the juridico-
political categories that operate to construct Palestinians as ‘violent’ and 
‘terrorists.’159 The defense knew that this rage, as a ‘material fabric,’ has an 
affective energy. It does things: it transmits meaning in the world.160 For the 
defense, as with the prosecution, it is not factual correctness that matters, but 
the disruptive potentials, and the surprising effects of the intervention. That is 
what makes his intervention a political action in the Arendtian sense of the 
term. If resistance consists in the disclosure of subjectifying norms that have 
become self-evident, this intervention compels reflection, and brings back the 
contingency of juridico-political norms that organize and structure debates over 
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what counts as resistance and terrorism into the realm of visibility. In resisting a 
discourse that relies on moralizing religious narrative to repress and produce 
quiescent citizens, performative strategies of resistance reconfigure these 
norms to obliterate the power-knowledge configuration that generates cultural 
meanings necessary for its politics. Seen that way, Leibowitz’s intervention at 
the theological level is a performative act of reconfiguration that provides the 
raw material for disruption. Speaking with the voice of a subject presumed to 
be his adversaries, Barghouti’s claim generates a truth that brings back the 
constitutive mechanisms of the discourse into an arena of contestation. 
According to this narrative, Barghouti, just like Moses, is fighting a pernicious 
occupation to liberate his people. In this, he instigates a political confrontation 
both within and outside the courtroom.  
 
7.8. Conclusion  
Barghouti’s trial is a captivating illustration of both the fragility and flexibility 
of the judicial space. In the chapter, I have tried to show how the courtroom 
functions as a site of political intervention where new meanings are generated 
to reconstitute the world in the image of political actors. By putting on a 
spectacle meant to dramatize the scale, and gravity of Palestinian terrorism, 
Israel sought to use its courtroom to generate meanings and values that function 
to hail Palestinians, without distinctions, as ‘dangerous,’ ‘murderous,’ ‘violent,’ 
and ultimately, ‘terrorists’ intent on destroying freedom and democracy. In a 
series of discursive interactions with powerful ideologies, the image of 
‘terrorism’ that Israel seeks to impinge sticks to the Palestinian body, it shapes 
and transforms it, generating the ‘material effect’ it names. As a technology of 
oppression, ‘terrorism’ generates bodily affects that defines the categories of 
the human, designate Palestinians as enemies of freedom and democracy, and 
justifies Israel’s denial of their aspiration as necessary and proportionate.   
 
However, courtroom proceedings are not rational validity claims that proceed 
according to exact rules. They are not ‘chess-games.’ In judging its public 
enemy in a dispute that does not signify the idiom of the accused, the system 
neither integrated nor suppressed sudden surprises disruptive to its repressive 
and disciplinary technologies of control. Unable to control the spill over effects 
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of its own spectacles, Israel witnessed the reconstitution of Barghouti into a 
Palestinian Mandela in its own space. Using the political possibilities created by 
the trial, Barghouti sought to generate a new cultural meaning and social value 
that reconfigured discourse of terrorism, occupation, and resistance. In this act 
of self-definition as a ‘freedom fighter,’ Barghouti’s counter-spectacle breaks 
the context under which the Israeli spectacle generates its political effects and 
registers a sudden surprise against the system in ways that excludes all 
compromise. Using a counter-sign, he enabled historical analysis and political 
critique the Israeli invocation of a master signifier operates to paralyze and 
mute. By problematizing the universality and self-evidence with which 
‘terrorism’ generates identical political effects in different contexts, he turned 
shared experiences of loss and suffering into a site of collective politics to 
create a possibility for a new beginning.   
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Chapter Eight 
 
 
8. Between Slave-Owners and Founding Fathers: 
Performative Counter-history in the Trial of Bobby 
Seale 
 
8.1. Introduction 
In the 1975-76 Lectures at the College de France, Foucault traces the genealogy 
of counter-history to 17th century England and France of Louis XIV.1 By setting 
philosophico-juridical discourses of royal power against the historico-political 
discourses of the Puritans, the Levellers and the aristocrats, Foucault suggests 
an understanding and analysis of political power in terms of war and war like 
relations such as struggles, confrontations, and antagonisms. He conceives war 
not only as the matrix for an analysis of power-relations but also as the essential 
constitutive condition of society.2 Identifying revolutionary and pre-
revolutionary England and France as the originary sites of counter-history, 
Foucault points to a turning point at which ‘the idea that war is the 
uninterrupted frame of history takes a specific form.’ This war, he argues, ‘The 
war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our 
society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war.’3 In England, it 
was the discourse of the Puritans and of the Levellers. In France, it was a 
‘discourse of aristocratic bitterness,’ a ‘discourse of struggle against the king.’4 
Foucault presents the historico-political discourse as a critical and resentful 
discourse that ‘regards the Prince as an illusion’ and sovereignty as domination. 
As he put it, it is ‘a discourse that cuts off the head of the king.’5  
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Drawing on Foucault’s analysis of counter-history as a discourse of struggle and 
political critique, I will analyze how Bobby Seale’s deployment of counter-
history created conditions of possibility for critique.6 Working through Jacques 
Rancière’s distinction between police and politics, I will offer a reading of how 
the usurpation of Seale’s speaking position discloses a fundamental wrong that 
disrupts the original configuration. The chapter proceeds in four parts: First, to 
establish a link between Bobby Seale’s critique in the courtroom and the Black 
Panther Party’s (BPP) practice of counter-history, I will turn to the BPP’s 
constitutive instrument, ‘The Ten-Point-Platform and Program,’ their 
documented struggles and texts of some of its prominent activists: Eldridge 
Cleaver, Angela Y. Davis, and George Jackson. Second, taking the conflict 
between the system and the counter-historical subject over the distribution of 
speaking positions as my point of departure, I will discuss how the defendant 
reconfigures the space to expose the biological war that goes on underneath the 
surface of law and order. Third, I will discuss two scenes of counter-historical 
significance to show how the practice of counter-history generates an event of 
rupture. Finally, I will discuss Seale’s transformation of the legal record into an 
archive of black liberationist counter-history and reflect on what it might mean 
for the defendant to insists on a count in which his voice is counted as 
uncountable.  
 
8.2. The Black Panther Party: Counter-history as Mode of Critique 
and Struggle  
The Black Panther Party for Self-Defense was established in the spring of 1966, 
in Oakland, California, to protect the black community from ‘rampant police 
brutality.’7 Envisioned as a revolutionary ‘community-based organization,’ the 
party’s political philosophies are co-extensive with ‘the struggle of people of 
African descent,’ a ‘struggle which began on the slave ships.’8 Envisioned by 
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Huey Newton and Bobby Seale, (the defendant), the BPP represented a decisive 
break with the political philosophies of earlier black liberationist movements. 
Contrary to the transcendentalist and enlightenment ideals of reason, truth, and 
freedom that informed the political thoughts of the civil rights movement, the 
BPP was historicist and revolutionary. Its constitutive instrument—’The Ten-
Point Platform and Program’—is a blueprint for a revolutionary and historico-
political struggle. According to former Black Panther activist Safiya-Bukhari-
Alston, ‘[T]he Eight Points of Attention and Three Main Rules of Discipline were 
directly lifted’ from Mao Tse Tung's Red Book: ‘Quotations of Chairman Mao.’9 
The party leadership and its organizers studied history, politics, and political 
economy and read thinkers from Marx, to Mao, from Nat Turner, to Martin 
Delaney, and from Marcus Garvey, Herbert Marcuse and Adorno to Malcolm X 
and Franz Fanon.10   
 
‘The Ten-Point Platform’ conceptualizes American sovereignty as domination 
and its laws, including its constitution, as a tactical deployment in the racist 
exploitation and oppression of black and other oppressed people.11 A certain 
destabilizing logic undergirds it—a logic that breaks from and displaces juridical 
universality to expose the violence that lies beneath the ostensible peace of 
liberal capitalist democracy. Rejecting the rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the US constitution, Point I stipulates for the freedom of black people. It states: 
‘We want Freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our black 
community. We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to 
determine our destiny’12 Point V states: ‘We want education for our people that 
exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education 
that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.’13 
Calling for the freedom and the right to self-determination of black people, the 
BPP’s founding document ‘speaks of rights that survives the vicissitudes of time 
solely in order to declare war’ on the laws and institutions establishing 
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American sovereignty.14  In demanding the right to education, an education that 
‘teaches [them their] true history and [their] role in the present-day society,’ 
this founding document identifies the present as a site of inquiry and struggle. 
On the 107th Anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation, the Party 
formulated this counter historical knowledge, this anti-juridical knowledge, in 
these emphatic terms: ‘The Constitution of the U.S.A. does not and never has 
protected our people or guaranteed to us those lofty ideals enshrined within 
it.’15 For them, American sovereignty and juridical codes are not guarantors of 
the reign of justice but the very instruments power uses to consolidate and 
preserve historical force relations.  
 
By rejecting the Constitution, laws and the courts as normative standards for 
equality and justice, ‘The Ten-Point-Platform’ conceives African American 
subjectivity as racialized colonies usurped of its speaking position as equal 
speaking beings. In an essay titled ‘The Land Question and Black Liberation,’ 
BPP Field Marshall Eldridge Cleaver succinctly formulated this notion. 
Distinguishing between what he called the ‘White Mother Country’ and ‘Black 
Colony,’ he argued against a juridical framework of understanding and 
articulating the claims of the black population against ‘White Mother Country.’ 
Instead, he urged a counter-historical framework that takes account of the 
constitutive and regulative conditions of the present and sensible to the silent 
war that organizes and structures the order:   
 
Black people are a stolen people held in a colonial status on stolen land, 
and any analysis which does not acknowledge the colonial status of 
black people cannot hope to deal with the real problem . . . Black 
power must be viewed as the projection of sovereignty, an embryonic 
sovereignty that black people can focus on and through which they can 
make distinctions between themselves and others, between themselves 
and their enemies—in short, between the white mother country of 
America and the black colony dispersed throughout the continent on 
absentee-owned land, making Afro-America a decentralized colony.16 
 
For Cleaver, any analytic framework that ignores the status of black people as 
stolen and colonial ‘cannot hope to deal with the real problem.’  In the face of 
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normative theories of legitimation whose task is to conceal, rationalize, erase, 
and justify the war that rages just beneath the calm order of liberal democracy, 
Cleaver argues, the ‘black colony’ cannot articulate a liberatory claim against 
the order without a counter-hegemonic knowledge of the enslavement of black 
people. In ‘Political Prisoners, Prisons, Black Liberation,’ Angela Davies provides 
an incisive articulation of the discursive criminalization of the black body and its 
official association with aggression and danger.17 Reflecting on the necropolitical 
logic of the race-war and the role of the legal order within that racist war, she 
writes, ‘For the black individual, contact with the law enforcement-judicial-
penal network, directly or through relatives and friends, is inevitable because 
he or she is black.’18 The logic that organizes and structures the legal apparatus 
is necropolitical—a logic that deploys the ‘law enforcement-judicial-penal 
network’ as a tactic to expose the black body to the risk of death.19  Here is 
Angela Davis:  
 
Whenever blacks in struggle have recourse to self-defense, particularly 
armed self-defense, it is twisted and distorted on official levels and 
ultimately rendered synonymous with criminal aggression. On the other 
hand, when policemen are clearly indulging in acts of criminal 
aggression, officially they are defending themselves through ‘justifiable 
assault’ or ‘justifiable homicide.’20 
 
The law and its judicial and penal apparatus have the primary function of 
preserving the political economic interests of the ruling class by mishearing 
their voice, misrecognizing their claims, and deliberately misrepresenting 
their discourse. Within this exclusionary frame, the identity of the subject 
before the law determines how the law codes a particular conduct. Here is 
Davis Again: 
 
 […] The political act is defined as criminal in order to discredit radical 
and revolutionary movements. The political event is reduced to a 
criminal event in order to affirm the absolute invulnerability of the 
existing order. […] As the black liberation movement and other 
progressive struggles increase in magnitude and intensity, the judicial 
system and its extension, the penal system, consequently become key 
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weapons in the state’s fight to preserve the existing conditions of class 
domination, therefore racism, poverty, and war.21 
 
Davis’s critique of ‘law and order’ as an extension of this ‘racist colonial war’ 
exposes the biological logic that prefigures and animates the activation of the 
legal system. As a result of this necropolitical logic, the system criminalizes 
politics and politicizes crime to rejuvenate law’s gate-keeping functions. The 
political deployment of law functions to reduce the ‘political event’ into a 
‘criminal event,’ affirming the absolute invulnerability of the existing order.’22 
Within this institutionally racist framework, black folks enter the litigation 
landscape in a conflict in which their idiom of conflict is not signified and their 
genre of discourse excluded.   
 
George Jackson is the BPP’s Field Marshall, who, along with Huey Newton, 
elaborated the notion that ‘politics and war are inseparable in a fascist state.’23 
Writing from within Maximum Security Unit at Soledad Prison, a disciplinary 
space that he sought to transform, with some success, into a site of political 
organizing, Jackson launches a counter-historical attack against American 
sovereignty. He wrote: 
 
The prestige of power at its maturity is a thing that will prevent people 
from acting against that power. This pig is a psychological thing, a state 
of being wherein the bourgeoisie[’s] reign of terror need not rely on 
violence to sustain itself. It’s relying on something that happened in the 
past, or some accomplishment, or some, let’s say, coup, that went 
down in the past, where it secured itself . . . So, consequently, our first 
attack is on the prestige of power . . . destroy the prestige of power, 
the iconoclastic act of crushing symbols . . . Because […] after the 
destruction of the prestige of power, power will be forced to revert 
back to its original force, raw brute force—violence.24 
 
This, then, is a counter-history that conceives law and order as a continued 
codification of founding violence into laws and institutions. From the 
Declaration of Independence to the US Constitution, from the slave codes to the 
Black Codes and Jim Crow Laws, from chattel slavery to economic slavery, the 
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terror inscribed in these laws, Jackson claims,  ‘need not rely on violence to 
sustain itself.’25 It thrives on past events whose violence has become rational 
and legitimate. Jackson’s is, to use Foucault’s formulation, a revolutionary 
discourse that interprets ‘the dissymmetries, the disequilibriums, the injustice, 
and the violence that functions despite the orders of laws, beneath the order of 
laws, and through and because of the order of laws.’26 Jackson’s account of 
sovereign violence is consistent with Foucault’s account of power and counter-
history. In a passage that encapsulates the core of a counter-historical 
discourse, Foucault begins by asking this question: ‘What is this discourse 
saying?’: 
 
Well, I think it is saying this: […] Law is not pacification, for beneath 
the law, war continues to rage in all the mechanisms of power, even 
the most regular. War is the motor behind institutions and order. In 
the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war. To put it 
another way, we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath 
peace; peace itself is a coded war.’27 
 
Foucault identifies counter-history as ‘Leviathan’s strategic opposite number,’ a 
discourse that uses a ‘historical knowledge pertaining to wars, invasions, 
pillage, dispossessions’ and ‘the effect of all that, the effects of all these acts 
of war’ as both a ‘description’ and a ‘weapon’ in that struggle.28 While Jackson, 
writing before Foucault, conceived the ‘prestige of power’ in its historical 
context, ‘a state of being wherein the bourgeoisie’s reign of terror need not 
rely on violence to sustain itself,’ Foucault argued, ‘History is the discourse of 
power, the discourse of the obligations power uses to subjugate . . . the 
dazzling discourse that power uses to fascinate, terrorize, and immobilize.’29 
Whereas Jackson’s counter-history calls for the destruction of the symbols of 
power—’our first attack is on the prestige of power . . . destroy the prestige of 
power, the iconoclastic act of crushing symbols’; the theorist of power relations 
and techniques of domination regards the practice of counter-history as ‘a 
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decisive displacement within the exercise of power.’30 As a counter-historical 
subject, what Foucault refers to as the new subject of history, Jackson rejects 
normative theories of legitimation and denounces law as domination.31 He 
claims that ‘the ultimate expression of law is not order—it’s prison.’32 Indeed, 
when Foucault writes of the counter-historical subject as a subject who sees 
‘the  State apparatuses, the laws, the power structures’ as the very instruments 
power uses to pursue and subjugate them, he is most probably referring to the 
likes of George Jackson and the Black Panthers who transformed prisons and the 
penal discourse into a counter-discourse.33 In an essay titled ‘Foucault and the 
Black Panthers,’ Brady Heiner provides an interesting critique of Foucault, 
accusing him for concealing ‘the genealogy of his own genealogies.’34 Whatever 
the genealogy of Foucault’s genealogies, there are striking similarities between 
Foucault’s 1976 lectures and the BPP’s philosophy and practice of counter-
history.   
 
Contrasting this historicist analytics of law and sovereignty with the juridical 
analysis of the prosecutor, the judge and the lawyer, Foucault presents counter-
history as a discourse ‘whose nature will allow it to get outside right, to get 
behind right and to slip into its interstices.’35 Extending this discourse to the 
sphere of the courtroom, Seale registered a destabilizing surprise against the 
court by crushing one of the most enduring and revered symbols of American 
sovereignty. He told the judge: ‘You have George Washington and Benjamin 
Franklin sitting in a picture behind you, and they was [sic] slave owners. That’s 
what they were. They owned slaves. You are acting in the same manner, 
denying me my constitutional rights being able to cross-examine this witness.’36 
By using the judge’s usurpation of his speaking position as a point of departure, 
Bobby Seale at once invokes and contests rights, he denounces and claims 
authority. But most importantly, he uses his subject-position as a black man and 
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a defendant ‘to get outside right, to get behind right and to slip into its 
interstices.’ Before I proceed further, let me provide a background to set the 
scene.   
 
8.3.  Background: Setting the Scene 
The year was 1968 and the scene was a federal courtroom in Chicago. The 
last week of August was a Convention week in Chicago. The city was bracing 
itself for an influx of delegates, activists, anti-war movements, 
environmentalists, and other interest groups who saw the Democratic 
National Convention as an important occasion to draw the spotlight on the 
ongoing Vietnam War, institutionalized racism and social injustice.37 Bobby 
Seale, the Chairman of the Black Panther Party joined seven other white 
activists who later became his co-defendants. While Bobby Seale hails from a 
ghetto in Oakland, California, the seven defendants were white middle class 
men active in the counter-culture movement that calls itself the ‘Yippies.’ 38  
They are in Chicago to stage what they called a ‘Festival of Life’; a 
celebration of life through music, art and poetry to highlight the moral and 
social malaise dividing the American body-politic along binary lines. Chicago 
witnessed a brutal crackdown on protestors.39 
 
Despite the Walker Commission’s finding that it was the police, not the 
protestors, which rioted during the convention week,40 the government 
announced a carefully crafted criminal charge against eight leaders that 
represented the various spectrums of the dissent of the 1960s. The charge 
was ‘conspiracy to cross state lines to incite a riot.’41 On 24 September 1969, 
the trial began in the Federal District Court in Chicago before a jury of eight 
white women, two black women, and two white men.42 Bobby Seale was 
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dragged into the conspiracy indictment as part of FBI’s ongoing mobilization 
of the legal system, according to FBI’s declassified information, ‘to expose, 
disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of Black 
Nationalist.’43  
 
Early in September of 1969, Charles Garry, a California based attorney who 
successfully represented Black Panthers in the past, filed a motion on behalf of 
Bobby Seale. Shortly before the preliminary hearing, Garry was admitted to 
hospital for gallbladder surgery. During the pre-trial hearing, Seale filed a 
handwritten motion asking the judge to postpone the trial until the attorney of 
his choice, Charles Garry, recovers from the surgery. The Judge rejected the 
motion, claiming that ‘Mr. Seale has counsel’ of record.’44 Judge William 
Hoffman was referring to a pro tem notice of appearance filed by William 
Kunstler (one of the attorneys for the other co-defendants) to see Mr. Seale in 
prison. Seale informed the court that he has no intention of retaining William 
Kunstler as his attorney. Pointing to Kunstler, he said, ‘That man is not my 
lawyer, he doesn’t speak for me.’45 He went on to say that ‘I will speak for 
myself. They can’t speak on behalf of myself. I still want to defend myself, and 
I know I have a right. I just want to let him know. That racist, that fascist! You 
know, the black man tries to get a fair trial in this country. The United States 
Government, huh. Nixon and the rest of them! Go ahead and continue. I’ll 
watch and get railroaded.’46  
 
Despite Seale’s persistent objection and public dismissal of Kunstler, the Judge 
continued to insist that Kunstler remains Seale’s attorney of record. Frustrated 
and outraged with Judge Hoffman’s tyrannical and racist tendencies, Kunstler 
told the court: ‘I want the record to quite clearly indicate that I do not direct 
Mr. Seale in any way. He is a free independent black man who does his own 
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direction.’47 Citing a Supreme Court precedent and the Canons of Professional 
Ethics, Kunstler went so far as arguing that ‘the Constitution does not force a 
lawyer upon a defendant. He may waive his Constitutional rights to assistance of 
counsel if he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open’ and 
that ‘it is essentially unethical for the lawyer to continue to represent Seale.’48 
Again, the Court rejected Kunstler’s motion.  
 
In late October, Seale filed another motion – this time requesting the court to 
exercise his constitutional right to self-representation. Again, the Judge denied 
the motion, claiming that ‘the complexity of the case makes self-representation 
inappropriate and the defendant would be more prejudiced were he allowed to 
conduct his own defense than if his motion were to be denied.’49 Seale 
protested the court’s denial of his motion in an even more disruptive manner, 
questioning the racist subtext underneath the judge’s reasoning: ‘Black people 
ain’t supposed to have a mind? That is what you think. We got a body and a 
mind. I wonder, did you loose yours in the Superman syndrome comic books 
stories? You must have, to deny us our constitutional rights.’50 Throughout the 
trial, until Seale was gagged and bound to the chair and ultimately severed from 
the case, Judge Hoffman refused to recognize his claims to representation and 
self-representation.  
 
Seale uses this violence of usurpation, a wrong that deprives him of the logos 
(as speech and account) that constitute the trial’s normative architecture, not 
only to demonstrate the contingency of equality—the equality of speaking 
beings—but also to destabilize the logic that determines the relationship 
between the parties. Using this episode of usurpation, Seale creates a line of 
flight into the founding violence of usurpation that dispossessed black people of 
the logos essential to be a part of the American body-politic. 
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8.4.  ‘Calling to Account’: The Usurpation of the Defendant’s 
Speaking Position  
 
In the second volume of ‘The Trial on Trial,’ the editors begin their introduction 
with three questions central to the legitimacy of the criminal trial.51 They asked 
the question of ‘who is to be called to account, by whom, and by what 
standards?’  Why does it matter for any normative community to ‘call anyone to 
account,’ instead of establishing the defendant’s guilt for these are two 
different issues? And what it is that ‘constitutes an account of the appropriate 
kind?’52 The standard response to the first question is that a political community 
calls to account one of its members (the defendant) before its courts in 
accordance with norms the community has given itself.53 Dismissing this 
standard response as inadequate and problematic, they argue that the notion of 
‘calling to account’ captures the trial’s normative commitment to defendants, 
‘as responsible agents and as citizens . . . to treat them as subjects who must 
be allowed to speak for themselves.’54 Calling to account means to treat the 
suspect ‘as addressors as well as addressees of the norms that the trial is to 
apply, who must be allowed a voice in the interpretation of those norms.’55 If 
there is a normative ring to the notion of ‘calling to account,’ it is the right of 
the defendant to be allowed to give an account of himself and the dispute in 
which he is named as a party. They argued, ‘calling to account carries a 
normative ‘expectation that [defendants] ought to answer the charge and offer 
an account of themselves.’56  
 
It is interesting to note that the expectation to offer an account is a necessary 
corollary of the ‘duty to answer the charge’ once the state has established a 
prima facie case.57 According to this paradigm, the defendant has no duty to 
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give an account but if he decides to contest the charges, he has the right to 
explore every angle to provide exculpatory evidence on his behalf. Contrary to 
these normative expectations, Bobby Seale was called to account but denied 
the benefit of what the notion of being called to account entails. He is usurped 
of his speaking position – the right to give account of himself and the conflict, 
the right to confront the witness and contest the charges. He is made 
unspeakable and uncountable but nevertheless continued to be counted as a 
party, what Agamben calls ‘exclusive inclusion.’58  
 
But if calling to account also means to regard the defendant as ‘an addressee 
and an addressor of the norms by which she is judged,’ how does Judge Hoffman 
justify his authority to call those they excluded and marginalized to account 
before the very order that oppressed and marginalized them? With the 
announcement of the dispute in which he is counted as a party and called to 
account for the wrongs he has committed against the community, Seale assumes 
a new subject position and enters a new relationship with the community. He is 
silenced and rendered unspeakable. Seale also raises a different problematic – 
he does not regard himself as an equal member of the ‘we’ that called him to 
account. In response to this double wrong that mutes his speaking position and 
still continues to treat him as defendant, Seale reconfigures the space in which 
he is named as defendant, contests the nature of the conflict, and renames 
himself in ways that breaks with the original configurations. 
 
By shifting the focus from the conflict proper to the violence of usurpation, 
Seale performs the impossibility of communication and understanding between a 
black body and a system that refuses to acknowledge them as speaking beings, 
that counts them as uncountable. Throughout the trial, Seale managed to 
redirect the exchange from the dispute named in the indictment to the 
distribution of speaking positions, to the logic that governs the term of visibility 
and hearing, the order that structures the modes of being, doing, and acting.59 
He rejects the court’s authority to deprive him of the very condition of 
                                         
58
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1998), 107.  
59
 Jacques Rancière, Dis-agreements: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), 29. 
229 
 
  Chapter 8: Bobby Seale 
intelligibility as a person before the law. He says: ‘The Court has no right 
whatsoever. The Court has no right to stop me from speaking out in behalf of 
my constitutional rights . . . to speak out in behalf of myself and my legal 
defense.’60 Insofar as I am not granted the benefit of the law as a defendant in a 
criminal trial, Seale contends, ‘I am not a defendant.’61 He protests his count as 
‘defendant,’ takes account of it as a miscount, renames the conflict a ‘railroad 
operation,’ ‘an attempt to smash and destroy loyalty to his doctrine and 
group.’62 In fact, in those motions denied by the court, Seale signed his name 
not ‘Bobby Seale, Defendant’; but ‘Bobby Seale, Chairman, Black Panther 
Party.’63 Not only this, Seale refused to respect court rituals, suggesting that his 
obedience and respect to the law presupposes reciprocity on the part of the 
judge to count him as a member of the polis. He said, ‘I am not rising for him, 
why should I rise for him, he is not recognizing my rights.’64 Seale transgresses 
the original configuration that structures the debate between the ‘part’ and the 
‘non part’: he exonerates himself from the duty to obey the judge until the 
judge recognizes him as a being capable of speech and account.  
 
In ‘Dis-agreements,’ Rancière begins at the beginning of political philosophy, 
going back to Aristotle and Ancient Greece, to the Patricians and the Plebeians 
of Antiquity, to retrieve ‘the logos proper to politics.’65 By making an analytic 
distinction between police and politics, Rancière deploys the idea of equality of 
men qua speaking beings (a speech that expresses and an account that may be 
taken of that speech) as the site of politics proper. He writes, ‘Nothing is 
political in itself for the political only happens by means of a principle that does 
not belong to it: equality.’66 Rancière is here referring to the equality of beings 
qua speaking positions. Police is the name Rancière gives to what we ordinarily 
call politics, to the rules and ‘set of procedures whereby the aggregation and 
consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution 
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of places and roles.’67 Police is a system of legitimization and distribution; the 
distribution of ‘an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, 
ways of being, and ways of saying,’ it is an order of the visible and the sayable 
that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech 
is understood as discourse and another as noise.’68  
 
Police, Rancière says, is ‘essentially the law,’ which determines the terms for 
activating its space, the conditions under which admission is granted or 
indefinitely deferred, the terms under which one appears before the law, within 
its coordinates, in the material, temporal and spatial sense of the term. As 
Agamben writes, ‘the open door destined only for [the man from the country] 
includes him in excluding him and excludes him in including him. And this is 
precisely the summit and the root of every law.’69 Seale is included on strictly 
exclusive terms. He is counted as a miscount, rendered incapable of 
enunciation. The denial of the equality of men qua speaking positions assumed 
by law does not register as usurpation in law. In other words, law does not take 
account of Seale’s claims, and counts it as ‘uncountable’ both in the 
Agambenian and Rancièrean schemas. The treatment accorded Bobby Seale as a 
defendant is reminiscent of the Patrician’s distribution of speaking positions. 
‘The order that structures patrician domination,’ Rancière writes, ‘recognizes 
no logos capable of being articulated by beings deprived of logos, no speech 
capable of being proffered by nameless beings, beings of no ac/count.’70 For the 
judge and the prosecution, Seale is simply unspeakable and un-hearable. Just as 
the Patricians order of domination mishears the voices of the Plebs and 
recognizes it as ‘noise,’ the judge refers to Seale’s ‘uncountable’ interventions 
as ‘noise,’ ‘outburst,’ ‘disruption,’ ‘shrieking,’ etcetera.71  
 
Politics for Rancière begins with the appearance of a major wrong that breaks 
even with the logic of the police; with the unfolding of ‘the gap created by the 
empty freedom of the people between the arithmetical order and the geometric 
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order.’72 Politics occurs by the interruption and subversion of the logic that 
organizes and structures the modes of being, doing, and acting inscribed by the 
system. Commenting on Rancière’s account of politics, Slavo Zizek observes: 
‘political conflict designates the tension between the structured social body in 
which each part has its place, and ‘the part of no part’ which unsettles this 
order on account of the empty principle of universality – of what Balibar 
calls égaliberté, the principled equality of all men qua speaking beings.’73  
 
Using the system’s own presumption of equality of ‘all men qua speaking beings’ 
as his point of departure, Seale reconfigures the space in which ‘parties, parts, 
or lack of parts have been defined’ to expose the wrong suffered by those ‘who 
have no right to be counted as speaking beings.’ In this reconfiguration, Seale 
disrupts the logic that structures and regulates the mode of being, doing and 
saying in the system. He is transforming the black body from the realm of 
invisibility to visibility, from a being without logos to one capable of speech and 
account, disrupting the logic central to the harmonious operation of the system. 
In short, Seale is simply reinventing African American subjectivity a new, 
activating politics at a site where politics is deactivated.  
 
If, as Rancière claims, ‘Political activity is whatever shifts a body from the place 
assigned to it or changes a place's destination,’ Seale’s refusal of his 
interpellation as a ‘defendant,’ his designation of the conflict as a ‘railroad 
operation,’ and his designation of himself as ‘Chairman of the Black Panther 
Party’ is an act of political activity that destabilizes the logic of the police.74 
Like the Plebeians who transgressed the instituted logic of interaction and gave 
account of themselves, Seale uses this miscount to make account of black 
subjectivity, not as ‘noise’ or ‘outburst,’ but as ‘counter-discourse.’ As we will 
see in the following, Seale uses this fundamental wrong, this incommensurable 
planted at the heart of ‘the distribution of speaking bodies,’ not to demand 
reparation, not even to recover his speaking position, but to activate politics, to 
demand the right to politics. 
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8.5. Between ‘Slave-Owners’ and ‘Founding Fathers’: the 
Genealogy of the Constituent Moment  
Genealogy is not concerned with surface problems. It is concerned with depth 
problems whose effects are right all across the surface.75 Genealogy does not 
seek to discover self-evident truth or stable foundation. Indeed, it assumes that 
there are no essential truths and stable foundations—no absolutes, and no 
essential identities behind beings.76 Beneath the ‘measured truths’ of 
metaphysics and humanist meta-narratives, genealogy excavates the modes of 
reasoning and systems of thought by which the stability and absolute of the 
present is ‘fabricated in a piecemeal fashion out of alien forms.’77 Through a 
rigorous attention to historical inquiry and ‘physical materiality,’ genealogy 
investigates the ways by which distinctions between good and evil, guilt and 
innocence, reason and unreason, is made. It records the historical 
correspondence of truth with a ‘truthful discourse’ and in the process unravels 
the ways by which the subject constitutes himself as the object of knowledge, 
truth, and power.78 Drawing on Nietzsche, Foucault writes, ‘truth is undoubtedly 
the sort of error that cannot be refuted because it has hardened into an 
unalterable form in the long baking process of history.’79  
 
‘The role of genealogy,’ Foucault says, ‘is to record its history: the history of 
morals, ideals, and metaphysical concepts, the history of the concept of liberty 
or of the ascetic life.’80 The genealogist operates along a ‘field of entangled and 
confused parchments’; revealing haunting contingencies, discontinuities and 
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heterogeneities that ‘deprive the self of the reassuring stability of life and 
nature.’81  
 
Genealogy is particularly interested in stories of origin and ‘the meaning hidden 
in an origin.’82 By rejecting the juridical truths of origin as axiomatic, the 
genealogist infiltrates its abyss, examines the formative history of origin and the 
system of meaning presupposed by its truth83, thus, unraveling the ‘proliferation 
of errors,’ strange singularities, and visible linkages that contingently articulate 
its coherence.84 By infiltrating these hardened truths and juridical constructions, 
effective history hijacks juridical concepts to turn them against those who used 
them as a mask for power; ‘invert their meaning, and redirect them against 
those who had initially imposed them.’85 In the scene that follows, Bobby Seale 
deploys a genealogical knowledge of the American founding fathers to expose 
the violent and ‘surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules, which in itself 
has no essential meaning’ to ensure the continuity and stability of the present. 
Here is an exchange that took place in the morning of 29 October 1969 that is 
genealogical in design and effect:86 
 
Mr. Seale: Before the re-direct, I would like to request again—demand, that I 
be able to cross-examine the witness. My lawyer is not here. I think 
I have the right to defend myself in this courtroom. 
The Court: Take the Jury out. They may go to lunch with the usual order 
Mr. Seale: You have George Washington and Benjamin Franklin in a picture 
sitting behind you, and they were slave owners. That is what they 
were. They owned slaves. You are acting in the same manner 
denying me my constitutional rights, being able to cross-examine 
this witness.  
The Court: Mr. Seale, I have admonished you previously— 
Mr. Seale: I have a right to cross-examine the witness. 
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The Court:      —what might happen to you if you keep on talking. 
The Court: We are going to recess now, young man. If you keep this up— 
Mr. Seale:      Look, old man, if you keep up denying me my constitutional 
rights, you  are being exposed to the public and the world that you 
do not care about people’s constitutional rights to defend 
themselves. 
The Court: I will tell you that what I indicated yesterday might happen to 
you— 
Mr. Seale: Happen to me? What can happen to me more that what Benjamin 
Franklin and George Washington did to black people in slavery? 
What can happen to me more than that? 
The Court: And I might add . . . I might conclude that they [the other 
defendants] are bad risks for bail . . .  
Mr. Seale: I still demand my constitutional rights as a defendant in this case 
to defend myself. I demand the right to be able to cross-examine 
this witness. He has made statements against me and I want my 
right to— 
The Court:  Have him sit down, Mr. Marshal. 
Mr. Seale:   I want my constitutional rights. I want to have my constitutional 
rights. How come you don’t recognize it? How come you won’t 
recognize my constitutional rights? I want to have the right to 
cross-examine that witness. 
 
This is the high watermark of Seale’s deployment of liberationist counter-history 
in the re-subjectification of African Americans- as subjects of wrong. Against 
the master-narrative by which the past is legitimized, Seale transforms black 
subjectivity and agency from a place previously assigned to it by the system, 
and gives it voice: ‘it makes heard a discourse where once there was only place 
for noise; it makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as 
noise.’87 By getting outside the juridical framework, by getting outside right and 
beyond right, the man ‘before the law’ draws attention to the cries of chattel 
slavery that can be heard beneath the surface of democratic capitalism. Sudden 
and unexpected, Seale’s counter-hegemonic account of American history 
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tarnished and eclipsed the uncontested glory of the founding fathers. By shifting 
from level to the meta-level, from claims over rights to the criminal origin of 
the political order, he enables a site of fundamental wrong—the founding 
moment—‘at the heart of the distribution of speaking positions.’ 
 
Speaking of the politics of this site, Foucault writes: 
 
From the vantage point of an absolute distance, free from the restraints 
of positive knowledge, the origin makes possible a field of knowledge 
whose function is to recover it, but always in a false recognition due to 
the excesses of its own speech. The origin lies at a place of inevitable 
loss, the point where the truth of things corresponded to a truthful 
discourse, the site of a fleeting articulation that discourse has obscured 
and finally lost.88 
 
Like every other nation, the United States of America is a construct of grand 
historical narratives. Its history is ‘the history of power as told by power itself’; 
a history that presupposes and reinforces the truth of this originary site. It is a 
history of sovereignty that inscribes, as Foucault says, ‘rights marked by 
dissymmetry,’ ‘a truth bound up with relationship of force, a truth-weapon and 
a singular right.’89 Within this framework, the fact that the majority of 
America’s prominent founders such as Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, 
and Benjamin Franklin held slaves is silently erased from mainstream American 
historiography.90 This historical knowledge which is ‘local,’ ‘regional,’ and 
‘incapable of unanimity,’ one that is ‘present in the functional and systematic 
ensembles,’ is systematically hidden and marginalized, and hence not ‘a 
common knowledge.’91  
 
Seale’s spontaneous reactivation of this resentful knowledge at that particular 
moment shifts the loci of contestation from the decisional aspects of law and 
rights to the normative legitimacy of the order and its systems of knowledge 
and meaning. This ‘site of a fleeting articulation,’ as Foucault calls it, where 
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those who refused to recognize and acknowledge the black body as an equal 
speaking being, inscribed a grid of intelligibility and a field of knowledge that 
continued to count them as uncountable. Seale’s genealogical intervention 
discloses a wrong that, in and of itself, in its very proclamation, gives account 
of the black body, as uncountable. Against the usurpation of his speaking 
position, Seale imports this fundamentally aporetic history to establish a direct 
link between founding usurpations and the particular usurpation of his voice by 
the judge. In so doing, Seale uses the resources offered by the system to filter 
into the courtroom some of the salient counter-historical narratives of his Party. 
Consistent with the BPP’s ideology and mode of critique, Seale draws straight 
line between the founding fathers that enslaved and disposed his forefathers 
and the present order that refuses to recognize and acknowledge the black male 
body as an equal speaking being. He accuses America’s founding father for 
moral failing –’They owned slaves—and draws a straight-line between that 
history and the history of the present by holding the judge responsible for the 
same moral crisis that inaugurated the nation’s founding: ‘You are acting in the 
same manner, denying me my constitutional rights being able to cross-examine 
this witness’92. 
 
By pointing out the powerful performative and symbolic force of the images of 
slave-owning founding fathers; Seale’s intervention attempts to find a register 
for a narrative that exposes the dazzling history of the founding fathers as 
contingent and contested. By bringing this contradiction placed at the very 
heart of the justice system, Seal’s counter-history shatters the illusion that 
slavery and racism are practices of a bygone era. By using counter-history as an 
interruptive discourse, Seale is exposing the various discursive and non-
discursive ensembles woven together to mask the contingency and complexity 
that lies beneath the received history of the founding fathers. 
 
By identifying Judge Hoffman with the founding fathers responsible for 
inscribing slavery into laws and institutions, including courts where Blackman is 
supposed to seek justice, Seale’s counter-history aims at dislocating juridical 
universality. By introducing an element of heterogeneity that disturbs the 
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coherent history of the founding fathers, his intervention seeks to cut the hinge 
between this history and the present that reinvigorates and validates itself by 
reference to this history. In ‘The Beginning of Politics,’ Rancière argues, ‘the 
wrong by which politics occurs is not some flaw calling for reparation. It is the 
introduction of an incommensurable at the heart of the distribution of speaking 
bodies.’93 By reactivating historical knowledges of enslavement and servitude for 
which he holds George Washington and Benjamin Franklin responsible, Seale 
introduces the incommensurable into the juridical domain which supplies the 
raw material for continued usurpation of his speaking position.  
 
In targeting this portrait, Seale is not merely interested in pointing out the 
contingent foundations of his period; he is problematizing the regulative and 
constitutive conditions of his period with the view to doing something with that 
problematization. By referring to the moral and ethical crisis revealed by 
America’s intense celebration of slave owning founding fathers, Seale’s 
intervention breaks the linkage between the glorious past of the founding 
fathers and the legitimacy of the present social order. But still, the object of his 
intervention remains the political practices of his time, not the past. By cutting 
that linkage, replacing the continuity thesis with the colonial thesis and a 
postulate of heterogeneity, Seale’s discourse exposes the great concealing, 
neutralizing and ultimately legitimizing impulses of law and justice, the illusions 
of truth and fairness they project. By tying this usurpation to the broader 
history that ‘miscounts’ the parts—in this case by celebrating the founding 
fathers responsible for subjecting black people to humanity’s most offensive 
indignities, he situates the public in direct contradiction with its professed 
values and principles.94 In this, he reveals slavery as something existentially tied 
to the American republic, and therefore as a ‘sign and signifier’ of the founding 
fathers. This then, is not the discourse of unity and continuity but of 
heterogeneity and discontinuity, what Foucault calls ‘a history of deciphering . . 
. and of the re-appropriation of a knowledge that has been distorted or 
buried.’95  
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8.6.  Liberationist Counter-history as Strategy of Rupture  
As ‘strategy of rupture,’ counter-history aims at suspending the continuity of 
hegemonic forms of knowledge, to interrupt its truth effects, to ‘cut it off from 
its empirical origin and its original motivations, cleanse it off its imaginary 
complicities.’96 In the context of trials, the phenomena of rupture denotes a 
disjuncture between law and justice, between what has been promised and 
upheld, between normative principles and actual practices and works to 
transform the gap into an event ‘on the stage of historical process.’97 As 
Christodoulidis argues, ‘the story of rupture unfold, in the way in which an act 
of resistance registers without being absorbed, integrated or co-opted into the 
system against which it stands.’98 Here is an exchange99: 
 
Mr. Seale: Since he made all of these statements, Can I say something to the 
Court? 
The Court: No, thank you. 
Mr. Seale: Why not? 
The Court: Because you have a lawyer and I am not going to go through that 
again. 
Mr. Seale:     He is not my lawyer. How come I can’t say nothing? He (the 
prosecutor)      had distorted everything, and it relates to the fact I 
have a right to defend myself. 
The Court: Well, I have been called a racist, a fascist,—he has pointed to the 
picture of George Washington behind me and called him a slave 
owner and – 
Mr. Seale: They were slave owners. Look at history. 
The Court: As though I had anything to do with that. 
Mr. Seale: They were slave owners. You got them up there. 
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The Court: He has been known as the father of this country, and I would think 
that it is a pretty good picture to have in the United States District 
Court. 
Mr. Kunstler:  We all share a common guilt, your Honor. 
The Court: I didn’t think I would ever live to sit on a bench or be in a 
courtroom where George Washington was assailed by a defendant 
in a criminal case and a judge was criticized for having his portrait 
on the wall. 
Mr. Kunstler: Your Honor, I am just saying the defendants are not for disruption. 
They are for peace. The judge of the court sits there and won’t let 
a codefendant have his attorney of record or defend himself. Then 
I have nothing further to say, your Honor. 
The Court: Bring in the Jury. 
 
In the afternoon of 29 October 1969, the same day as the previous scene, Judge 
Hoffman returns to that destabilizing point of his own free accord. At this point 
in the course of the trial, unauthorized interventions like ‘that man is not my 
lawyer,’ ‘I have the right to speak on behalf of my constitutional right,’ ‘I have 
the right to defend myself,’ ‘that man has distorted the point,’ have been 
pervasive. In response to what has been a familiar objection by the defendant, 
the judge tries to find a way of responding to what has been said in the 
morning: ‘Well, I have been called a racist, a fascist, — he has pointed to the 
picture of George Washington behind me and called him a slave owner . . . As 
though I had anything to do with that.’100 In this response, and the conversations 
that followed, we see an initiative by the judge to cement the fracture 
sustained by Seale’s temporal interruption of the history of the founding 
fathers. If ‘rupture registers in terms of a response it triggers,’ Judge Hoffman’s 
return to that point, not necessarily to deny, justify or defend the founding 
fathers but rather explain how the founding fathers ‘[have] been known in [the] 
country,’ is one such break that the system cannot repress nor contain within its 
economy of containment.101 Christodoulidis writes: ‘[A] rupture registers when 
an act appears incongruent to the logic of its representation, and with such 
                                         
100
 Id. 
101
 Christodoulidis, Against Substitution, 194. 
240 
 
  Chapter 8: Bobby Seale 
intensity that it cannot be domesticated nor ignored.’102 If the incongruity of the 
act ‘with the logic of its representation’ and the impossibility of domestication 
and containment constitutes the key features of rupture, I argue that this 
intervention satisfies these features.  
 
First, if the courtroom is conceived as a site of truth and justice elevated 
beyond politics, a site at which the descendents of the slave population seek 
truth and justice, the portraits are incompatible with the court’s normative 
inscription. The judge’s willingness to keep portraits of the founding ‘heroes’ in 
an institution that sits in judgment over the victims of the social order created 
by these ‘heroes’ is incongruent to the normative inscription of the court as 
impartial, neutral, independent, and just. By memorializing and recounting the 
history of founding fathers, the Judge is reinforcing the dominant narrative to 
generate power effects: the portraits not only ‘establish a juridical link 
between those men’ and the present, but also projects their dazzling image to 
guarantee the truth of the present.103 ‘The point of recounting history, the 
history of kings, the mighty sovereigns and their victories,’ writes Foucault, 
‘was to use the continuity of the law to establish a juridical link between those 
men and power, because and its workings were the demonstration of the 
continuity of the law itself.’104 Memorializing, i.e., ‘making them memorable’ at 
the site of truth and justice, inscribes their monumental deeds in discourse and 
illuminates a single side of their story forever; leaving the other in darkness.105 
This, I argue, is not only incongruent with the normative representation of a 
court of law as a site of justice; it is also a fundamental incommensurability the 
system cannot ‘domesticate.’ 
 
In reminding the Judge that they were slave owners and that the judge has not 
only accorded them pride of place in the present but also acted ‘in the same 
manner,’ Seale is establishing a link between the reinvigorating image projected 
by the portraits of the founding fathers and ongoing practices of political 
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marginalization and economic subordination of black people.106 Attentive to the 
antagonistic logic of disruptive counter-history, Seale intervenes quickly in 
response to Judge Hoffman’s attempt to distance himself from the guilt of 
slavery: ‘They were slave owners. You got them up there.’ By the time the 
judge returned to the issue with a measured tone, apparently ‘to recall the 
context’ and therefore domesticate the fracture—’He has been known as the 
father of this country, and I would think that it is a pretty good picture to have 
in the United States District Court’—it was too late. The imperative has already 
broken down, interrupted, and forced to enter a new time and a new normative 
status. By the judge’s own admission, the hanging of the portraits of the 
founding fathers in federal courtrooms is no longer an act of symbolic, political 
and historic significance. The dazzling and petrifying image they project into 
the courtroom, that juridical link and the continuity of law they help establish, 
and the truth effect it generates— all these symbolic values have been reduced 
by the representative of the system, the judge, into something of a mere 
aesthetic significance—’I would think that it is a pretty good picture to have in 
the United States District Court.’ This abrupt displacement of the imperative, I 
argue, marks a radical break with the past, a break that interrupts the 
continuity of the past that serve as a referent for the present. It is a break that 
constitutes an ‘event of rupture,’ what Derrida calls a force de rupture, and 
appears as an event ‘on the state of historical processes.’107  
 
In this historicization and re-politicization, in the purely political act of the 
reconfiguration of history, Seale creates an opportunity for an event of rupture. 
Seale’s counter history destabilizes the Judge’s discursive affirmation of the 
history of the founding fathers. By unravelling the dirty linen that resides just 
beneath the glorious history of founders, Seale’s account of the founding fathers 
represents a repudiation of the acts and gestures that legitimize it. By 
unearthing the contingencies surrounding the history of founders, exposing the 
violence that the visible order of law conceals, Seale’s intervention unmasks the 
stories these dazzling and petrifying portraits are meant hide.  
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Perhaps, we have seen a transformative effect of this rupture when William 
Kunstler, a subject that belongs, according to the logic of ‘black liberationist 
counter-history,’ to the hegemonic group, subscribes to Seale’s narrative of 
events: ‘We all share a common guilt, your Honor.’ The very subject that 
Seale’s ‘liberationist counter-history’ seeks to situate in ‘contradiction with its 
principles’ admits of such contradiction and pleads guilty as charged. It is a 
phenomenon of rupture that revealed the founding father and the social order 
they created as a sign and signifier of slavery, racism, and domination. It is this 
moment that exposed power for what it inherently is, a rupture that forced 
power, as Jackson argued ‘to revert back to its original force, raw brute force—
violence’—that led to one of the most politically vital events of that eventful 
trial: the stunning image of a gagged and bound Blackman in the 20th century 
American courtroom. 
 
8.7. The Legal Register as an Archive of Liberationist Counter-history 
 
My life existed somewhere in the liminal space between that which is recorded 
officially and that which remains officially off the record. I cannot begin to 
explain the pain of living a life with no record, where one breathes but there is 
no existence. 
 
—Yazir Henry 
 
So far, I have been reading Seale’s deployment of liberationist counter-history, 
not merely as a description of black political agency but also as a weapon of 
reconfiguration and wrestling of the past from the totalizing discourse of 
history. In this section, I want to focus on a different genealogical dimension of 
Seale’s strategy—his belligerent insistence to transform the legal record into an 
archive of liberationist counter-history. But before that, it is worth pausing to 
ask, why Seale is interested in filtering his narrative of history into the register 
of the system he denounces as racist and the record of an institution he 
condemns as a device of oppression? In what terms do these subversive 
narratives register? And why does he insist on getting into the register though 
his unauthorized voice registers only as contemptuous, as ‘noise’ against the 
hegemonic and privileged discourse of the state?  
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In her book, ‘The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in 
the Americas,’ Diana Taylor distinguishes between the archive and the 
repertoire.108 In Taylor’s performance genealogy, the archive ‘consists of objects 
such as documents, letters, archaeological remains, and maps—objects that 
seem ‘real,’ concrete, and able to transmit memory over space and time.’109 On 
the contrary, ‘repertoire’ consists of ‘performances, gestures, orality, 
movement, dance, singing—in short, all those acts usually thought of as 
ephemeral, nonreproducible knowledge.’110 Bobby Seale’s liberationist counter-
history is a performance of ‘repertoires of resistance,’ an ‘embodied counter-
history’ that deciphers ‘the disparities between history as it is discursively 
transmitted and memory as it is publicly enacted by the bodies that bear its 
consequences.’111 For ‘the part of no part,’ for this genealogical subject, the 
trial matters precisely because of the opportunity it affords for what Taylor 
refers to as a ‘repertoire of resistance.’112 
 
For Bobby Seale, if the demand for the recognition of his constitutional rights 
matter, it is not because redress is possible for this fundamental wrong in the 
courtroom. For those who are counted as uncountable, at once visible and 
invisible to the law, those whose history is at the interstices of the ‘officially 
recorded’ and those ‘officially off the record,’ the trial is an opportunity to 
contest and displace the ‘discursive practices of officially sanctioned history.’113 
More than anything else, Seale wanted to repurpose the trial and transform it 
into a narrative of power’s ‘lower depths,’ the racist violence that survived 
chattel slavery, and continued to animate American sovereignty and its 
institutions of justice. In denouncing American ‘law and order’ as a register of 
violence, Seale filters his discourse, and wrenches away the legal record from the 
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exclusive domain of the state; transforming it into an archive of liberationist 
counter-history. He insists: ‘Let the record show that Bobby Seale speaks out in 
behalf of his constitutional rights, his right to defend himself, his right to speak in 
behalf of himself in this courtroom.’114 Whether one reads his interventions as a 
‘noise,’ ‘shrieks,’ ‘pounding,’ ‘shouting,’ or a ‘disruptive act,’ in the sense the 
judge uses these terms115, or a counter-discourse, and legitimate objections by 
the defendant to protest the usurpation of his voice and offer an account of 
himself and his people, to claim the right to politics, Seale’s interventions have 
goal-objectives that transcend the Judge’s narrow preoccupation with contempt 
citations. Setting his genealogical critique of law, violence and racism against 
juridical conceptions of law and order, Seale insists on the record to 
institutionalize and conserve his narrative. Here is an exchange that captures the 
intensity with which Seale competed with the judge for a register in the same 
archive:116 
 
 
Mr. Seale: They don’t take orders from racist judges, but I can convey the 
orders for them and they will follow them. [Seale is referring to a 
group of Panthers in the spectators’ section.] 
The Court: If you continue with that sort of thing, you may expect to be 
punished for it. I warned you right through this trial and I warn you 
again, sir. 
 
‘Bring in the jury. 
Mr. Seale: We protested our rights for four hundred years and we have been 
shot and killed and murdered and brutalized and oppressed for four 
hundred years because of— 
The Court: There is another instance- that outburst may appear of record and 
it does. ‘Did you get it, Miss Reporter? 
The Reporter:  Yes, sir. 
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Mr. Seale: I hope you got my part for the record, too, concerning that. Did 
you get that, ma’am? 
The Reporter:  Yes, sir. 
MR. Seale: Thank you. 
The Reporter: And that outburst also. 
 
Mr. Dellinger: I think you should understand we support Bobby Seale in 
this—at least I do. 
The Court: I haven’t asked you for any advice here, Sir. 
 
Mr. Seale: All I have to do is clear the record. I want to defend myself in 
behalf of my constitutional rights. 
The Court: Let the record show that the defendant Seale has refused to be 
quiet in the face of the admonition and direction of the court. 
  
Mr. Seale: Let the record show that Bobby Seale speaks out in behalf of his 
constitutional rights, his right to defend himself, his right to speak 
in behalf of himself in this courtroom. 
 
 
In ‘Archive Fever: Freudian Impressions,’ Derrida traces the term ‘archive’ to the 
Greek word arkhe, a term that designates, at once, ‘the commencement and the 
commandment.’117 Arkhe, Derrida notes, operates according to two principles: 
‘the principle according to nature or history, there where things commence—
physical, historical, or ontological principle—but also the principle according to 
the law, there where men and gods command, there where authority, social 
order are exercised.’118 This is precisely what the legal record epitomizes.  It 
operates according to the principle of ‘nature or history’ and also ‘according to 
the law.’119 It exhibits the characteristic of a physical, historical or ontological 
site ‘where things commence’ and a law, according to which judges command, 
where magistrates exercise authority, on behalf of the social order they 
represent. As a guardian of the documents, the archon, Judge Hoffman in our 
                                         
117
 Jacques Derrida, Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression, 25 (2) Diacritics, 9 (1995), 9. 
118
 Id. 
119
 Id at 10. 
246 
 
  Chapter 8: Bobby Seale 
case, is charged with ensuring content and ‘the physical security of what is 
deposited and of the substrate.’120 Derrida argues, the archons, the judges who 
determine what legitimately belongs to the record, are ‘accorded the 
hermeneutic right and competence’- the authority to ‘interpret’ the documents 
that recall and state the law. Derrida further observes, ‘In an archive, there 
should not be any absolute dissociation, and heterogeneity or secret which could 
be separate (secernere), or partition, in an absolute manner.121  
 
The legal record is a reflexive site of consignation. It implies power, what Derrida 
calls the ‘power of consignation,’ the power not only ‘to consign’ as in deposit, 
but also the power to consign in the sense of ‘consigning through sign.’122 The 
archontic power presupposes the power to identify and arrange things in such a 
way that ‘all the elements articulate the unity of an ideal configuration.’123 
Whereas archives are reflexive registers that could ‘not be reduced to memory,’ 
the legal record embodies a unique reflexivity peculiar to its normative 
presuppositions. The normative assumption that underpins the trial denies the 
archons the exclusive monopoly over the archive. It imposes a limit on the 
archons,’ in our case the Court’s, authority to legitimately exclude certain 
contentions of the defendant. Seen from this angle, the legal record is a unique 
archive that admits of heterogeneity, and incongruity. Seale’s strategy here is 
not one of gathering together, but of gathering apart, not one of unification, but 
of fragmentation, introducing contingency, contradiction, and heterogeneity that 
sits incongruently to the homogenizing rituals of the courtroom. If the Court’s use 
of the legal record as a site of consignation is positivist and traditional; Seale’s 
appropriation of it is subversive and revolutionary.  
 
As I argued in chapter four, if the trial is a performative ritual moment that is 
‘repeated in time,’ ‘maintain a sphere of operation that is not restricted to the 
moment of utterance itself,’ if it at once ‘constitute and escape’ the particular 
instance of its speech, it is precisely because of the record.124 In order for 
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liberationist counter-history to shape the future, to reconfigure the present 
configurations of power, it must be consigned, instituted and conserved for that 
future. Derrida writes, ‘if there is no archive without consignation in an external 
place which assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of 
reproduction, or of re-impression, then we must also remember that repetition 
itself, the logic of repetition, indeed the repetition compulsion, remains, 
according to Freud, indissociable from the death drive.’125 When Seale claims that 
‘We protested our rights for four hundred years and we have been shot and killed 
and murdered and brutalized and oppressed for four hundred years’126, he is not 
offering this claim as a defense to the prosecution’s claim, he is transforming this 
black repertoire into an archive and crystallize the encounter with the state into 
what Judith Butler calls a ‘condensed historicity.’127 In this way, he not only 
conserves the past from ‘Freudian death drive’ but also bears witness to the 
emergence of a new African American subjectivity beneath the old.   
 
In the second part of ‘Archive Fever,’ Derrida reflects on the ‘institutive and 
conservative functions’ of archives:  
 
To cite before beginning is to give the key through the resonance of a few 
words, the meaning or form of which ought to set the stage. In other words, 
the exergue consists in capitalizing on an ellipsis. In accumulating capital in 
advance and in preparing the surplus value of an archive. An exergue serves 
to stock in anticipation and to prearchive a lexicon which, from there on, 
ought to lay down the law and give the order, even if this means contenting 
itself with naming the problem, that is, the subject.128 
 
It is here that one finds the clearest indication of why Seale competes with the 
archon that commands the ‘hermeneutic right,’ and the monopoly over the right 
of institutionalization, i.e., inscription according to longstanding juridico-political 
truths.129 Using the reflexivity of the legal record, Seale situates himself, 
incongruently, ‘to set the stage,’ to capitalize on contradictions and points of 
tension, to reject the categories and subject positions the law uses to code black 
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subjectivity. Working on those ‘entangled and confused parchments,’ Seale is 
pre-archiving the emergence of a new language, a new subjectivity, a new 
epistemic standard for ‘law’ and ‘justice’ to enhance counter-history’s ‘surplus 
value.’ It is precisely this transgressive and resentful logic that sees history as a 
‘calculation of forces,’ that conceives of ‘entangled and confused parchments’130 
as a counter-discourse and the real fabric of struggle that informed Seale’s 
unceasing cry to infiltrate this hermetically sealed space: ‘the domain of 
officialdom, the sanctum sanctorum of truth and justice.’131 He cries, ‘I want it 
for the record. I will present it myself in behalf of myself in my own defense.’  
 
Seale’s insistence on the record also suggests a certain genealogical sensibility 
towards a written sign, sensitivity towards a mark that subsists beyond its 
particular author. In ‘Signature Event Context,’ Derrida offers a brilliant 
illustration of the performativity of writing. He writes, ‘A written sign . . . is a 
mark that subsists, one which does not exhaust itself in the moment of its 
inscription and which can give rise to an iteration in the absence and beyond 
the presence of the empirically determined subject.’132 Although Derrida argues 
that this characteristic mark of language is not specific to a written sign, the 
possibility of the moment exceeding itself, its ability to be cited and reiterated, 
its potential to ‘escape the instance of its utterance,’ to be deployed in ‘new 
ways and at new sites’ depends on its dissociability from what Derrida calls ‘the 
death drive.’133 While its liberatory significance is always contingent on factors 
beyond his control, Seale’s strategy is driven by an immanent motive to 
document stories of struggles on the normative structures of the very system he 
denounces as racist and decadent. In importing into the courtroom these 
fractured stories, the ‘fissures, and heterogeneities’ of origin, Seale is trying to 
document for future invocations the perverse rationality that animates the truth 
of the system.  
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Speaking of the future and archive, Derrida notes, the question of archive is ‘a 
question of the future, the question of the future itself, the question of a 
response, of a promise and of a responsibility for tomorrow. The archive: if we 
want to know what that will have meant, we will only know in times to come.’134 
So at stake is not so much the past, not even the present, but the future, the 
future that is entangled with and shaped by present. Seale’s purpose here is to 
filter and accumulate as meticulously as possible, contingent fragments, traces 
and remainders that register incongruently to the ‘archival violence’ of the legal 
record. He speaks without the authority to speak: ‘Let the record show that 
Bobby Seale speaks out in behalf of his constitutional rights, his right to defend 
himself, his right to speak in behalf of himself in this courtroom.’  
 
Seale is here building a strategic knowledge of this power for future struggles. 
For those at the margin of politics, those whose knowledges are invalidated by 
systematized knowledge, the record is a weapon. Seale’s insistence to get into 
the register, despite the juridical categories under which it registers, suggests 
his acute awareness of the iterability of written juridical signs, its future 
potential to function ‘in the radical absence of every empirically determined 
receiver.’135 As ‘vectors of power and history,’ these destabilizing signs can be 
used, to use Karen Zevi’s formulations, ‘in new ways and at new sites and in 
ways that break with context, displacing the original meaning of a word or 
norm.’136 Seen from that point of view, the legal register becomes an 
unparalleled grid of the political trial generally and the conspiracy trial 
specifically. Seale seem to have understood this logic when he asked the 
stenographer for a confirmation: ‘I hope you got my part for the record, too, 
concerning that. Did you get that, ma’am?’137 
 
Just as tanks and cemeteries could become sites of reconfiguration and re-
function; the legal record can be, and it has been, reconfigured to function as a 
tool of ‘historical instruction and normative reconstruction.’ From the trial of 
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Socrates and Jesus of Nazareth to the heresy trials and the Inquisition of the early 
modern Europe, from the Amistad trials, to the trial of Susan Anthony, from the 
trials of Alfred Dreyfus to Nelson Mandela’s, the transcripts of these trials served 
as the most reliable impeachment of the nature and policies of their respective 
systems. Against the monopolizing tendencies of the judge, Seale intervenes 
without authority to consign a counter-hegemonic narrative of American 
sovereignty into the register of the system, incongruently so, to longstanding 
normative assumptions and premises undergirding American ‘law and order.’ By 
turning the moment of the trial into what Lawrence Douglas calls ‘didactic 
spectacles,’ superimposing pedagogic imperative, Seale here insists to institute 
his protest and above all his counter-hegemonic account of the founding fathers, 
and the biopolitical mobilization of law and order against blacks into the legal 
record.  
 
By unearthing ‘the battle cries that can be heard beneath’ America’s politics of 
rights and its system of justice, Seale wanted to make the battle over the 
‘record’ another important strategic grid of the conspiracy trial. In this scene, 
Seale accused the judge of racism and narrated his version of what the last 400 
years represented in political-historical terms: ‘We protested our rights for four 
hundred years and we have been shot and killed and murdered and brutalized 
and oppressed for four hundred years.’138 By tracing the violence of the state 
against the black population back to 400 years, Seale demystifies the juridical 
pretense of equality and implants this new history into existing orders of 
knowledge to reframe African American subjectivity and agency. The recounting 
of 400 years of murder, brutality, and oppression, is ‘not simply a matter of 
describing a relationship of force,’ it is a way of modifying ‘the very disposition 
and the current equilibrium of the relations of force.’139  
 
In disobeying and protesting this act of usurpation, Seale assigns a strategic role 
to the record, the only official register, and enlists it for his anti-racist and de-
colonization struggle. He uses the legal record to mark a break, a rupture in 
legality. Just as George Jackson, the BPP Field Marshall sought to transform the 
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prison system from ‘an apparatus that criminalizes and detains the radical 
community activists’ into a ‘tool for revolutionary mobilization’; Seale is here 
engaged in a transformative act of mobilizing the legal record as a reservoir of 
counter-historical knowledges for future deployment. Seale wanted the record 
to bear witness not so much to the denial of his Sixth Amendment rights but 
most fundamentally to the usurpation of black peoples’ speaking position as 
equal beings, to practices of racism and violence, and the role of the judiciary 
and the penal system in legitimizing and justifying them.  
 
He wanted the legal register to bear witness to the sorry state of affairs, to the 
deprivation of black people of the very condition of intelligibility as speaking 
beings, to show that the black population of the United States has never 
enjoyed the lofty ideals of the Declaration of Independence or the US 
constitution. Instead of protecting them, the constitution condemned them to a 
complex and invasive violence, at once epistemic and ontological. He denounces 
the Constitution as a tactical deployment against black and other oppressed 
people; situating them at its constitutive outside, on the periphery, outside its 
protection but within its jurisdiction. By pointing to the strategic function of the 
legal system in the rationalization and justification of this violence, Seale 
wanted to expose the system as racist and the court process as a continuation of 
a biological war by other means. Inasmuch as this trial is a battle over 
spectacle, for Seale, it is an archival project whose purpose is to institute into 
the public record, via courtroom speech acts, the fundamental wrongs that the 
discursive practices of history and memory represses and excludes.  
 
8.8. Conclusion 
By departing from forms of critique that are possible within the logos of the 
trial, Seale deploys a counter-historical and anti-hegemonic knowledge of 
American history to create immanent possibilities for change and 
transformation. His counter-history stages a public and discursive affirmation of 
a backstage discourse that cannot be asserted in the face of power: beneath the 
stable continuities of laws and orders, underneath the cohesive unity of subjects 
and the distribution of speaking positions, counter-history distills and unravels 
contingency, discontinuity, heterogeneity, complexity, and dissymmetry central 
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to an event rupture. Against the trial’s communicative distribution of speaking 
positions into defendants, prosecutions, jurors and courts, Seale reconfigures 
the space, exposes the communicative as strategic, names the conflict a 
‘railroad’ operation; a double-wrong, that at once accuses and usurps him of 
the right to contest the charges as a ‘defendant’ in criminal law. In accusing the 
system for depriving him of the very conditions of visibility and hearing, his 
discourse aims at exposing the disjuncture between the codified rights of the 
defendant and the systematic and selective denial of these rights to those who 
belong to ‘the part of no part,’ those whose very look evokes suspicion. 
 
While Judge Hoffman paralyzes Seale’s right to self-representation by resorting 
to gate-keeping juridical constructions, Seale switches his operation from the 
level of rules to the meta-normative question of origin- a moment that 
institutes a grid of intelligibility, encoding the rules of visibility and audibility 
that continue to animate our present. While the judge invokes functional legal 
technologies to contain the usurpation of Seale’s speaking position, and 
therefore mask the real conspiracy represented by the prosecution, Seale’s 
strategy is to use a discourse foreign to his adversaries, from a position of 
inequality, from the political margin, to expose and disrupt the system of 
colonization that undergirds the constitution and the laws of the nation.  Seale’s 
liberationist counter-history looks to rights and laws not to secure equality and 
justice but to displace the law, to expose the grand schema by which law 
secures inequality. He is interested in discovering, in the gulf that opens up 
between its normative undertakings and its visible practices, a raw material 
that generates ‘a contradiction that makes impossible a response in and by the 
system’—a rupture.  
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9. Summing Up: Toward a Performative Epistemology of 
Law and Resistance 
 
                                   Everything becomes and returns eternally 
 
                 Nietzsche, The Will to Power  
 
The cultural forms may not say what they know, not know what they 
say, but they mean what they do—at least in the logic of their praxis. 
 
                                                                  Paul Willis, Learning to Labour 
 
Two provisional theses emerge from this thesis. First, law and its discourses are 
performative par excellence. From the inauguration of the body-politic to the 
constitution of the legal subject, from the rituals of legislation to ceremonials of 
adjudication, law is performative: in both linguistic and discursive terms. A 
performative logic and mode of reasoning animates the ways in which law 
structures and organizes the juridical universe. It is central to law’s mode of 
self-production, its reception, and its effects. Though law lays claim to 
normativity, the normative in law is simply a metaphysical placeholder for the 
performative. Second, a performative epistemology of law creates conditions of 
possibility for a performative resistance in law. By revealing the contingency and 
complexity underlying the coherence, universality and normativity of the 
system, by disclosing the becoming central to sovereignty, the subject, and the 
political, a performative conception of law creates conditions of possibility for 
critique and political struggle. But before I proceed further, let me recapitulate, 
briefly, the central claims advanced in part one of the thesis. 
 
In chapter two, I tried to demonstrate how the constitutional state and the 
emergence of legality as an overriding legal principle ultimately dislodged the 
right to resistance from the political sphere. Resistance became illegal. At the 
same time, the institutions, forms of knowledge and rationalizations mobilized 
by the new techniques of power withdrew the subject’s desire for power and 
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entrenched a conception of law as rational, objective, autonomous, and neutral. 
Law came to be identified with the public exercise of reason. Working through 
Benjamin and Foucault’s historico-political analysis of law and sovereignty, I 
argued against the logic and forms of rationality that animates law’s 
depoliticizing tendencies. By transforming discontinuity into continuity, 
historicity into necessity, contingency into inevitability, singularity into 
universality, law effectively hides its salient features, its truths and its economy 
of power from its subjects. It is this truth of law that is forever anticipated but 
never definitively materialized that is central to law’s operational premise: 
closure and foreclosure. A normative account of law—law as value-neutral, 
objective, and autonomous—is not only incompatible with the historical, 
sociological, and political realities of foundations, legislations, and adjudications 
but also limits the possibility of becoming, foreclosing the future to possibilities 
of change and transformation. Once law is framed in these strongly normative 
terms—objective, neutral, rational, and absolute—, that presupposition imposes 
closure, limiting ways of being, speaking, and acting.  
 
In chapter three, I sought to offer a conception of law and sovereignty that 
breaks free with the normative claims of mainstream legal thought. I argued 
that law is performative at its key moments- origin, subject-formation, 
legislation, and adjudication. The fiction of foundations and the meaning hidden 
in them dehistoricizes sovereignty and depoliticizes law, concealing the 
antagonisms, battles, and usurpations that signifies its temporal and spatial 
existence. Through this performative logic, law grounds itself in invisible and 
empirically intangible presuppositions. By denying law’s inextricable nexus with 
history, politics, sociology, and economics, the normative turns its back to 
power, oppression, and injustice. By providing the performative logic that 
contingently conditions sovereignty and the subject, the two constitutive 
elements of politics, I put forth a performative epistemology of law that keeps 
the political open to ‘unprefigurable future significations.’ By offering an 
account of how sovereignty and subjectivity came to have the kind of reality 
they have, I demonstrated how the coherence, self-evidence and unity of these 
formations came into being and tried to open space for the possibility of being 
otherwise.  
 
255 
 
  Chapter 9: Summing Up 
Chapter four identified the political trial as specific moment that disrupts law’s 
claims to normativity, objectivity, and neutrality. By identifying the political 
trial as a crisis of law and sovereignty, as a moment where the submerged crisis 
of sovereignty appears all across the normative structures of the system, I 
suggested potential sites of intervention for political critique and struggle within 
the legal domain. By locating the political trial at the interstices of normativity 
and performativity, the point at which the performative meets the normative 
both to deconstruct it and reconstruct it, I tried to identify the power-
knowledge-discourse constellation that occupies its centre of gravity. 
 
The political trial is a limit situation. It operates in the material gap between 
the ‘normative elements of justice’ and ‘the concrete order’; the temporal gap 
between the submerged problems of the past and its surface manifestation; and 
the discursive tensions between Habermasian discursive politics and Foucauldian 
micro-politics. It is this liminality, this in-betweenness, and its relationships with 
strategy, knowledge, discourse, and power that makes the political trial such a 
convenient site of disruption, intervention, resignification, and transformation. 
 
In chapter five, I offered specific strategies and tactics of resistance that may be 
used to open up sites of resistance and struggle in the legal domain. Drawing on 
Foucault’s account of power and resistance, I suggested a conception of 
resistance as performative. Performative resistance resists not only the 
institutions of power but the notions, concepts and analytic frameworks, i.e., 
the knowledge system these institutions disseminate and its power effects. It 
historicizes and problematizes the very conceptual frameworks within which 
these thoughts occur. It resists the deliberative model, the procedures and 
rituals by which these discourses and frameworks generate effects of power. The 
framework is therefore as much an object of intervention as the content. If 
performative resistance is to open up thinking and acting space without 
unwittingly perpetuating the very power it resists, we must acknowledge the 
shackling bonds of language and the constructed reality of the present to begin 
to articulate resistance at the periphery; where both language and discourse are 
least stable and most vulnerable to subversive resignification. It is at the 
margin, away from the podium, that performative intervention creates a break 
between signification and context. Performative resistance pays attention to 
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that which normative thought forecloses, suppresses, authorizes, or produces. It 
intervenes precisely at sites and moments where these foreclosures, 
suppressions or authorizations are synchronized with the legal form to generate 
images and useful political concepts.   
 
If performativity, as Sedgwick put it, is ‘kinda hegemonic, kinda subversive,’ 
how can we escape the risk of perpetuating and sustaining the very power 
networks we seek to escape? If the claim is that performativity is central to the 
constitutive and regulative conditions of the present, what transformative 
opportunity can performative epistemology brings to bear on performances of 
resistance in law? 
 
Performative Epistemology  
 
First, a performative epistemology of law is crucial not only because it generates 
strategic knowledge of law and the power law produces and disseminates but 
also because it offers a theoretically and empirically intelligible substitute to 
the abstract and inaccessible juridical notions of law. If we look at law’s key 
moments—foundations, subjectification, legislations, and adjudication—a 
performative logic animates, generates and presents the normative specificity 
and reality of these moments. A performative epistemology seeks to break free 
from the essentialism of juridico-philosophic thought and tilts towards a 
historico-political conception of law, sovereignty, the subject, and the political. 
It attends to the historical, political, and sociological facts within which law is 
produced, understood, interpreted, and applied. It recognizes contingency, 
deconstructs the discursive practices by which law justifies, legitimizes, and 
objectifies its truths, and the various ways by which brute force-violence- came 
to be compatible with our political rationality. A performative epistemology of 
law designates the open-endedness of the constitutive and regulative conditions 
of the present, the indeterminacy of sovereignty and the irrepressible potential 
of the subject to be otherwise.  
 
Second, a performative reconceptualization of law attends to law’s schematics 
of closure and resuscitates its emancipatory potential. If the normative 
conception depletes law’s potential for liberation and transformation, 
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constraining and circumscribing its promise for freedom and dignity; 
performativity’s dissonant gestures break up law’s illusory rationality and 
objectivity without pretending to offer a much deeper reality and certainty. 
Attentive to cognitive and affective practices that bind the subject to 
disciplinary power-knowledge constellations, a performative epistemology 
contests the logos of the system against which it stands. It makes visible the 
political ontology of the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present. It 
deconstructs sovereignty, subjectivity, and politics as assemblages of 
‘contingent dispositif,’ revealing how their normativity and coherence is 
contingently articulated. As an explanation of the constitutive conditions of the 
present and its signifying forms, performativity deconstructs and reveals how 
sovereignty and subjectivity, and therefore politics, are constituted as natural 
and self-evident through performative iteration of an iterable code. To put it 
succinctly, performativity generates and presents law’s supposedly self-evident 
normativity and materiality as its exteriority.  
 
The explanatory offshoot is revealing: it reveals these three constellations as 
constructs, allowing those on the margin to appreciate how things came to have 
the kinds of reality they seem to have. It enables the subject to name the 
system as a system than a natural order that already is and cannot be otherwise. 
It reveals the order as performative and contingent than as constative and 
inevitable. By providing a line of flight into the constitutive and regulative 
conditions of the present; a performative epistemology keeps sovereignty, 
subjectivity and the political open to ‘unprefigurable future significations.’  
 
Questions still linger: if there can be no thinking without or outside language, as 
Theodore Adorno claims, or no understanding or articulation that takes place 
outside discourse, as Foucault argues, how can performativity escape the 
subjugating bonds of language and discourse? If one needs to work with concepts 
to capture the very conditions that constitute and regulate us, and especially 
when these concepts are implicated in what Butler and Athanasiou call 
‘authoritative forces of signification,’ how can we escape what the sign signifies?  
 
For many anti-essentialist theoreticians—Adorno, Foucault, Derrida, Butler, 
Giroux, McLaren—language precedes and exceeds the subject. It is always 
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already there, as a constitutive and regulative domain that structures the very 
act of thinking that is meant to resist language’s subjectification. However, as 
discussed in chapter three, both language and discourse carry their own 
transformative possibilities. As Adorno himself tell us, despite the subjugating 
confines of language and discourse within which thinking occurs, there is a 
potential for subversion in thinking: the particular refuses its subsuming under 
the general. Words, signs, and symbols engender a potential for reinscription 
and re-description. They can be re-inflected and redeployed in new ways, at 
new sites, and in ways that break with their signifying logic. Between 
signification and context, Derrida claims, there is a disjuncture that enters the 
social realm as a ‘trace element.’ There is a possibility of disjuncture between a 
‘concept and what it expresses and between a sign and what it signifies.’1  
 
Like every concept, legal concepts exceed their particular instantiations and 
definitions. Legal ‘rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized, they 
are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose.’2 They are replete with 
discursive dynamisms, points of tension, and incongruities that instigate refusals 
and opens up lines of flight for creative resistance. It was Nietzsche who 
captured, rather powerfully, this excess, this infinite character of a text, when 
he said, ‘all concepts that semiotically subsume entire processes defy definition. 
Only that which has no history can be defined.’3 However concealing and 
domineering law’s languages, discourses and deliberative frameworks, the gate-
keeper cannot eliminate their underlying discursive openness and indeterminacy 
without risking the secret of its own remarkable resilience. By attending to 
points of tension that cannot be represented within law’s economy of 
representation, a performative epistemology enables innovative rethinking and 
rechanneling of these representations. By recognizing the exclusionary logic by 
which legal language and discourse operates, acknowledging the innovative and 
generative functions of modern power, this approach activates performative 
resistance.  
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Performative Resistance  
 
Performative resistance is a reflexive enterprise best suited to overcoming law’s 
violent gestures of installing domination as necessary and inevitable. As a 
concept that functions across discourses central to law’s technologies of truth 
generation, performativity allows us to appreciate ‘the meaning and value-
producing practices in language’ and ‘the relationship between utterances and 
their referents.’4 Understanding the particular form that these relations take 
within specific circuits of power-knowledge regime allows us to frame generative 
resistance sovereignty cannot ignore. It can serve as a starting point for a 
creative thinking that enables re-description and intervention. 
 
It was the poet Paul Valery who ingeniously claimed that ‘the secret of well 
founded thinking is based on suspicion towards language.’5 This is precisely the 
kind of sensitivity that performative knowledge brings to bear on performances 
of resistance. It recognizes that power pervades all aspects of life, including the 
position of the resistant subject, but calls for an acknowledgement of the 
contingent character of resistance itself. It tells us language’s world creating 
potential, its power to impose closure and limit our mode of being and thinking; 
forcing us to frame our refusals with the vocabulary of the system often without 
the possibility of break. If we are sensitive to the performative dimensions of 
legal language and discourses, we will recognize the ways in which ‘conventional 
linguistic practices’ like deliberation, debate, and the communicative offer of 
the trial entrench an exclusionary mode of interaction ‘defined by the very 
interactions it excludes.’6 
 
Though performative resistance is not always elaborate and does not necessarily 
confront ‘the public transcript’7 openly, performative resistance in law is a 
public repudiation of the constitutive and regulative conditions of the present. 
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Performative legal resistance is a public transgression and reworking of the 
juridical regimes that constitute and regulate sovereignty, the subject, and the 
politics of the present. It is a struggle by the subject to reopen political closures 
imposed on these formations through grand historical narratives, language and 
discourse. While it does not claim to speak from a position of exteriority to 
these constitutive regimes, it calls for a more nuanced awareness of the 
functions, strategies, and goals of these power regimes. 
 
From Nelson Mandela’s spectacular performance of equality, inclusion and 
democracy before Apartheid courts to Marwan Barghouti’s historicization of 
occupation and resistance and to Bobby Seale’s transformation of the legal 
register into an archive liberationist counter-history, we bear witness to an art 
of transgression, a refusal to be governed. They were elaborate events that 
marked a moment of profound rupture in the order of sovereignty, the sudden 
appearance of a violent past and the submerged crisis all across the normative 
structures of the system. This, in itself, is a generative appearance. Its 
emancipatory potential lies in the simple fact of disclosure of that which was 
concealed out of view and made inaccessible to the subject; in the proclamation 
of that which is not permitted to be proclaimed in public.  
 
These aporetic moments are melancholic and haunting. What remains of these 
moments, what survives of the disclosures and the proclamations they make, 
what escapes and surprises the system, touches us across time and space even 
long after the substance of the case has evaporated. Who knew what effects the 
trial of Socrates and Jesus of Nazareth would have had on the present?  Who 
would have thought that the trial of Nelson Mandela would change South Africa? 
Who expected that the Rivonia Trial will be registered in ‘UNESCO’s Memory of 
World Register’ and recalled in the trial of Marwan Barghouti, himself a leader 
of his people from a brutal colonial occupation, as a vindication of Palestinian 
acts of resistance? It is these remains, the remnants that events leave behind 
that escape their original instantiation and may be redeployed as a weapon of 
struggle, in new ways, in a radically different context, for an entirely different 
purpose. It is this legacy, what Butler calls a ‘condensed historicity,’ that 
exceeds itself in time and space, this touching image that impinges something on 
us and remains with us that performative resistance leaves behind. It is to that 
261 
 
  Chapter 9: Summing Up 
which we are left with when everything ends that performative resistance 
addresses itself, that to which we respond, a kind of gesture that stands for 
something bigger than itself in the world. The performative subject, like the 
new intellectual Foucault dreamed of, is a subject that is onto something but 
doesn’t quite comprehend what he is about: ‘doesn’t know exactly where he is 
heading nor what he’ll think tomorrow because he is too attentive to the 
present.’8 He produces strategic knowledge of power, and effects of truth that 
will be deployed at some future time, in unexpected spaces, and forms that 
cannot be foreseen.  
 
Performative resistance is not about normative distinctions. It does not seek to 
anchor itself in new orthodoxies; it does not aspire at uncovering an original 
foundation from which the subject is violently deprived. It is a plea for open-
endedness, a meditation against the normative closure of sovereignty, the 
subject and the political. Its transformative energy lies not in suggesting a 
normative anchor, but in reopening closures and revealing law’s logic of closure 
and self-reference, in disclosing new ways of being and perceiving the universe. 
Through gradual processes of transgression, it seeks to enter the social domain 
as a trace, what Derrida calls reminders, or what Agamben calls remnants, 
filtering a counter-hegemonic knowledge of the present, which, by its very 
formulation and circulation in the body-politic, resists, as epistemic resistance. 
It not only provides epistemic resources for those deprived of the means of 
understanding and articulating their grievances, but also transforms the 
subject’s agency, and instigates other forms of direct political actions. In short, 
if one can speak of the justice of performative resistance, it is the 
materialization of conditions of possibility, a possibility of becoming, becoming 
something other than what one or something is.   
 
But performative resistance does not stop at revealing what is wrong with the 
present. Going beyond refusals, transgressions, contestations, and self-
creations, performative resistance perceives a better world the specific outline 
of which cannot be fully anticipated and determined. While it is not a normative 
enterprise, it brings normativity to its performative resistance through the 
                                         
8
 Michel Foucault, ‘The End of the Monarchy of Sex,’ in Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, 
Sylvere Rotringer, eds. (New York: Semiotext(e), 1996), 55. 
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exercise of some kind of ethical responsibility towards the other; promising the 
potential universalizability of its enactments. This might sound counter-intuitive 
but even the foremost thinker of necessity, a priori truths, and the purity of 
reason, Kant, admits the foundational role of social fictions, causality, and 
empirical intelligibility. In ‘Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,’ Kant 
writes, ‘Even the appearance of the good in others must have value for us, 
because in the long run something serious can come from such a play.’9   
 
The thesis identified the trial as its primary sight of engagement not just 
because the trial is law’s foremost institution, but also because it is the most 
privileged and perhaps easily accessible site of struggle in law. It is in the 
courtroom that public authority eliminates its adversaries and constructs 
legitimacy in the name of arbitrating conflicts in the realm of reason. As a 
performative power-knowledge formation, the political trial creates the 
conditions of possibility for a performative resistance. Against the legal order 
that regards its mode of being and acting as inevitable and normative, the 
resistant subject in a political trial mobilizes this strategic knowledge of law, 
i.e., a performative epistemology of law, to rework the very norms and practices 
by which he is constituted and regulated. Indeed, nowhere else is the synthesis 
between power and knowledge so manifest than in the courtroom. By identifying 
the political trial as a specific juridico-political event that interrupts law’s claim 
to normativity and universality, I reinforced my general claim that the normative 
in law is merely a placeholder for the performative. All the three chapters 
presented what I called a performative-genealogical reading of three separate 
political trials.  
 
In chapter six, I tried to show how the resort to the judicial apparatus instigates 
a destabilizing attack against the system. Locating himself within, but breaking 
suddenly from the system’s normative expectations, Nelson Mandela opens up 
space for a ‘micro-politics of resistance’ – one capable of sustaining a 
genealogical and performative engagement with the juridical order. To keep the 
space open, Mandela begins his contestations with an internal critique, from 
forms of critique that are possible within the terms and frameworks of the 
                                         
9
 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tran. Victor Lyle Dowdell, (Southern 
Illinois University Press: Carbondale, 1978), 39.  
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system, to maximize the responsive capabilities of the space. In so doing, he 
creates a condition of possibility for disruption and transformation; to reveal the 
biopolitical nature of the violence produced and conserved by the juridical 
edifice. By articulating specific and local instances of violence, exclusion, and 
injustice, Mandela bears witness to the rotten past of the law as a precondition 
for a radically egalitarian conception of legality and authority. Mandela the 
defendant both uses and critiques the law, resists and claims authority, 
prosecutes and indicts at the very site he is called upon to answer serious 
charges. By acting in a confining bureaucratic space with a veneer of neutrality 
and impartiality, where the very notion of resistance is discursively precluded, 
he intervenes to assert the right to politics, to create a new reality, a utopian 
world in which a different normative/epistemic standard is possible. He 
institutes a radically different way of perceiving and naming the world. He 
imagined a different world; a world of political action where what seems 
impossible within the existing political universe is conceivable. Knowing that this 
new world can come into effect only after action, not before, Mandela chose to 
act as he did, we may say he spoke ‘truth to power’ and lived to see the 
actualization of his utopian performance. 
 
Chapter seven examined the performativity of the discourse of resistance and 
terrorism by Barghouti and Israel respectively. Subverting Israel’s established 
practice of using political trials for broader politico-historical projects, 
Barghouti registered several surprises that the system could not absorb. In the 
despair and anguish that moved him from a pacifist to a militant, Barghouti 
enacts a freedom fighter and other exemplary figures who dared to ‘speak truth 
to power.’ Barghouti in Tel Aviv is a clear contrast to Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
Barghouti, like those before him—Socrates whose only sin was encouraging 
critical thinking, Susan Anthony whose only crime was daring to vote as a 
women, Martin Luther King for defying a racist law in Birmingham, Alabama, and 
Mandela, for violently resisting a racist and violent order—is making a special 
claim that modifies and clarifies his relationship to Israeli occupation. In this 
resistance, in this protest against continued occupation, there is a claim to a 
right that is beyond specific determinate legal realm. In his act of self-
definition, he resists the construction of his identity as a ‘terrorist’ and re-
creates himself as a defiant and resistant subject that transcends the confines of 
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his construction. In this ‘double-movement’ of ‘invocation and critical 
reflection,’ there is a performative logic appropriate to a discourse at once 
repressive and productive. Comparing Barghouti with the Biblical Moses and the 
State of Israel with the Pharaoh is another disruptive move aimed at subverting 
the images and concepts Israel seeks to solidify.  He argued that the issue is not 
merely what Israel counts as ‘terrorism’; there is something profoundly unjust 
taking place behind the guise of the performative label of terrorism.  
 
In chapter eight, I analysed certain scenes from the trial of Bobby Seale during 
the Chicago Eight Conspiracy trial. Seale’s unrelenting insistence on the 
recognition of his constitutional right is a productive tactical move. The 
language of rights is here relied upon as a counter-discourse to open up space 
for politically productive interventions. Rejecting the judge’s qualification of 
the defendant’s right, Seale refuses his continued interpellation as a 
‘defendant.’ In transforming this opportunity into a political event, Seale locates 
himself not outside the legal framework but within, and invokes the very 
constitution he denounces. Although he speaks of rights, he is not claiming the 
right tied to sovereignty and takes the juridical as its point of departure. Seale is 
performatively calling into being a right emancipated from the constraints of 
Judge Hoffman’s validation, but a right that shatters the confining constraints of 
juridical rules, a ‘right that survives the vicissitudes of time.’ His goal is not to 
project the ‘uneclipsed glory of the sovereign’ but to enumerate and protest the 
subjugations and exclusive inclusions of the last four centuries that secured the 
inequality of blacks.10  
 
By amplifying the double wrong to which he is subject, a wrong that cannot be 
redressed within the present distribution of speaking positions, Seale recounts 
the polymorphous techniques of domination implemented by the field of the 
judiciary and the discourse of rights. By identifying the courtroom as a site at 
which the law establishes itself, authenticates oppressive rationalities, and 
produces effects of power, a ritual moment that historicizes and neutralizes the 
violence of exclusion and inequality, he exposes the American justice system—
including the constitution—as strategic deployments that functions to conceal 
the silent war that rages just beneath the surface of democracy.  
                                         
10
 Id at 71. 
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In the end, this is a genealogical critique of law and sovereignty and must be 
read as such. As a conceptual apparatus, genealogical critique does not consist 
in the destruction or abolition of its object. My attempt here is not to condemn 
law and sovereignty but to apprehend the constitutive and regulative conditions 
of my scenes of analysis – law, sovereignty, subjectivity and the political trial. 
My purpose was not to provide a theory of law and resistance but to offer an 
alternative conception of law that mitigates the closures and self-evidences of 
the present. Towards that end, I suggested a performative epistemology of law 
that keeps sovereignty, politics, and the subject reflexive and open to 
‘unprefigurable future resignifications.’ By locating law and legal institutions 
within an entangled web of power relations, neither its sources nor its origins, a 
performative epistemology attends to circuits of power within which knowledge 
informs power and discourse. 
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